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Summary 
The guarantee of a fair trial is fundamental to the criminal process of every modern 
society. Like all civilised nations, Botswana’s legal order provides for the protection of 
accused persons through the guarantee of a fair trial. But equality of arms, a central 
feature of medieval trial by combat, seems to have disappeared from modern criminal 
procedural systems. The question arises, therefore, whether criminal justice systems 
sufficiently cater for the fair trial of accused persons. This thesis will argue that the 
present legal and institutional framework for the protection of fair trial rights in Botswana 
falls short of guaranteeing procedural equality and that this severely compromises 
fairness. The institutional framework does not support equality of arms and therefore 
leaves procedural rights in a basic state of application. The thesis, therefore, seeks to 
analyse the protection of fair trial rights in Botswana in light of the principle of equality 
of arms. 
 
The thesis explores the origins and theoretical foundations of the principle. It recognises 
that the present application of the principle occurs by implicit countenance. The absence 
of any constitutional recognition of the principle leaves procedural rights in a basic state 
of application. The thesis discusses the practical implications of an express recognition 
and constitutional application of the principle in the adversarial system.  
 
Equality of arms should be central in the criminal process and no party should have an 
unfair advantage over the other. The thesis recognises that the prosecution is in a position 
of advantage in that it has the support of the state. This advantage manifests itself in the 
form of vast resources regarding expertise, investigatory powers and legislative powers. 
Disparities in resources, the ability to investigate and access to witnesses create an 
inequality of arms between the state and the accused. This can only be balanced and 
countered by empowering the accused with constitutional and procedural rights that 
specifically protect the accused in the face of the might of the state. These procedural 
rights include the presumption of innocence, the right to legal representation and the right 
to disclosure. It is argued, however, that though accused-based rights and constitutional 
rules of procedure generally protect the accused and ensure that the process is fair, they 
mainly remain theoretical declarations if they are not applied in line with equality of 
arms. In other words, the meaningful enjoyment of these rights by the accused, demands 
the strengthening of resources and legislative and institutional governance. Fairness in 
criminal trials is epitomised in the balance between the overwhelming resources of the 
state and the constitutional protection of the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional 
protection afforded to the accused is compromised. 
 
The first part engages the reader with the development of accused-based rights and 
introduces the constitutionalisation of procedural rights in Botswana. It discusses the 
scope and application of the principle of equality of arms, develops its relevance to the 
adversarial system and justifies an application of the principle in Botswana domestic law. 
It makes a comparison between the adversarial and inquisitorial models while 
recognising the growing tendency towards convergence. It highlights the adversarial 
system as interest-based, and recognises the indispensability of the principle of equality 
of arms to such a system. While recognising that inquisitorial procedures often offend 
equality of arms, the role of the inquisitorial system in ensuring equality of arms is also 
recognised. It measures and analyses the normative value, application and recognition of 
equality of arms in Botswana’s legal system, arguing for express recognition and a 
conceptual application of the principle by the courts. It is reasoned that express 
recognition of the principle will result in fuller protection and better realisation of 
accused-based rights. Exploring the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy, it recognises the 
need for convergence, but emphasises the principle of equality of arms and the right to 
adversarial proceedings as the foundation for fair trials.  
 
The second part analyses the investigation process and generally bemoans the great 
inequalities at this stage of the criminal process. It discusses procedural and evidential 
rules that serve to minimise the imbalances and the role that exclusionary rules play in 
ensuring fair trials and reliable verdicts. 
 
The third part identifies specific trial rights which are relevant to the principle of equality 
of arms. Central to the discussion are the right to legal representation and the 
presumption of innocence which are discussed in chapters 7 and 8 respectively. These 
two important rights are central to the protection of the accused but unfortunately are the 
most compromised due to lack of resources and legislative intervention. Chapter 9 deals 
with other rights that are relevant to the principle as well as the ability of the accused to 
present his case and effectively defend himself. It emphasises the need for the courts to 
engage in the trial, thereby enabling the unrepresented accused. 
 
The fourth part contains final conclusions which argue that the principle of equality of 
arms forms the basis for the full realisation of individual procedural rights and advocates 
for the recognition of the principle in the Botswana legal order. It is concluded that the 
constitutional enshrinement of fair trial rights and their basic application by the courts, 
without actual measures to ensure their realisation, are insufficient. Suggestions include 
legislative and institutional reforms, as well as a constitutional recognition of the 
principle of equality of arms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Opsomming 
 
Die waarborg van ‘n billike verhoor is fundamenteel tot die strafprosesregstelsel van elke 
beskaafde gemeenskap. Soos in ander beskaafde lande, word die beskuldige in Botswana 
ook beskerm deur die reg op ‘n billike verhoor. 
 
In die Middeleeue was gelykheid van wapens (“equality of arms”) die sentrale kenmerk 
van die tweegeveg as geskilberegtigingsmetode. Dit blyk egter dat hierdie sentrale 
kenmerk afwesig is in moderne strafprosesregstelsels is. Die vraag ontstaan of hierdie 
toedrag van sake ‘n beskuldige se reg op ‘n billike verhoor op risiko plaas. In hierdie tesis 
word betoog dat die posisie in Botswana van so ‘n aard is dat “ongelyke bewapening” 
veroorsaak dat die reg op ‘n billike verhoor belemmer word. Die plaaslike institusionele 
bedeling onderskraag nie die beskerming van gelykheid van wapens nie en veroorsaak 
derhalwe dat prosessuele regte in “a basic state of application” is, met ander woorde, op 
‘n eenvoudige en meganiese toepassingvlak is. Met die norm van gelyke bewapening as 
vertrekpunt, ondersoek hierdie tesis die beskerming van die reg op ‘n billike verhoor in 
Botswana. 
 
‘n Ondersoek word geloods na die oorsprong en toereriese basis van die beginsel van 
gelyke bewapening. Die afwesigheid van uitdrukklike grondwetlike erkenning van die 
beginsel, word vergelyk met die praktiese implikasies en uitdruklike grondwetlike 
erkenning en toepassing in ‘n adversatiewe stelsel. 
 
Gelykheid van wapens behoort sentraal tot die strafproses te wees en geen party behoor 
‘n onbillike voordeel bo die ander te geniet nie. In hierdie tesis word erken dat die 
vervolging bloot vanweë die feit dat dit deur die staatsmasjienerie ondersteun word, 
wesenlik bevoordeel word bo die individu as aangeklaagde. Dit gaan hier om toegang tot 
hulpbronne soos deskundigheid, asook die rol wat misdaadondersoekmagte en ander 
wetgewing speel. Ongelykhede byvoorbeeld in hulpbronne, in die vermoë om misdaad te 
ondersoek en in die toegang tot getuies, dra alles daartoe by dat ‘n wanbalans tussen die 
staat en die individu ontstaan. Die verlening van prosessuele regte aan die beskuldigde is 
‘n metode om die balans te probeer herstel. Voorbeelde van sulke regte is die reg om 
onskuldig vermoed te wees, die reg op ‘n regsverteenwoordiger en die reg op insae in 
verklarings. In hierdie tesis word egter betoog dat alhoewel hierdie regte en ander 
grondwetlike strafprosedures die beskuldigde kan beskerm en die billikheid van die 
proses kan bevorder, dit absoluut noodsaaklik is dat voormelde regte en prosedures in lyn 
met die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens geïnterpreteer en toegepas moet word. 
Betekenisvolle afdwinging en toepassing van ‘n beskuldigde se regte verg versterking 
van bronne en die institusionele bedeling. Billikheid in die strafverhoor word gekenmerk 
aan die graad van balans wat bereik kan word tussen die oorvloedige hulpbronne van die 
staat teenoor die grondwetlike beskerming van die beskuldigde. In die afwesigheid van ‘n 
balans, word die beskuldigde benadeel. 
 
Die eerste gedeelte van hierdie tesis behandel die ontwikkeling van die beskuldigde se 
regte en bevat ‘n inleiding tot die konstitusionalisering van prossuele regte in Botswana. 
In Deel Een word die omvang en toepassing van die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens 
bespreek en word die relevantheid van hierdie beginsel in die adversatiewe proses 
identifiseer, veral wat Botswana betref. Die adversatiewe en inkwisitoriese modelle word 
vergelyk en bespreek met erkenning aan die moderne neiging dat die twee modelle besig 
is om in een te vloei – die sogenaamde verskynsel van “convergence”. Daar word 
aangetoon dat gelykheid van wapens die adversatiewe model onderlê. Hierteenoor is dit 
so dat die inkwisitoriese model ook erkenning aan gelykheid van wapens verleen. Daar 
word betoog dat gelykheid van wapens ‘n normatiewe waarde het en uitdruklik in 
Botswana deur die howe erken moet word. Uitdruklike erkenning sal tot groter 
beskerming en realisering van ‘n beskuldigde se regte lei. In Deel Een word ook tot die 
slotsom geraak dat alhoewel daar ‘n behoefte aan “convergence” is, dit onvermydelik tog 
ook so is dat gelykheid van wapens en die reg op ‘n adversatiewe proses die grondslag 
van ‘n billike verhoor vorm.  
 
In Deel Twee word die misdaadondersoekproses ontleed en word die grootskaalse 
ongelykhede wat hier onstaan en bestaan, bespreek. Daar word gelet op prosesregtelike 
en bewysregtelike reëls wat hierdie ongelykhede kan minimaliseer. Die rol van 
uitsluitingsreëls ter bevordering van ‘n billike verhoor en ‘n betroubare bevinding, word 
ook aangespreek.  
 
Deel Drie identifiseer spesifieke verhoorregte wat in ‘n besondere direkte verband met 
die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens staan. Hier is veral twee regte van besondere 
belang: die reg op ‘n regsverteenwoordiger (hoofstuk 7) en die reg om onskukdig 
vermoed te wees (hoofstuk 8). Ongelukkig is dit so dat hierdie twee regte erg ondermyn 
word. Die reg op resverteenwoordiging word ingekort deur ‘n gebrek aan finansiële 
bronne terwyl die vermoede van onskuld deur wetgewing ondergrawe word. In hoofstuk 
9 word ander relevante regte bespreek en word die noodsaak van ‘n aktiewe hof in die 
geval van ‘n onverteenwoordigde beskuldigde bepleit 
 
Deel Vier bevat finale gevolgtrekkings. Daar word betoog dat die beginsel van gelykheid 
van wapens die basis vorm in die volle relisering van individuele regte en, verder, dat 
hierdie beginsel ten volle in die regstelsel van Botswana erken behoort te word. Blote 
grondwetlike verskansing van die grondwetlike reg op ‘n billike verhoor en ‘n blote 
basiese interpretasie daarvan deur die howe, is onvoldoende wanneer daar geen maatreels 
is om die haalbare realisering af te dwing nie. Wetgewende en institusionele hervorming 
is nodig, asook ‘n grondwetlike erkenning van die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens. 
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PART 1 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF FAIR TRIAL 
RIGHTS, EQUALITY OF ARMS, AND THE 
RELEVANCE OF THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
CHAPTER 1 
THE EVOLUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF FAIR TRIAL 
RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA 
1 1 Introduction 
There is no gainsaying that one of the purposes of the criminal justice system is to 
punish offenders. When the guilty is punished and the innocent set free, justice is said 
to have been done. But even where the guilty is punished and the sentence is 
proportional to the crime, procedural justice is not complete without the notion of 
fairness.1 Therefore, the underlying value of fairness in the criminal process is not 
only the discovery of the truth, but the assurance that the process is characterised by 
enabling factors that fully recognise the rights of the accused. The assurance of 
fairness is strengthened by the constitutionalisation of procedural rights which 
prescribes set procedural steps and guarantees the accused an opportunity to defend 
himself and present his case without substantial disadvantage in comparison to the 
prosecution.  
 
In Botswana the basic instrument that guarantees fair trial rights is found in the 
Constitution.2 Section 10 of the Constitution provides a statement of declaration for 
the protection of the accused and a guarantee for fair trials. The various rights 
contained in section 10 serve not only to protect the rights of the accused but can also 
be seen as fulfilling the principle of equality of arms between the prosecution and the 
accused. This is achieved by the entrenchment of certain rights which are vital to the 
                                                 
1
 Wasek-Wiaderek The Principle of “Equality of Arms” in Criminal Procedure under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its Functions in Criminal Justice of Selected European 
Countries (2000) 9. 
2
 1966 Constitution of Botswana Cap 1. 
 3 
presentation of the case of the accused. The constitutions of most nations have similar 
provisions which gained normative recognition and importance, consequent to the 
human rights revolution that followed the Second World War. Thus, the guarantee of 
fair trial rights has evolved and gained recognition, a far cry from ancient times when 
accused persons had little or no procedural rights.  
 
1 2 The evolution of accused-based rights 
1 2 1 Historical perspective 
What we today glorify as rights of the accused has undergone several stages of 
development. Three distinct periods in history can be discerned in this process. First is 
the period characterised by the absence of rights, and specific restrictions on the 
accused in the presentation of his defence. The second period, in or about the 18th 
century, represents changes and the introduction of new rules. It saw the removal of 
these restrictions and the development of rules of procedure that saw the accused 
being given a fair chance to defend himself. In the third period which commenced 
after the Second World War, these procedural rules gained fundamental entrenchment 
in legal systems and emerged into constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
 
The first historical period was precarious for an accused facing a criminal charge. 
Though there is evidence that Roman law encompassed procedural rules relating to 
the protection of the accused as early as 450BC,3 these rules seemed to have faded by 
medieval times, a period when the inquisition flourished. The inquisition furthered a 
                                                 
3
 Roman legal system gave the accused the opportunity to confront his accuser and to make his 
defence. See O’Brian “The Right of Cross Examination: U.S. and European Perspectives” 2005 Law 
Quarterly Review 481 499. 
 4 
single cause, the condemnation of the accused. Rules of procedure were determined 
by authorities of the state. Naturally, this led to a one-sided system whereby the rules 
of criminal procedure were fashioned to suit the interests of the state. This system 
represented a uni-ruled or uneven period where the accused was the primary source of 
proof. Proof was effectively a one-sided affair.4 This period was characterised by 
primitive tools of oppression that flourished in the absolutism of medieval times. In 
medieval times there existed no rules to protect the accused. Whatever rules existed 
where geared towards condemning him. He was presumed guilty and had to establish 
his innocence. He could be interrogated without being informed about the charge or 
who his accuser was. He also could not challenge his accuser. The accused could not 
give evidence or call witnesses. Therefore, the prosecution had an unfair advantage in 
what was a one-sided contest.5 Rather than a critical assessment on the merits, early 
jurisprudence was devoted to determining which of the parties should have the duty of 
proving the truth of the claim or defence.6 
 
By the 18th to 19th century the second period had started. This period saw rules geared 
towards protecting the accused and giving him an opportunity to defend himself. In an 
adversarial sense it could be said that rules regulated the contest between the 
                                                 
4
 “I have emphasised in this chapter that securing the accused as an informational resource was the 
central preoccupation of the early modern criminal trial…English criminal courts were determined to 
hear the accused speak in person and unaided at oral public trial about the charges and the evidence 
adduced against him”: Langbein The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (2005) 61-62; Nugent “Self-
Incrimination in Perspective” 1999 South African Law Journal 501 504. 
5
 Nugent 1999 South African Law Journal 510. 
6
 Nugent 1999 South African Law Journal 504; Silving “The Oath: I” 1959 Yale Law Journal 1329 
1362-1363. 
 5 
contestants. There were now competing rules, some favouring the state and enabling it 
to investigate, prosecute and curb crime, and others ensuring that the accused was not 
unfairly disadvantaged and giving him a fair chance to defend himself. The rules 
spread gradually to a state of evenness. But because of the might of the state and its 
agencies, these rules could be flouted. In fact, it would be easy to flout a procedural 
rule. This is so because unlike substantive rights, its flouting had no penal 
consequences. Most often, the flouting would be by the state or judicial officers. As a 
result, no legal consequences would occur. The only consequence would occur where 
a judicial officer misdirected himself as a result of which his decision was overturned 
on appeal. 
 
The third period is characterised by the solidification of accused-based rights and the 
galvanising of rules that act in favour of the accused against the might of the state. 
This period is represented by the human rights revolution that followed the Second 
World War. It saw procedural rules maturing and assuming a new status. This new 
status was attained by recasting the rules in a constitutional framework. With their 
recognition as fundamental rights, they attained a new legal status. They came to be 
codified in several instruments, thereby emphasising their significance and 
guaranteeing their application. This meant that a person could now go to court with 
the knowledge that these set of rules that protect him would not be overlooked. They 
were now conceptualised as rights, an infringement of which will render a trial unfair. 
Hence the birth of constitutional proceduralism, the measuring of the criminal process 
within the regime of fundamental constitutionalised rights.  
 
 
 6 
1 2 2 Constitutional proceduralism – A new system of procedural rules  
It is doubtful whether the development of rules of procedure that protect the interest 
of the accused would have flourished in the absence of an institutionalised and viable 
system. The ultimate solidification of such rules therefore lies in their 
constitutionalisation. Constitutional proceduralism relates to the emergence of rules of 
procedure and their constitutionalisation. Constitutionalisation translates rules of 
procedure from a vegetative dormant state to a viable institution of effective 
protection. These rules have become constitutionalised through two processes. First, 
they have become so widely used and are so fundamental for the credible function of 
the criminal process that they are recognised as essential elements of a fair trial. They 
are universally accepted rules, recognised by all civilised legal systems. Thus, there is 
a whole corpus of laws both international and domestic that relate to the protection of 
rights, that they can now be referred to as a universal charter of procedural rights. 
Similar basic rules apply in most legal systems even though they may vary in 
application, scope and content. These basic rules even form part of the legal tradition 
of countries with no codified Bills of Rights.7  Second, the human rights revolution 
following the Second World War resulted in the deliberate constitutionalisation of 
substantive and procedural rights.8 This saw the constitutionalisation of procedural 
rights in major human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                 
7
 Some British officials insist that England already had a tradition of respecting fair trial rights even 
prior to the Human Rights Act. As the Lord Chancellor writes in the preface to Blackstone’s Human 
Rights Digest “…It is important to emphasise that most of our laws were already compliant; that this 
country has as great a respect for human rights as any of our neighbours”: Starmer & Byrne (eds) 
Blackstone’s Human Rights Digest (2001).  
8
 Hiebert “Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?” 2006 Modern Law Review 7. 
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Rights (UDHR)9 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).10 
The codification of procedural rights is a mark of their indispensable role to the 
operation of a just and fair criminal justice system. Procedural constitutional rules 
have evolved into a comprehensive and consistent system. In the domestic context, 
they appear in the forms of Bills of Rights. 
 
Constitutional proceduralism involves the recognition of a set of rules as fundamental 
rights rather than formal procedural steps. Criminal procedure increasingly derives its 
legitimacy from constitutional foundations. Rules of procedure and their articulation, 
loose their legitimacy if they do not support the requirements of a fair trial. 
Constitutional proceduralism marks a system whereby rules of procedure are 
increasingly tested against constitutions to measure their fairness or validity. As a 
result, procedural fairness is measurable on the basis of constitutional values. In the 
result, a new system is discernible wherein rules of criminal procedure are given 
constitutional alignment. Procedure creates rules which have emerged into 
constitutional norms that are immutable. They are only circumventible in the interest 
of public order and when justice and the rights of the accused are not compromised.11  
 
                                                 
9
 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, 
Available on http://www.hrcr.org/docs/index.html. 
10
 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976. 
11
 Kokott states in The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law (1998) 
13 that individual rights embodied in constitutional and international conventions reflect societal 
objectives. Accordingly the full enforcement of individual rights is not responsive only to the rights of 
the individual but the interests of the state. 
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1 3 The Bill of Rights under the Botswana Constitution 
1 3 1 Guaranteed rights 
At independence, Botswana was endowed with a written constitution. Like most 
written constitutions it contained a written and justiciable Bill of Rights. Though 
Britain, her colonial master, rejected the notion of written Bills of Rights until 
recently, she bestowed them on most of her former colonies.12 The Botswana Bill of 
Rights is crafted on the neo-Nigerian style which is itself founded on the UDHR and 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention).13 The Bill of Rights in the Botswana Constitution, inter alia, 
contains express provisions relating to the protection of life, liberty, security of the 
person and the protection of the law, freedom of conscience, expression, assembly 
and association, and protection of privacy of home and property.14 Though their 
protection is of paramount consideration, these rights are not absolute. However, 
limitation of rights should find justification in the Constitution in order to maintain 
their legitimacy.15  
 
                                                 
12
 The independence constitutions of all former British colonies in Africa except Ghana and Tanzania 
had Bills of Rights. 
13
 Fombad The Protection of Human Rights in Botswana: An Overview of the Regulatory Framework 
in Fombad (ed) Essays on the Law of Botswana (2007) 1 6; Van Blerk “The Botswana Court of 
Appeal: A Policy of Avoidance?” 1985 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
385 386; 213 U.N.T.S. 222 entered into force on 3 September 1953. 
14
 S 3-15. 
15
 Maripe “Freezing the Press: Freedom of Expression and Statutory Limitations in Botswana” 2003 
African Human Rights Law Journal 52 55. 
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There is a marked absence of so-called second and third generation rights in the 
Constitution. They do not even feature as non-justiciable principles of state policy.16 
The South African Bill of Rights contains provisions relating to social, economic and 
cultural rights and the constitutions of a number of African countries17 have adopted 
these rights as non-justiciable principles of state policy, an indication that they 
recognise the importance of these rights. However, they cannot adopt them as binding 
legal obligations on the state due to very limited state resources. The recognition of 
social, economic and cultural rights in the South African context was necessitated by 
the fact that mass poverty and unemployment was imposed on the people as a 
deliberate policy of the erstwhile political system. The provision for civil and political 
rights therefore would have been meaningless in the absence of social, economic and 
cultural rights.  
 
The absence of second and third generation rights in the Constitution of Botswana is 
not surprising. The independence constitutions of African states did not contain such 
concepts since they were the products of Western hegemony. Western legal and 
political philosophy does not embrace the need to express social, economic and 
cultural questions as rights. In any case, during the independence era those rights were 
                                                 
16
 However the government maintains a massive social and welfare programme including free (recently 
subsidised) education, medication, old age pension, feeding programmes for destitutes and orphans, 
drought relief for farmers, citizen entrepreneurial development programmes etc. 
17
 Example, chapter 5 of the Constitution of Ghana  PNDCL 282, 1992 (see also The Constitution of 
the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Act 527 of 1996) and chapter 2 of the Constitution of Sierra 
Leone Act No 6 of 1991. These rights also form an integral part of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986; 21 International Legal 
Documents 58 (1982). See Arts 15, 16, 22 & 24. 
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not fully articulated, at least not in the African hemisphere when the prevailing 
ideology was centred on self-determination, a concept closely linked with civil and 
political rights. 
 
Botswana’s independence Constitution remained basically intact since she has 
maintained a stable political atmosphere. Most African constitutions that refer to 
second and third generation rights have gone through political journeys of upheavals, 
experimentation with one party systems or socialist style governments and an 
eventual return to multi-party democracy which saw the scrapping of their 
independence constitutions and the empanelling of new ones. This gave these 
countries the opportunity to rethink their philosophy on human rights and remake 
their constitutions accordingly. By then the concept of social, economic and cultural 
rights had taken hold in African states. Also, Botswana shunned the socialist style 
political system – the root of second and third generation rights – for political, 
strategic and economic reasons.18 It must be noted however that there is an elaborate 
legislative structure relating to the protection of employees, while access to social 
services are largely made available by the state. 
 
1 3 2 Determination of rights 
The High Court has original jurisdiction to determine complaints of violation, or 
impending violation, of the Bill of Rights.19 The final determination of constitutional 
                                                 
18
 While giving sanctuary to several members of the African National Congress (ANC), being 
landlocked, with the closest seaports being in South Africa and South African controlled Namibia 
(formerly South West Africa), Botswana’s leadership rejected radical Pan-Africanism as a means of 
appeasing apartheid South Africa, the economic lifeline of the country. 
19
 S 18 of the Constitution; Fombad The Protection of Human Rights 17. 
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matters lies with the Court of Appeal which is the highest court of the land. In some 
countries, authority for determining constitutional violations is vested in special 
tribunals.20 In neighbouring South Africa, the need for a constitutional court was 
precipitated by the realisation that at the time of the transition, many judges hailed 
from conservative backgrounds and their legal expertise and experience was more or 
less aligned to commercial and contract law rather than constitutional law. It was 
thought therefore that they were ill-equipped to implement the provisions of a new 
constitution and its human rights provisions.21 Because of the centrality of human 
rights in criminal proceedings, the Constitution of Botswana provides for interruption 
of criminal proceedings in magistrates’ courts in the event that questions relating to a 
contravention of the Bill of Rights arise. In such event, the presiding magistrate may 
stay the proceedings and refer the constitutional matter to the High Court for 
determination.22 In essence, it can be said that the High Court has original jurisdiction 
to determine constitutional questions. 
 
1 3 3 Limitation of rights 
Fundamental rights, though entrenched in the Constitution, are potentially of limited 
application. The provisions relating to the protection of specific rights are lacking in 
broadness in that the declaration of each right is followed by a cumbersome list 
expressly legitimising situations, the application of which will not violate these 
declared rights. This may have the effect of leaving the courts with little room to 
                                                 
20
 For example, South Africa, France, Austria, Turkey, Spain, Italy and Germany have constitutional 
courts. 
21
 Steenkamp “The South African Constitution of 1993 and the Bill of Rights: An Evaluation in Light 
of International Human Rights Norms” 1995 Human Rights Quarterly 101 121. 
22
 S 18(3) of the Constitution. 
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gravitate towards the advancement of rights. These situations under which rights 
suffer potential abridgement can be categorised into four situations.  
 
First, they can be abridged in circumstances where the law makes provision that is 
reasonably justified in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality or public health.23 This general omnibus exception is common to modern 
constitutions. This provision is rooted in utilitarianism and relates to the protection of 
the community at large. It is primarily intended to protect the safety of the state as an 
entity as well as its people. In terms of the above-mentioned situations, the 
abridgement should be specified by law. This section potentially permits the 
abridgement of a constitutional right by legislation.24 The abridgment of constitutional 
rights by legislation can create serious anxiety unless the courts subject the validity of 
such legislative provisions to rigorous tests. 
 
Second, some rights are subject to the rights and freedoms of other persons as 
individuals or as members of certain groups.25 In this way the right to freedom of 
expression may be abridged if it conflicts with the need to protect the reputation and 
private lives of other persons.26 Also, the right of freedom of conscience, (which is 
partly meant to protect the rights of persons to practise their religions without 
                                                 
23
 See S 13(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
24
 Matua “The African Human Rights System in A Comparative Perspective: The Need for Urgent 
Reformation” 1993 Legal Forum 31 32. 
25
 S 13(2)(b) of the Constitution.  
26
 S 12(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
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intervention from other religious groups), may be abridged where it conflicts with the 
interests of other persons to practise their religion.27  
 
Third, certain rights are circumscribed to ensure the validity of certain functions of 
state. The express protection of some rights under the Constitution automatically 
creates conflict with certain laws. Therefore while the Constitution creates rights, it 
also ensures that certain actions of state that are inconsistent with such rights are 
validated. These actions are of two kinds. In the first instance, there are some actions 
whose legitimacy the state specifically intends to retain. They are mainly penal in 
nature. While the Constitution specifically prohibits the intentional killing of another 
person, killing is legitimised if carried out in accordance with a sentence of a court in 
respect of which a person has been convicted under the law. Also, though section 7 
outlaws torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, the section provides that any law 
that authorises the use of any punishment that was lawful before the country attained 
independence will not be affected by the provision. This guarantees the use of and 
constitutionality of corporal punishment under the criminal justice system.28 In the 
second instance, there are some actions that are necessary for the effective 
administration of the state and the administration of justice. However, these actions 
potentially infringe on certain rights. It is imperative therefore that their legitimacy be 
affirmed as a matter of necessity. So while the privacy of home is guaranteed, the 
execution of civil debts would be impossible if this right was unlimited. Therefore the 
Constitution guarantees the entry into premises for the purposes of executing civil 
                                                 
27
 S 11(5)(b) of the Constitution. 
28
 S 25 Penal Code Cap 08:01. 
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judgments.29 Such guarantee also validates the entry into property by public officers 
in order to conduct inspections for taxation purposes, or to search on the issuance of a 
warrant. 
 
Fourth, where a state of public emergency is declared or when Botswana is at war.30 
The president is empowered to declare a state of public emergency under the 
Constitution. Individual rights may be severely curtailed under such circumstances. 
 
1 4 The right to a fair trial 
1 4 1 What amounts to a fair trial 
It is a fundamental and constitutional rule of law that every accused is entitled to a fair 
trial.31 The right to a fair trial consists of a number of component rights including but 
not limited to the right to a speedy hearing, legal representation, cross-examination, 
the presumption of innocence and pre-trial disclosure.32 To say that most of the 
component rights consisting of a fair trial foster equality and enables the accused to 
present his case is a truism. The principle of equality therefore becomes the core of 
                                                 
29
 S 9(2)(d) of the Constitution. 
30
 S 16 & 17 of the Constitution. 
31
 Clayton & Tomlinson The Law of Human Rights I (2000) 589; “In terms of section 10 of our 
Constitution a person accused of a criminal offence must receive a fair trial before an impartial court 
within a reasonable time.”: Nganunu CJ in Bosch v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 71 104E-F (CA); “It is a 
fundamental principle of our law and, indeed, of any civilised society that an accused person is entitled 
to a fair trial”: Milne JA in S v Tyebela 1989 (2) SA 22 (A) 29G; see also Dikgang v The State [1987] 
B.L.R. 352; Rabonko v The State [2006] 2 B.L.R. 166. 
32
 Clayton & Tomlinson Human Rights 589-590; Trechsel classifies fair trial rights into two 
components. A general one which applies to the general proceedings and specific rights involving the 
rights of the accused: Trechsel Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (2005) 85. 
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the structure of fairness and lies at the heart of the modern criminal process. Since the 
human rights revolution, constitutional rights (fair trial rights included) have become 
embedded in international human rights documents and are justiciable on the 
international and domestic plane.33 The right to a fair trial is absolute, subject only to 
limitations necessary for a legitimate purpose in a democratic society that does not 
compromise the fairness of the trial. The question whether a trial is fair depends on 
the conduct of the trial as a whole.34  
 
Article 6 of the European Convention identifies a number of fair trial rights. Ferguson 
notes that these rights “are subsumed by, and subordinated to, the one absolute right 
to a fair trial, so that all other rights can be infringed to the extent that the 
                                                 
33
 Jackson “The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence, 
Divergence or Realignment?” 2005 Modern Law Review 737 747; Cappelletti The Judicial Process in 
A Comparative Perspective (1984) 207. 
34
 Kraska v Switzerland (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 188 para 30. In Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 
E.H.R.R. 1016 the Court rejected the argument that article 6(1) of the European Convention was 
breached as the only evidence that led to the conviction of the accused was obtained by a secret 
listening device contrary to article 8(1). The Court noted that the domestic courts had considered 
whether the admission of the evidence created substantial unfairness. However, the Court has also held 
that a single aspect of a case may contravene the notion of fairness such that it is possible to conclude 
that the trial was unfair without regard to the rest of the proceedings: Crociani v Italy (1981) 24 Y.B. 
222, E.Comm HR. Cited in Clayton & Tomlinson Human Rights 647; R v Forbes [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1 13 
(HL). 
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infringement does not render the trial unfair in overall terms and is capable of 
objective justification.”35  
 
Section 10 of the Constitution of Botswana is the operative provision that provides for 
fair trial rights. The specific rights mentioned in section 10 are not exhaustive. 
Therefore, a trial may still be unfair when the specific rights therein are respected, if 
the trial is not fair as a whole. 
 
1 4 2 The content of the constitutional provision for fair trial rights in Botswana 
Sections 10(1) and 10(2) of the Constitution are of significance in that they make 
express provisions relating to procedural rights. Though most of these rights exist as 
rules of common law, their embodiment in the Constitution solidifies them as 
important components of the legal system. Sections 10(1) and 10(2) provide: 
 
“(1) If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the charge is 
withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial court established or recognised by law. 
(2) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence – 
(a) shall be presumed to be innocent until he or she is proved or has 
pleaded guilty; 
(b) shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in a language that 
he or she understands and in detail, of the nature of the offence charged; 
                                                 
35
 Ferguson “Trial Within A Reasonable Time” 2001 Scottish Law Times 141 143; Jacot-Guillarmod 
Rights Related to Good Administration of Justice (Article 6) in Macdonald, Matscher & Petzold (eds) 
The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (1993) 381 392.  
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(c) shall be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or 
her defence; 
(d) shall be permitted to defend himself or herself before the court in 
person or, at his or her own expense, by a legal representative of his or her 
own choice; 
(e) shall be afforded facilities to examine in person or by his or her legal 
representative the witnesses called by the prosecution before the court, and 
to obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to 
testify on his or her behalf before the court on the same conditions as those 
applying to witnesses called by the prosecution; and 
(f) shall be permitted to have without payment the assistance of an 
interpreter if he or she cannot understand the language used at the trial of 
the charge, 
and except with his or her own consent the trial shall not take place in his or 
her absence unless he or she so conducts himself or herself as to render the 
continuance of the proceedings in his or her presence impracticable and the 
court has ordered him or her to be removed and the trial to proceed in his or 
her absence.” 
 
Other rights falling under various subsections of section 10 include the right of access 
to the judgment of the court, the protection against double jeopardy and the right not 
to testify at one’s trial. These are core procedural rights that have gained universal 
recognition and are regular features of international and regional human rights 
conventions. The danger of Bills of Rights is that they list specific rights, sometimes 
creating an impression that those rights that are not listed are not protected or 
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otherwise of less significance.36 This approach should be avoided and section 10 
should be seen merely as setting up minimum standards, the basis of a normative 
structure to be employed by the courts.37 The establishment of the provisions of 
section 10 as mere minimum standards is reflective of international documents with 
comparable provisions.38 The specific rights provided for in section 10, it can be seen, 
serve to ensure procedural equality. While the principle of equality of arms is not 
specifically catered for, it runs through its provisions and is the basic underlying 
principle of constitutional procedural law.  
 
1 5 Classification of procedural rights 
Procedural rights may be classified according to three considerations. The first 
classification relates to whom the right is applicable in the criminal justice system. 
The second relates to the normative plane on which they operate. The third relates to a 
right accruing to the accused and emanating from a duty on the court to explain the 
procedural and evidential processes of the trial to the unrepresented accused.  
 
1 5 1 Classification by personage of application 
Classification by personage refers to the rights of persons who have legitimate 
interests to have access to the trial. There are three such types of persons. First, there 
are rights that serve to protect the accused. Rights such as the right to legal 
representation, presumption of innocence, the right to disclosure, the right to call 
witnesses, the right to cross-examination, the right to testify etc, are personal rights of 
                                                 
36
 Walker The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (1988) 381. 
37
 S v Zuma & Others 1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC); 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
38
 See art 14(3) of the UDHR; art 6(3) of the European Convention.  
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the accused. Most important of all is the right of the accused to be tried in his 
presence. The accused has a right to hear the evidence led against him and to contest 
it. This ensures that the accused gets a fair trial and that he has a proper opportunity to 
address the issues and present his defence. These rights are central to the application 
of the principle of equality of arms. Therefore, even though the courts in Botswana 
have not made any pronouncement on the principle, its relevance is guaranteed by the 
Constitution which caters for the above-mentioned rights. However the fact that the 
courts have not specifically recognised the principle of equality of arms is bound to 
have consequences in the application of constitutional procedural rights. 
Consequently, there is a risk that the accused in Botswana might not receive equality 
and fairness in the same fullness as his counterpart in jurisdictions where the principle 
receives specific legal appreciation.  
 
Second, the public has an interest in the prosecution of criminal cases. This 
guarantees the public a right to be present during criminal trials. Therefore, while the 
accused has a right to a public hearing, a right of access to trials and documents39 by 
the press and general public has been recognised.40 In the United States, this has been 
recognised both as a constitutional41 and statutory42 rule of law. Whereas the 
                                                 
39
 Seattle Times Co. v U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Washington 845 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1988). 
40
 In Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II) 478 U.S. 1 7 (1986) the Court stated 
that the “right to an open public trial is a shared right of the accused and the public.” 
41
 Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court for Norfolk County 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Detroit Free Press, 
Inc. v Recorder’s Court Judge 409 Mich. 364 (1980); Shipman v State Cr., 639 P.2d 1248; State v 
Drake 701 S.W.2d 604. 
42
 In re Midland Pub. Co., Inc. 362 N.W.2d 580 (Mich. 1984); Gannett Co. Inc. v DePasquale 443 U.S. 
368 (1979). 
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accused’s right to a public trial derives from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
the right of the press and public to attend criminal trials arises implicitly from the 
First Amendment.43 Since the public has a right of access to trials, the accused or the 
state would not in the ordinary course of events be able to insist on a trial behind 
closed doors.44 Representatives of the press and public must be given an opportunity 
to challenge and be heard on the issue of their exclusion.45 There is authority that the 
right is not applicable only to those present at the trial when application to close the 
proceedings are made, and that notice of public exclusion should be given to the 
public at large.46 A motion for courtroom closure should be docketed in the public file 
kept in the court clerk’s office47 and individual notice to the press and public is not 
required.48 It has also been held that a copy of the motion should be served on at least 
one representative of the media when a motion for closure is filed and when it is heard 
in court.49 There is also contrasting authority to the effect that the right of access 
extends only to members of the public who are actually in court when the motion is 
made.50  
                                                 
43
 Rovinsky v McKaskle 722 F.2d 197. The First Amendment guarantees free public discussion.  
44
 State v White 398 P.2d 903, 97 Ariz. 196; People v Gacy 468 N.E.2d 1171, 82 Ill.Dec.391, 103 Ill.2d 
1. 
45
 Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court for Norfolk County supra note 41. The Seventh Circuit held 
in In re Associated Press 162 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1998) that members of the press and public are entitled 
to intervene to raise First Amendment claims of access to proceedings and documents. 
46
 State ex rel. New Mexico Press Ass’n v Kaufman 98 N.M.261, 648 P.2d 300 (1982); U.S. v Criden 
C.A.Pa., 675 F.2d 550. 
47
 U.S. v Criden supra note 46; Application of The Herald Co. 734 F. 2d 93 (CANY, 1984). 
48U.S. v Criden supra note 46.  
49
 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v Lewis 426 So.2d 1. 
50
 U.S. v Charga C.A.Tex 701 F.2d 354. 
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The recognition of public access to criminal proceedings is also reflected in South 
African case law although not in explicit terms. In the case of S v Leepile & Others 
(4)51 the Court held that though the evidence of a witness could be taken in camera, it 
was necessary that the public be informed of its contents. Of course, this case was 
determined before South Africa’s present constitutional order. However, one can say 
that, even though not expressed as a right, the Court was actually laying recognition to 
a right of access by the public in South African common law. Also, in the case of 
Magqabi v Mafundityala & Another,52 the Court held that members of the public are 
guaranteed free access to court proceedings as long as they do not disrupt the 
proceedings.  
 
In the English case of Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001)53 which involved 
the question whether there was a breach of the right of the accused to a trial within 
reasonable time under article 6(1) of the European Convention,  Lord Woolf CJ 
recognised the right of the public when he had this to say: 
 
“Similarly, at the trial of a defendant on a criminal charge, it is not only the 
defendant who is to be considered. The public are interested in whether or not 
defendants are tried for criminal offences they have committed. As is the case 
with many of the rights which are contained in the Convention, the courts are 
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 1986 (3) SA 661 (W). 
52
 1979 (4) SA 106 (E). 
53
 [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1869. 
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called upon to hold the balance between the rights of the individual and the 
rights of the public.”54 
 
The legal principles relating to the public and accused’s right to a public hearing are 
similar. In addition, a public hearing satisfies the public interest in seeing that 
offenders are brought to book. A public hearing also enhances transparency and 
public confidence in the system. Though the enforcement of the right of the public to 
access trials is well-known in the United States, in theoretical terms this right should 
receive universal recognition, and should, in practical terms, be enforceable in the 
judicial system of every civilised country.55  
 
Finally and closely related to the right of the public, is that of the victim in seeing that 
the offender is punished. The recognition of the victim as a party instead of a mere 
witness is in line with rights which accrue to him as the injured party.56 Victims’ 
rights are realisable rather than enforceable. The concept of victims’ rights does not 
operate on the same level as other rights. Victims’ rights are not fully developed in 
modern jurisprudence and the question whether victims have procedural rights is 
doubtful. Traditionally, the victim’s interests are relegated and he is treated as a mere 
witness. To some extent his interests are contingent on the outcome of the trial. He 
can only claim compensation if the accused is convicted. The standard used in a 
criminal trial is one beyond reasonable doubt, a standard more difficult to satisfy than 
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 1875H. 
55
 This right will of course be subject to public interest and state and public security considerations. 
56
 See generally Roach “Four Models of the Criminal Process” 1999 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 671. 
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if the victim was pursing a civil claim. His chances of obtaining compensation in 
criminal proceedings are therefore more difficult to achieve than if he had instituted 
civil proceedings. While an accused or an individual can directly make claims for 
violation of their rights, the rights of victims of crime are only realisable in an obtuse 
manner. The right of the victim lies within the criminal justice system and is realised 
when the accused is convicted. Consequently, the rules of criminal procedure give the 
victim limited access to the process and he functions basically as a witness. In 
Botswana, victims of crime are able to apply for compensation within the criminal 
process. Other modes of accessing the system such as acknowledging the impact of 
the offence on the victim as in the taking of victim impact statements do not apply. 
Victims’ rights are therefore best realised by instituting civil proceedings. 
  
1 5 2 Procedural rules and constitutional rules of procedure  
There exists a further classification of rules of procedure, separate and distinct from 
those mentioned above. This classification relates to the normative plane on which 
these rules operate. Several of the rules contained in section 10 of the Constitution 
also form part of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act,57 the principal statute that 
regulates criminal procedure in Botswana. For example, the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act contains provisions entitling the accused to cross-examine witnesses, to 
legal representation,58 to present his defence in court,59 to be informed of the charges 
against him,60 and to be present at his trial.61   
                                                 
57
 Cap 08:02. 
58
 S 177 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
59
 S 177 and 180(4) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
60
 S 128 and 141 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
61
 S 178 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
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The result is that there are two sets of rules regulating procedural rights. Those found 
in the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act are legal and formal in nature. They are 
procedural rules principally regulating the mechanism or order of criminal 
proceedings. They are enabling mechanisms that guarantee the orderly conduct of the 
proceedings from arraignment to sentence. Apart from creating orderliness, certainty 
and form, they guarantee equality and the integrity of the proceedings. No doubt, 
these rules primarily regulate procedural equality between the contestants and ensure 
that each contestant is given an equal opportunity to present his case. They can be 
described as statements of equality. For example, they provide that accused persons 
should be present at their trial and should be given an opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses. They preserve the integrity of the proceedings by giving the presiding 
officer powers to ensure that the proceedings proceed timeously and that orders of the 
court are effected. Of significance are powers that ensure that the accused and 
witnesses present themselves for trial. This enables the judicial officer to enforce 
basic principles of fairness such as ensuring that the trial proceeds within reasonable 
time and that the accused’s witnesses are secured. 
 
Section 10 on the other hand contains constitutional rules of procedure. They are a set 
of standards that are instrumental in determining the fairness of criminal trials. Two 
questions therefore arise. First, whether their inclusion in the Constitution was 
necessary and, second, whether any right that was left out by the Constitution is less 
relevant.  
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In relation to the first question, it must be noted that the principal purpose of section 
10 of the Constitution is the provision of measures for ensuring a fair trial. It is trite 
that an express constitutional statement of a rule of procedure raises its hierarchy as 
law thereby solidifying its observance. The provisions of section 10 are couched in 
direct terms as opposed to some of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act. For example, section 177 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 
provides as follows: 
 
“Every person charged with an offence is entitled to make his defence at his 
trial and to have the witnesses examined or cross-examined by his counsel, or 
other legal representative…” 
 
In comparison, sections 10 (2) (d) and (e) of the Constitution which contain parallel 
provisions (and appear above) are couched in direct terms. It can be seen therefore 
that the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act is directory. Section 10 of the 
Constitution on the other hand contains direct commands. But this does not suggest 
that the rules of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act can be easily ignored or 
watered down. Indeed the misapplication of such rules will be met with severe 
reproach from the courts, especially where the accused is prejudiced as a result. One 
must hasten to note however that this is due to the general influence of the 
Constitution on the legal process. In Moletsane v The State62 the appellant who 
                                                 
62
 [1996] B.L.R. 73 (CA); see also Walter Madisa v Regina [1964-67] B.L.R. 157; Chiwaura v The 
State [1985] B.L.R. 201; Moletsane v The State [1995] B.L.R. 83; see also the South African case of S 
v Masina en andere 1990 (1) SACR 390 (T) where the Court permitted the family of a convicted 
accused to present evidence on extenuating circumstances even though the accused himself had refused 
to participate in the proceedings. 
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represented himself at his trial, appealed to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that at 
the conclusion of the evidence he was not given an opportunity to make submissions 
in terms of section 181 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. He argued that 
such omission amounted to an irregularity that should vitiate the entire proceedings. 
Section 181 provides for the summing up of the case by the prosecution and the 
accused or his legal representative after the closure of evidence. In its judgment, the 
Court noted that the magistrate’s omission to call upon the accused to make 
submissions was inadvertent and that he similarly omitted to call upon the prosecution 
to make submissions. The Court in making a decision did not only limit itself to the 
prevailing facts but considered a hypothetical question whether the magistrate’s 
omission was mala fide. The Court ruled that where a trial judge inadvertently omitted 
to call on the accused to address the court after all the evidence had been adduced and 
proceeded to conviction, that would amount to an irregularity which would vitiate the 
proceedings only if the omission was prejudicial to the appellant or was likely to have 
been so. The Court ruled on the other hand that where a judge refused a request by the 
accused or his legal representative to address the court or deliberately refrained from 
calling upon him to do so and proceeded to convict, that would amount to an 
irregularity which would vitiate the entire proceedings and lead to a quashing of the 
conviction. In dismissing the appeal, the Court noted that the evidence against the 
accused was overwhelming beyond any possible doubt, and that the accused was not 
prejudiced by his not making submissions. In so holding, the Court noted all the 
issues that the accused said he would have mentioned in his submission and 
concluded that the magistrate had fairly and judiciously dealt with them during the 
course of the trial and any further reference to them would have been irrelevant.  
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It is a truism that constitutional statements of procedural rules strengthen the rules 
they formulate. For example section 146 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 
gives the courts discretionary powers to direct the prosecution to deliver to the 
accused any information relating to the charge. For several years the defence was 
denied access to copies of police statements and documents on the basis that they 
were privileged.63 However, a change of events occurred in 2001 when the courts64 
held that access to witness’ statements and other documents in possession of the 
police form part of the accused’s constitutional right to be given adequate facilities to 
prepare his defence.65 The accused, with limited exceptions, is now entitled to such 
statements as a right and is no longer required to furnish the court with reasons why 
the information should be produced,66 as was the pre-2001 situation when the 
question of disclosure had no constitutional backing. The result is that the prosecution 
regularly and without resistance furnishes the defence with statements of witnesses.  
 
In relation to the second question, it must be noted that every provision of law should 
be complied with, especially procedural rules that ensure fairness and equality in 
trials. The problem that arises is that procedural rules that do not have constitutional 
status are easily maneouvred especially when they conflict with other rules of law that 
potentially have the effect of compromising the rights of the accused. For example, 
there is no express constitutional prohibition against pre-trial self-incrimination. 
Section 229(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act permits the admissibility 
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 Kenosi v The State [1993] B.L.R. 268 (CA). 
64
 Attorney-General v Ahmed [2003] 1 B.L.R. 158 (CA); Ndala v The State Misc Crim App No F 95 of 
2001 (unreported). 
65
 S 10(2)(c) of the Botswana Constitution. 
66
 See the case of Motsumi v The State [1996] B.L.R. 905.  
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of evidence showing that anything was pointed out or its discovery was made as a 
result of any information given by the accused to the police, notwithstanding that such 
pointing out or information amounts to a confession or is inadmissible by law. This 
provision conflicts with section 228 of the same legislation which provides that 
confessions are not admissible unless reduced into writing in the presence of a judicial 
officer. The essence of section 228 is obviously to ensure that confession statements 
are made without duress. In effect, section 229(2) undercuts the guarantee that section 
228 provides, the guarantee being that all confessions should be free, voluntary and 
obtained without duress. It waters down the use of a judicial officer as an instrument 
in guaranteeing the voluntariness of confessions. Further, section 229(2) opens the 
floodgates for the police to use unsavoury methods. It is a legislative statement in 
support of the use of unlawful methods to obtain information and evidence. It 
validates the use of the accused as an instrument to obtain evidence and the use of 
such evidence in court against him regardless of how it was obtained.67 This amounts 
to a breach of the accused’s right not to be compelled to participate in his own 
prosecution. This provision remains in force in the absence of any constitutional 
rebuttal. So is the common law rule that permits the admissibility of illegally obtained 
evidence.68 In South Africa on the other hand where there is specific constitutional 
limitation on the admissibility of evidence that was obtained in breach of the Bill of 
Rights, the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence will be subject to 
constitutional scrutiny.  
                                                 
67
 In terms of S 35(5) of the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996, evidence may be excluded if 
it was obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights, if its admission would render 
the trial unfair or if its admission would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
68
 Seeletso v The State [1992] B.L.R. 71; Kenosi v The State supra note 63; Moloi v The State [1995] 
B.L.R. 439 (CA). 
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Unlike formal procedural rules, it is difficult to disregard a rule of procedure that has 
constitutional support. In the case of Ntwa v The State69 the applicant was first 
indicted in a magistrates’ court in April 1997. The charge sheet filed in April 1997 as 
well as a subsequent charge filed in July 1997, were quashed as they were both 
defective. On both occasions the charges were struck down without prejudice to the 
state. In September 2000 the state filed yet another charge sheet and indicted the 
applicant. The applicant approached the High Court in terms of section 18(3) of the 
Constitution.70 He contended that there had been an unreasonable delay by the 
prosecution resulting in an infringement of his constitutional right to be afforded a fair 
trial within reasonable time.71 The state argued that it was perfectly within its rights to 
prosecute the applicant at any time prior to the lapse of twenty years limitation period 
provided by section 26 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. In rejecting the 
state’s argument, Marumo J had this to say: 
 
“I think this submission seeks to utilise section 26 of the Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence Act for what it was never intended for, and inappropriately. The 
provision simply sets prescription periods after which criminal causes of 
                                                 
69
 [2001] 2 B.L.R. 212. See also Bojang v The State [1994] B.L.R. 146; Leow v The State [1995] B.L.R. 
564; Masango v The State [2001] 2 B.L.R. 616 where it was stated that there was no constitutional duty 
on the court to inform the accused of his right to legal representation, this being a rule of practice. 
Therefore failure to do so does not necessarily vitiate the proceedings. 
70
 For an explanation of this provision see the first paragraph of page 11 above, and in particular the 
text immediately preceding note 22. 
71
 As provided by S 10(1) of the Constitution. In Masango v The State supra note 69 the determination 
of the issue was based on whether the accused had suffered any prejudice. 
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action become time barred. It does not seek to stipulate the processes by which 
the State should bring matters before courts. Those processes are found 
elsewhere in the procedure Code and also in the Constitution. Section 10(1) is 
one of the applicable provisions. Furthermore, even if the provision did confer 
on the State the right alleged (which clearly it does not) the provision would 
have to yield to the supremacy of the constitutional provision, the latter 
document being the supreme law of the country. I shudder at the very thought 
of the State being in a position to notify someone that he or she is to be 
charged with a criminal offence, and then being able to keep such a person in a 
state of anxiety and suspense for a period of some 19 years prior to proceeding 
with the charges…It would be a crass society and a singularly supine judiciary 
that would tolerate such a situation.”72 
 
Both constitutional rules and rules of procedure strive to ensure that the accused is not 
unfairly disadvantaged as a participant in the legal process. However, while 
constitutional rules of procedure primarily focus on the protection of the accused, 
regulating the relationship between the state and the individual and in securing a fair 
trial, rules of procedure are able to regulate the order of the trial. The courts in 
Botswana protect constitutional procedural rights far more rigidly than rules of 
procedure which do not have constitutional status. They are usually ready to overlook 
the violation of a procedural rule where prejudice has not resulted. They do so in 
order to avoid acquittals on technical grounds. Therefore, procedural rules receive 
lukewarm application from time to time.  
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 Ntwa v The State supra note 69 221H-222C. 
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1 5 3 Secondary procedural rights 
There is a further set of “rights” that are not catered for in the Constitution, nor 
provided for in statutory provisions. These rights arise out of a special judicial 
enabling duty. In this regard, the courts have a duty to assist the accused and ensure 
that he is aware of legal procedural provisions. This duty bestows correlative rights on 
the accused. The essence of these rights is two fold. First and generally, they ensure 
that the accused receives instruction of the legal procedures of the court. In this 
regard, the level of inequality between the accused and the state is reduced and it is 
ensured that the accused is able to participate and defend himself. This ensures the 
accused procedural access to the proceedings. Second, they inform the accused of the 
existence of constitutionalised procedural rules. Whereas the courts of Botswana 
recognise the importance of the courts advising accused persons of their constitutional 
and procedural rights, it appears that the question whether a trial is unfair as a result 
of failure to inform the accused of his rights, largely depends on whether such 
omission results in a failure of justice.73 Inevitably, procedural equality, which these 
rules are meant to create, is compromised. The duty to inform the accused of his 
rights, while forming an integral part of the regime of procedural rights, effectively 
consigns the rights emanating from such duty to the status of secondary procedural 
rights. South African jurisprudence demands as a fundamental notion of fairness that 
the accused should be informed of his right to legal representation noting that failure 
to do so may result in failure of justice.74 In Botswana, fairness depends on whether 
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 Ramogotho v Director of Public Prosecutions [2007] 1 B.L.R. 334 (CA); Moroka v The State [2001] 
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failure to inform the accused of his right to legal representation results in prejudice to 
the accused.  It is doubtful therefore whether these duties of the court translate into 
rights for the accused. In this regard, they can be described as secondary to the 
traditional procedural rights.   
 
1 6 Conclusion 
The state is a powerful entity with powers disproportionate to those of the individual. 
The articulation and recognition of procedural and constitutional rights are 
instruments in limiting and regulating the policing powers of the state with a view to 
creating equality and fairness.  
 
The constitutionalisation of procedural rights is an important tool in protecting the 
accused in the interest-based adversarial system. Section 10 of the Constitution 
represents the constitutionalisation of several statements of procedural equality. These 
statements are no longer mere common law or statutory rules regulating criminal 
proceedings. They are fundamental, constitutional, procedural rights. While there is 
no express constitutional mention of the principle of equality of arms in Botswana, the 
spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights speaks to equality. The principle 
receives implicit countenance in that the accused is guaranteed an opportunity to 
cross-examine, call witnesses in his favour and secure legal representation.  
 
The entrenchment of the right to a fair trial as a concept of human rights firmly caters 
for equality, thereby securing the place of the accused in the criminal justice system. 
The courts have accepted the Constitution as the supreme document against which the 
legitimacy of all laws are tested. In effect, it should be possible to raise the principle 
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of equality of arms as a constitutional question in the courts of Botswana and it should 
receive specific and direct judicial consideration. The courts continue their sojourn in 
engaging a liberal approach in the interpretation of rights. The Constitutional 
entrenchment of criminal procedures not only complements procedural rules but 
fortifies the substance of their application. The genre of constitutional proceduralism 
creates a system that engages the state in ensuring that the rights of the individual are 
protected. In spelling out specific procedural rights, the Constitution lays down the 
foundation for the protection of accused persons at their trial. These rights are not 
exhaustive but form the basic principles regarding the protection of fair trial rights in 
general. The entire process of the determination of rights involves a whole array of 
judicial action. The courts have the onerous task of working through these norms and 
guarding the constitutional status of procedural rights while ensuring that real justice 
is done.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF ARMS 
2 1 Introduction 
The principle of equality of arms is of ancient origin.1 Early trials took the form of 
battle wherein the accused and accuser fought in armour and rode on horses with 
batons and fought to the death.2 The contest ended with the death of one contestant, at 
which point justice would have been served.3 The rules of combat ensured that neither 
party enjoyed advantage in terms of arms and armaments.4 The principle has roots 
both in common law and civil law traditions.5 It is an expression of the natural law 
principle audi alteram partem which was first formulated by St Augustine.6 The 
principle derives modern conceptual development and content from the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human 
Rights. The principle “involves striking a ‘fair balance’ between the parties, in order 
                                                 
1
 Bufford “Center of Main Interests, International Insolvency Case Venue, and Equality of Arms: The 
Eurofood Decision of the European Court of Justice” 2007 Northwestern Journal of International Law 
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that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that 
do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.”7 Though the 
principle has flourished and gained acceptance as the bedrock of procedural fairness 
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as well as international 
and internationalised tribunals,8 its scope and application is somewhat constricted and 
contextualised in the latter.9 It however represents a pivotal barometer in underscoring 
the credibility of such tribunals.10 Indeed, the principle forms part of international 
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 Simor & Emmerson Human Rights Practice (2001) para 6.145; Jackson 2005 Modern Law Review 
751. 
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 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
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human rights principles.11 It is particularly relevant in the adversarial tradition which 
manifests itself as an interest-based system. The system demands that there must be 
balance and equality between the key players, and the accused should be assisted to 
present his case in such a manner that he is not disadvantaged in relation to the 
prosecution. 
 
2 2 Conceptual framework 
2 2 1 The role of the European Court 
The criminal justice system was set up primarily to convict offenders. This being the 
focus of the system, considerations of the rights of accused persons and procedural 
equality were introduced at a later stage in the development of legal systems. The 
operation of accused-based rights are bound to raise tensions in a system that was 
previously set up, principally to represent the interests of the society as against the 
interests of the accused. State resources are devoted towards fighting crime and 
convicting offenders. It is not surprising therefore, that the amount of resources 
allocated to the realisation of the rights of the accused pales in comparison to those 
allocated to the prosecution. However, the system has now in practical terms, moved 
towards ensuring the objectives underlying the recognition of the rights of the 
accused. Therefore, a reconsideration of the application of procedural rules in light of 
the principle of equality of arms is the key to full and effective realisation of 
procedural equality and fair trial rights. 
                                                                                                                                            
Procedure” 2005 International Criminal Law Review 513 514; DeFrancia “Due Process in International 
Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters” 2001 Virginia Law Review 1381 1438; Negri Equality of 
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Indeed, the modern development of the principle of equality of arms stems from 
article 6 of the European Convention.12 The principle is the result of a departure by 
the European Court on Human Rights from strict and literal appreciation of the 
specific rights contained in articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the Convention, and the 
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 The article provides: 
“1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly 
but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, 
public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the 
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice. 
2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law. 
3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if 
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the 
interests of justice so require; 
d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him; 
e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court.” 
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conceptualisation of its own notion of fairness.13 Consequently, the Court has 
developed the principle as a procedural norm in the European legal order.14 It has 
emphasised that an adversarial system governed by equality of arms is fundamental to 
a fair trial as enshrined in article 6(1) of the European Convention.15 The Court has 
interpreted and fashioned this provision, resulting in a principle that recognises as 
sacrosanct that neither party to proceedings is put in a position that substantially puts 
him at a disadvantage in relation to his opponent.16 The current established view is 
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that the principle gives relevance to a number of accused-based rights.17 These 
include the right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present the facts of his 
case to the court, the right to present his legal arguments to the court, the right to 
respond to evidence, the right to comment on legal arguments of the prosecution,18 the 
right to disclosure of evidence in the possession of the state that is necessary for 
preparation of the defence case,19 the right to legal representation and the right to be 
presumed innocent. Though the principle is not specifically spelt out in article 6, the 
cluster of rights contained in the article basically gives content to the principle and 
enables the accused to present his case and defend himself. Effectively, it gives him a 
status in the trial and protects him from undue disadvantage. 
 
2 2 2 Considering European jurisprudence 
The European Court and Commission have determined a plethora of cases involving 
alleged infringement of article 6 in so far as it relates to inequality between the 
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prosecution and the accused. The Court has noted that each party should be afforded 
reasonable opportunity to present his case, including his defence under circumstances 
that do not put him at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent.20  
 
In Neumeister v Austria (No 1)21 the Court held that both parties in criminal 
proceedings must be represented throughout the case and that by hearing the 
prosecuting authority in the absence of defence counsel, the principle of equality of 
arms was violated. The Court has also emphasised equality in the ability to present 
evidence. In Bönisch v Austria22 it was held that the expert witnesses of both sides 
must be heard. The Court noted that equal treatment should be given to the court 
appointed expert and those called by the accused, irrespective of their capacity. In this 
regard the accused should be opportuned to refute the views of the court appointed 
expert. The Court noted in this case that the court appointed expert had acted more 
like a witness against the accused than an independent witness since he could attend 
throughout the hearing, put questions to the accused and comment on the evidence. 
Since he had greater control over the proceedings than the accused’s expert witness, 
the Court held that the accused was not given equal treatment.  
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In Feldbrugge v Netherlands23 it was held that each party must be given an 
opportunity to oppose the arguments of the other. In Colozza v Italy24 the Court held 
that the accused should generally be present and be entitled to take part in the 
proceedings. The principle is not limited to equality in the presentation of formal 
evidence. The Court has recognised the disparity between the prosecution and the 
defence in terms of resources and therefore provides that the facilities which an 
accused charged with an offence should enjoy in terms of article 6(3)(b) should 
extend to access to all relevant information collected by the prosecution during its 
investigations.25  
 
Equality brings “participation rights” and “defence rights”26 to the fore. Implicit to 
this is the demand that a party is entitled to reply to comments made by the other side. 
The right of reply has found expression in the jurisprudence of the Commission. Four 
Austrian cases represent the thinking of the Commission in this regard. In Ofner and 
Hopfiner v Austria,27 the Austrian Supreme Court heard the Attorney-General but not 
the accused persons on appeal. In determining whether inequality had occurred, the 
Commission noted the role played by the Attorney-General in relation to the law, the 
circumstances under which the hearing took place and the consequence of the hearing 
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for the accused, in particular whether there was a reformation in peius.28 No violation 
of the principle was found as the role of the Attorney-General was to ensure that the 
laws are respected and not to secure a conviction of the accused. He was recognised 
as an objective and fair person who presented no threat to the rights of the accused. In 
the cases of Pataki and Dunshirn v Austria29 where the public prosecutor’s aim was 
securing a conviction, the situation was different. In those cases, the public prosecutor 
appealed against the sentences imposed on the applicants. Written submissions were 
filed and the files were sent to the chief public prosecutor for information and 
opinion. The files were sent to the court with the recommendation that the appeals be 
allowed as per the written submissions. The applicants were absent, and in both cases 
had no representation. In the Pataki30 case the sentence was increased from three 
year’s imprisonment to six years. In the Dunshirn31 case the sentence was increased 
from fourteen months to fifty four months. The Commission considered the question 
whether the presence of the public prosecutor and the absence of the applicants and 
their counsel was a contravention of the Convention. The Commission noted that it 
was difficult to establish with certainty whether the public prosecutor had taken an 
active part in the proceedings as no records were kept. The Commission noted that 
even if the public prosecutor did not play an active part in the proceedings, the fact 
remained that he was present and had an opportunity to influence the members of the 
court. The accused and his counsel on the other hand had no opportunity to contest his 
representations. This in the view of the Commission constituted an inequality which 
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infringed the notion of a fair trial. The Commission concluded that the proceedings 
were not in conformity with the Convention. Clearly, European jurisprudence no 
longer regards Procureurs-General as neutral and emphasises the importance to be 
attached to appearances and to the increased sensitivity of the public to the 
administration of justice.32 
 
2 3 Scope and application of the principle 
Though the discussion for the purposes of this work is limited to criminal 
proceedings, it is worth noting that the principle also finds application in civil 
proceedings. The European Court has applied the principle as contained in article 6 
(3)(c) of the Convention to civil proceedings on a few occasions as a development of 
the provisions of article 6(1).33 The Court has been able to do so by recognising the 
right of access to court and then pinning to it access to legal advice as an ancillary 
right.34 “According to the Commissions’s case law Art. 6(1) guarantees, inter alia, the 
principle of equality of arms, i.e. that anyone who is a party to civil proceedings shall 
have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the Court under conditions 
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which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent.”35 In 
Dombo Beheer v Netherlands36 the Court held that “as regards litigation involving 
opposing private interests, ‘equality of arms’ implies that each party must be afforded 
a reasonable opportunity to present his case – including his evidence – under 
conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis his 
opponent”.37 The Court and Commission has also held that equality of arms requires 
parties to civil proceedings to be permitted to cross-examine witnesses,38 to be 
informed of and be able to challenge decisions for administrative action,39 and be 
allowed access to facilities.40 In Ruiz-Mateos v Spain41 it was held that the principle 
was infringed when in appeal proceedings before the Spanish Constitutional Court the 
applicants were not allowed to reply to written submissions made to the Court by 
counsel for the state, their opponent in a civil case, on the constitutionality of a 
relevant law.  
 
2 3 1 Pre-trial investigation  
The scope of the principle extends to the pre-trial stage of the criminal process. Of 
relevance to article 6(1) of the European Convention is the question, when is one 
charged with a criminal offence. In determining what would amount to a criminal 
                                                 
35
 De Geillustreerde Pers v Netherlands (1989) 11 E.H.H.R. 85 86; see also Airey v Ireland supra note 
34. 
36
 Supra note 20. 
37
 Supra note 20 para 33. 
38
 X v Austria No. 5362/72, 42 C.D. 145 (1972). 
39
 Hentrich v France (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 440. 
40
 Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 405. 
41
 (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 505. 
 45 
charge for the purposes of determining whether the accused was tried within a 
reasonable time, the European Court embraced the investigation argument. The 
European Court has interpreted the Convention’s demand for a prompt trial to extend 
over a wide period, from investigation including periods of provisional release of the 
suspect up to the final determination of appeal.42 In this regard, the passage of time 
commences from the pre-trial period when the accused becomes aware that he is 
being investigated, or when he is arrested as a suspect. In effect, a criminal charge is 
not limited to the bringing of formal charges against the accused but extends to the 
pre-trial investigatory period. This approach has made its mark in Botswana law43 
where the formal argument which restricts “charge” to the formal charging of the 
accused to court has been rejected. To this extent the scope of the principle of equality 
of arms becomes immediately applicable to pre-trial procedures. In this regard, a 
consideration of fairness in light of the principle is not limited to an accused’s 
appearance in court but extends to the investigation process. Therefore, an 
investigation that excludes the suspect from searches, seizures, the confrontation and 
taking of statements from witnesses, potentially puts him in a position of 
disadvantage. So does a denial of access to statements, documents and exhibits 
obtained in the course of investigations. Any model of investigations that excludes the 
accused and keeps information in secrecy, potentially infringes the principle. 
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2 3 2 Disciplinary proceedings 
The scope of the principle has been extended to disciplinary proceedings where the 
resultant sanctions involved the deprivation of personal liberty.44 The European Court 
has taken the view that the state should be limited in designating offences as 
disciplinary when they are really criminal, otherwise, the principle and demands of 
article 6 could be evaded. Also, in Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom45 where the 
question arose whether disciplinary proceedings in prison constituted criminal charges 
under article 6, the Court held that disciplinary proceedings resulting in serious 
penalties such as loss of remission and privilege, and which could be pursued as 
criminal offences in courts,  involved criminal charges which required the protection 
of article 6.46 The Court has also applied article 6 to administrative offences.47 
 
2 3 3 Application to procedural rights 
The principle of equality of arms applies to a number of procedural rights. Harris and 
others note that the principle in article 6(1) overlaps with specific guarantees in article 
6(3).48 This is crystal clear with article 6(3)(d), which relates to the right to cross-
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examination and the right to call witnesses, article 6(3)(b) in respect of facilities to 
prepare the accused’s defence and article 6(3)(c) in respect of legal representation.49 It 
however has a wider application than this, applying to all aspects of the proceedings.50  
Indeed, the underlying demand of the principle is procedural equality between the 
parties. 
 
2 4 Financial equality 
The issue of equality mostly refers to procedural equality. However, another 
component which goes to the core of fairness is financial equality. The financial 
resources available to the accused undoubtedly impacts on the quality of legal 
representation he gets, if he is able to get one at all. Meernik notes that in the United 
States, the “upper dogs” such as federal governments typically have success rates in 
trial and appellate courts as against the “underdogs” such as individual accused 
persons.51 According to him, “…the ‘haves’ emerge victorious more often because 
they can afford to hire the best legal talent and incur the expenses of lengthy and 
thorough litigation.”52 States and international tribunals are usually stringent in 
allocating financial resources to accused persons. In theory, international tribunals 
have thrown the spotlight of equality on procedural rather than financial equality.53 
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While it is conceded that the needs of the defence and prosecution are different and 
that the accused might not need as near as equal the resources of the prosecution, the 
allocation of funds to secure an experienced lawyer (or rather the lack of such funds), 
will definitely undermine the principle of equality of arms.  
 
The case of Steel and Morris v United Kingdom54 typically illustrates how lack of 
financial resources can incapacitate a party to proceedings. The matter was in respect 
of an application brought by two British nationals Helen Steel and David Morris. Mr 
Morris was unemployed and Ms Steel was either unemployed or on low wage at the 
material time. They were members of an environmental group called London 
Greenpeace which had conducted an anti McDonald’s campaign in the mid 1980s. As 
part of the campaign a leaflet entitled “What’s wrong with McDonald’s?” was issued 
in 1986. McDonald’s issued a writ on the 20th September 1990 claiming damages for 
libel caused by the leaflet. The applicants were denied legal aid and therefore had to 
defend themselves throughout the trial and the appeal, with help from some volunteer 
lawyers at times. The applicants submitted that they were hampered by lack of 
resources not only by way of legal representation, but also in terms of administration, 
note taking, photocopying and the tracing, preparation and payment of the costs and 
expenses of expert and factual witnesses. McDonald’s on the other hand was 
represented by leading and junior counsel experienced in the law of defamation as 
well as solicitors and other assistants. The trial took place between the 28th June 1994 
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and 13th December 1996 and lasted for 313 court days. McDonald’s was awarded 
damages in the sum of GBP 60,000 which was reduced to GBP 40,000 on appeal. 
McDonald’s did not apply for costs nor did they seek to enforce the award. The 
applicants argued, inter alia, that the proceedings were unfair and contravened article 
6(1) of the European Convention as they were denied legal aid. The examination of 
the question whether legal aid was necessary for a fair hearing had to be determined 
by a number of criteria namely, the particular facts and circumstances of each case 
and the importance of what was at stake for the applicants in the proceedings, the 
complexity of the relevant law and procedure and the applicant’s ability to represent 
himself effectively. In determining what was at stake for the applicants it was noted 
that although defamation proceedings did not have severe implications, the financial 
consequences were potentially severe. In relation to the complexity of the 
proceedings, it was noted that the trial lasted for 313 court days which were preceded 
by 28 interlocutory applications. The trial involved 40,000 pages of evidence and 130 
oral witnesses. The appeal lasted for 28 days. Even though the applicants had been 
articulate and had received intermittent help from lawyers, this was insufficient and 
could not be compared to representation provided by a qualified lawyer with 
experience in the law of libel. The Court concluded that the denial of legal aid to the 
applicants had put them in an unacceptable state of inequality with McDonald’s and 
that there had been a violation of article 6(1) of the Convention.    
 
The interaction between the allocation and availability of resources on the one hand, 
and the necessity for the accused to present an effective defence on the other, is 
peculiar to cases in international criminal tribunals which tend to be very lengthy with 
hundreds of witnesses being called. This has naturally led to a notion of judicial 
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economy wherein the tribunals play a supervisory role and seek to cut down on the 
number of witnesses so as to save time and funds.55 This position has undoubtedly 
witnessed a shift from adversarialism to inquisitorialism in the procedure of the 
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.56 A common criticism of these tribunals has been the 
disparity in the allocation of resources and insufficiency of funds allocated to the 
defence. Significant improvements have been made however as these tribunals strive 
to maintain their credibility. The lesson to be learnt from these tribunals is that 
resources are a fundamental pillar of the equality of arms principle. The principle has 
however been contextualised by the ICTY Appeals Chamber. The Chamber noted that 
within the context of international criminal trials the prosecution bears the burden of 
telling the entire story and establishing every element beyond reasonable doubt 
whereas that of the defence is poking specifically targeted holes in the prosecution’s 
case, an endeavour which may require less time and fewer witnesses. This position 
shows that both sides may not necessarily be entitled to equal resources. What is 
fundamentally important is that one side is not significantly disadvantaged. In this 
regard the principle of proportionality rather than strict mathematical equation 
applies.57 
 
There is no denying that the curtailment of financial resources to accused persons 
facing charges in international criminal tribunals have been a matter of concern 
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though improvements have resulted from criticisms.58 This was exacerbated by the 
fact that the accused persons would seek witnesses who are in far off countries and 
scattered within those countries thereby making it difficult to trace them. Defence 
teams were allocated far fewer investigators thereby compromising their efforts to 
secure witnesses. Documents would mostly be in the hands of government 
functionaries who would often refuse to cooperate with the defence, denying them 
access. While the office of the prosecutor is generally an independent body with huge 
resources, defence teams of indigent accused persons would depend on the office of 
the Registrar for funds.59  
 
The jurisprudence of the tribunals has not been of assistance to the defence either. In 
Prosecutor v Milutinovic60 the defence filed a motion seeking an order that the 
Registrar allocates additional funds in respect of pre-trial preparation in relation to 
Dragoljub Ojdanic. The defence argued that several particularities such as the scope 
of the case, the nature of the accused’s defence, and the extended and complex legal 
issues involved, justified the request for additional funds. The Trial Chamber in 
denying the application mentioned that while accepting the Registrar’s position that it 
is open to some flexibility in considering the allocation of additional funds, the 
defence should demonstrate exceptional circumstances or events beyond its influence 
if such requests are to be granted. The Trial Chamber stated that the system of 
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allocating flat fee payments to lawyers at the pre-trial stage, taking into account the 
complexity, should be interpreted in light of the need to ensure a fair trial for the 
accused and recognition of the limited resources available in the ICTY legal aid 
system. The Chamber also noted that counsel who represent indigent accuseds were 
quite aware of the system of remuneration at the pre-trial stage and the maximum 
amount allocated depending on the complexity of the case. The ICTR for its part 
declared that the principle of equality of arms does not entitle the defence to the same 
means and resources as the prosecution.61  
 
While equality of arms does not mean precise equality of resources, it is clear that 
there is substantial inequality in the allocation of resources to the prosecution and 
defence in international tribunals.62 This is inevitable as they depend on the goodwill 
and financial contributions of states and are usually under pressure to wrap up 
proceedings. With limited budgets, they are obviously compelled to employ judicial 
economy with the result that equality of arms is compromised. The situation is similar 
on the domestic front. As the fight against crime is seen as a pressing social demand, 
state machineries established for this purpose attract funding, whereas the importance 
of allocating funds to protect individual human dignity is relegated to the background. 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
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The principle of equality of arms is an essential requirement of the right to fair trial 
and should form the foundation for the application of a number of rights contained in 
section 10 of the Constitution of Botswana. The section seeks to ensure procedural 
equality and demands that the defence is able to present its case on terms equal to 
those of the prosecution which has all the advantages and resources of the state on its 
side. The European Court has highlighted a number of fair trial principles that are 
consistent with equality of arms. They include the right to be present and confront 
one’s adversary, the right to comment on the case of one’s opponents, the right to 
have access to documents and to comment on them, the right to engage in adversarial 
proceedings and to present one’s case under conditions that do no put one at a 
substantial disadvantage in relation to his opponent. Section 10 of the Constitution of 
Botswana contains procedural rights which are geared towards ensuring the protection 
of the accused in the criminal process and can be said to be the fundamental tool that 
guarantees the effective application of equality of arms. Though there is no express 
recognition and application of the principle of equality of arms in Botswana, there are 
certainly instances where it has received implicit countenance. Since section 10 of the 
Constitution is not dissimilar from article 6 of the European Convention, the 
transposition and application of the principle should not come under strain in the 
Botswana legal order. The principle is reflected in several rules and rights enumerated 
in article 6 of the European Convention which are also found in section 10 of the 
Constitution and couched in similar terms. These rules are mainly protective of the 
accused in the adversarial system which principally operates in Botswana. While 
European jurisprudence cannot bind Botswana courts, they would most certainly 
serve as a positive yardstick in determining the measure of equality in Botswana’s 
adversarial system.   
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CHAPTER 3 
EQUALITY OF ARMS IN THE CONTEXT OF ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS 
3 1 Introduction 
Botswana’s procedural system is predominantly adversarial. This denotes the engagement 
of opposing contestants in dispute. Their aim is to convince the judicial officer to find in 
their favour. In this regard, the system is interest-based. It is within the context of 
adversarialism that the principle of equality of arms receives full application. 
Adversarialism means that the parties to the proceedings are able to fully engage and 
participate in the proceedings. In this regard they should be guaranteed procedural 
equality as a prerequisite for fairness. Participation embraces a whole range of rights that 
empower the accused. Such rights include his ability to have knowledge of the 
prosecution’s case including evidence that exonerates him, the ability to comment on the 
evidence and documents of the prosecution, to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and 
to reply to comments made by the prosecution. While the guarantee of equality 
presupposes adversarialism, the inquisitorial model and the role of the inquiring judge is 
certainly relevant to equality in that he is able to probe for evidence that might otherwise 
be suppressed by the parties in the adversarial system. Of importance however, is the 
realisation that strict ideological deference to a particular model is not the ideal situation. 
Fairness surpasses ideological attachment and the strengths of both systems may well be 
tapped to pursue the ends of justice. Therefore, convergence or hybrid systems are bound 
to emerge. 
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3 2 The adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared 
Two main procedural designs have emerged in relation to criminal proceedings. Courts 
within the common law tradition employ the adversarial approach whereas courts of the 
civil law tradition mainly employ the inquisitorial approach. The most convenient way to 
highlight the distinctive characteristics of the adversarial system lies in a comparative 
analysis with the inquisitorial system. In the adversarial system, the parties to the contest 
each have an interest in establishing their case. The question of equality is central to the 
adversarial procedural system since it recognises two opposing parties engaged in a 
contest.1 The system is a contest between the state and the accused with the judge as the 
umpire. The adversarial system depends on the parties to present their evidence and shape 
the legal issues.2 The court does not inquire into the facts but rather adjudicates on the 
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matter, based on the evidence produced by the parties.3 A contest can only be fair if there 
is equality between the parties.4  
 
Jackson and Doran5 note that the parties rather than the judge dominate the adversarial 
process whereas the process is the reverse in the inquisitorial system. In other words, the 
adversarial process is a contest whereas the inquisitorial process is an inquiry.6 The 
adversarial process enhances the role of the parties, giving less attention to the role of the 
judge or inquirer who is more or less a passive umpire.7 The role of the judge is even 
more restricted at the preliminary stages of the contest.8 
  
Jackson and Doran’s analysis of the adversarial system brings two issues to mind. First, 
their contention that the role of the judge is limited at the trial stage is only a true 
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reflection of the adversarial system insofar as he does not actually manage the pre-trial 
process. Though the arbiter plays no primary role during the investigations, he has latent 
control over it. It is he who ultimately determines the admissibility of evidence and 
adjudges the proper use of pre-trial procedures. Therefore, during the investigation stage, 
the police are required to adopt approaches that will survive judicial scrutiny.  
 
Second, their contention that the parties dominate the proceedings while the adjudicator 
takes a back seat represents a traditionalist view and is not entirely true. This assertion is 
based on the fact that judges in adversarial systems are mainly expected to remain passive 
while the parties conduct their cases. But the issue should be viewed from the bigger 
picture having regard to the substance of the role played by each actor and not merely 
from a quantitative assessment. While it is true that the activity of the inquirer is limited 
in so far as the production and presentation of evidence is concerned, he maintains a vital 
role as far as the determination and application of procedural and evidential rules are 
concerned. As an arbiter, the manner in which he regulates the procedure might have a 
direct bearing on the outcome of the final decision. Evidence which is wrongly admitted 
or excluded might lead to one conclusion or the other. Misdirections on the law might 
result in erroneous conclusions or in prejudice to one or more of the parties. Failure to 
consider vital evidence may lead to the same occurrence.  
 
The relationship between the arbiter and the parties is a triangular one, with the parties 
battling each other on opposite ends while endeavouring to present a credible case to the 
arbiter who is at the head of the triangle. He in turn relates to each party, making 
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decisions on procedural and evidential matters and determining the admissibility of 
evidence and the proper procedure to be followed, having regard to the circumstances. 
The centrality of the role of the arbiter is reflected by the fact that appeals are based on 
his errors. His misapplication of the law or facts may have led to an unsatisfactory 
conclusion. His failure to apply the proper procedure and to guard the constitutional 
rights of the accused are usually matters for appeal. A conclusion by an appellate court 
that the arbiter misdirected himself may lead to a reversal of his decision. The arbiter 
therefore plays a dynamic role in the adversarial process.  
 
Further, the demand for fair trial and equality is increasingly reshaping the role of the 
judicial officer in the adversarial system. In this regard, he increasingly participates in 
proceedings so as to assist the unrepresented accused who is particularly procedurally 
disadvantaged in relation to the prosecution.  
 
In systems governed by the inquisitorial procedure, the court has powers to investigate 
and can call for evidence relating to the facts in dispute.9 The investigation and trial are 
governed by “judicial management”. The judicial officer is involved in the investigative 
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process and police interrogation during the pre-trial phase.10 In this way it is possible to 
identify innocent persons early in the process. Consequently, investigations may be 
discontinued against them without them having to go through trial.11 The judicial officer 
also controls and directs the trial.12 Subjective conviction more than formal rules of 
evidence plays a greater part in the determination of credibility and strength attached to 
the evidence.13 The inquisitorial process shifts the emphasis away from the contestants to 
the judge or inquirer. The inquiry is directed at seeking the truth.14 Not only is the judicial 
officer involved at the early stages of the contest, it is he and not the contestants who 
determine the ambit of the dispute.15 He has the primary responsibility of gathering 
evidence and the parties are relegated to being objects of the inquiry rather than being the 
                                                 
10
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subjects of the action with responsibility for the conduct of their cases.16 The judicial 
officer introduces or elicits evidence by first questioning the witnesses and the accused. 
Thereafter, he may permit the prosecution or defence to question the witnesses.17 
 
The inquisitorial process is not guided by rigid rules of evidence as in the adversarial 
system. Indeed, in the inquisitorial process, the judicial officer decides the case on a 
subjective conclusion of the facts.18 This essentially means that judicial officer takes it 
upon himself to unearth the truth. The judicial officer is bound not only to consider the 
evidence adduced by the parties, but must ensure that the issues are investigated.19 In this 
regard he searches for the actual truth and not merely the formal truth as presented by the 
parties.20 
 
3 3 Empirical assessment of the differences  
3 3 1 Legal representation 
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The greatest asset of the adversarial system is the active participation of lawyers. 
Counsels on both sides are usually able to bring out crucial issues of law and facts to the 
attention of the court. Defence counsel effectively confronts the evidence of the 
prosecution, actively and positively guarding the interest of the accused. In the 
inquisitorial system, the role of defence counsel is limited. There is no active presentation 
of the defence from a defence perspective. It has been argued that the inquisitorial system 
is non-confrontational and that the prosecutor’s role is not necessarily to procure a 
conviction, but to investigate and collect all evidence whether favourable or unfavourable 
to the accused.21 Clearly, this is not really true. On many occasions the prosecutor is 
partisan. Therefore, the fact that defence counsel does not really take an active part, 
results in procedural inequality. The non-confrontational approach of the inquisitorial 
system, and presentation of all evidence before the judge without contention appears to 
compromise the right of the accused to defend himself and present his case. The 
accused’s right to a legal representative to present his case and his right to vigorously 
attack the evidence proffered against him are compromised. This defeats the principle of 
equality of arms which primarily operates as a defence right to protect the accused.  
 
 
 
3 3 2 Role of the parties 
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The passive role of the judge and the active role of the parties in the adversarial system 
inhibit the truth finding process. The contest between the parties is combative.22 As has 
been said, the judge has a passive role in the adversarial system and the responsibility of 
proof and presentation of evidence rests primarily with the parties.23 In actual fact, 
judicial function involves making a decision on the basis of the evidence produced by the 
parties, rather than ascertaining the real truth.24 The inquisitorial system on the other hand 
is not really a contest between the parties. The primary responsibility for fact finding 
rests with the judge.25 In the inquisitorial model the judicial officer embarks on a full 
investigation of the entire case.26 He actually pursues the truth by eliciting evidence from 
the witnesses and summoning witnesses where necessary.27 This might assist the 
unrepresented accused who lacks the resources to investigate and present evidence, 
thereby putting the interests of the competing parties on an even keel. In this regard, 
equality is enhanced. However, the opportunity for attack and combat are lost and the 
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accused is unable to enjoy full legal representation.28 It must be noted however that 
though the civil law prosecutor has been touted as playing a neutral role, collecting 
evidence for and against the accused, seeking the material truth, and merely acting as a 
ministere public, this is not always true.29 In actual fact he does have a partisan 
disposition.30 He investigates the case, formulates the indictment, requests a conviction 
when he thinks that the accused is guilty, applies that the judge takes coercive measures 
as and when necessary and appeals against an acquittal when necessary.31 
 
The adversarial system with its combative nature is likely to stifle the truth finding 
process. In the adversarial system, since it is the parties who present their case, they 
usually present their side of the case and not necessarily the truth. The aim of each party 
is to influence the court to arrive at a conclusion favourable to him. They are more 
interested in winning than in eliciting the truth.32 The adversarial lawyer presents the 
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evidence in a manner most suited to his client’s case.33 A vital witness may be omitted if 
the parties fear that his evidence might be unfavourable to their case.34 The determination 
and outcome of the adversarial dispute may therefore depend on the ability and 
competence of the legal representation of one side or the other,35 rather than the ability of 
the arbiter to discover the factual truth. The adversarial cross-examination has been 
hailed as a very effective instrument of seeking out contradictions and inconsistencies 
and finally arriving at the truth.36 This instrument is however not as powerful as the 
ability of the judge to fish out the evidence by demanding the production of evidence and 
witnesses, thereby revealing the full facts. Still, the adversarial process’s major weakness 
is that it operates on the notion that each party ‘owns’ its evidence.37 This is a major 
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hurdle in attaining the truth but can be overcome by the capacity of the judge to seek out 
the truth – a matter which is more fully dealt with in paragraph 3 3 4 below. It is difficult 
to strike an equal balance between the parties in such circumstances. In criminal cases, it 
is mostly the prosecution that has monopoly on the evidence. This results in procedural 
inequality which can only be remedied if the prosecution is obliged to make its evidence 
available to the defence. This results in procedural balance and enables the accused to 
fully defend himself. 
 
3 3 3 Equality 
Another criticism of the adversarial system is founded on the proposition that the state 
and individual do not stand on equal footing. The state has limitless resources for the 
detection and investigation of crime, and to prove the accused’s guilt.38 The nature and 
extent of state resources cannot be matched by the individual to the extent that there is no 
equality of arms between the two sides.39 Placing the burden of proof on the state does 
not necessarily redress the imbalance.40 It is alleged that the inquisitorial system on the 
other hand, removes the possibility of one party dominating the proceedings such as 
where the accused is unrepresented.41 In this context, the interests of the accused are not 
properly protected. But the real fact of the issue is that there are several procedural and 
evidential rules which are constitutionally protective measures that serve to redress the 
imbalance and to empower the accused in the face of the seemingly ubiquitous powers of 
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the state. These include the right to silence, the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
right to legal representation, restrictions in relation to the admissibility of confessions, 
and provisions enabling an impecunious accused to approach the court to subpoena 
witnesses on his behalf.42 It must be noted further that in several adversarial jurisdictions, 
the judge does not just sit in court as a lame arbiter. In Botswana for example, in practice, 
judicial officers use their discretion to ensure that the rights of unrepresented accused are 
protected. A judicial officer will not be slow in ensuring that prosecutors comply strictly 
with the rules of procedure and evidence when the accused is unrepresented.  
 
3 3 4 Judicial participation 
The demand for a fair trial and the requirement to maintain balance between the parties 
often requires that the judicial officer participates in the adversarial contest often to the 
aid of the unrepresented accused. In this way, the judicial officer becomes an active 
participant. The courts have developed a number of legal duties in relation to an accused, 
non-compliance of which may attract an acquittal on appeal if the accused is prejudiced 
as a result. For example, it is a fundamental duty of the courts to keep the accused fully 
informed of his rights at every stage of the trial. These rights should be fully explained 
and it should be ensured that the accused understands them. They include the duty to 
inform the accused of his right to legal representation, the duty to inform him of his rights 
and options at the close of the prosecution’s case, the duty to inform him of his right of 
cross-examination and the purpose thereof, the duty to explain the facts of the case in 
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detail and to give him an opportunity to admit or deny every element of the offence 
where he pleads guilty to a charge.  
 
Though Botswana has an adversarial procedural system, it is laced with traces of 
inquisitorial constructs. These are in the form of statutory powers. For example, the 
courts are empowered at any stage of the proceedings to subpoena and examine any 
witness or to recall and re-examine any witness.43 It must be noted however that the 
application of the adversarial model has been reiterated by judicial pronouncements. In 
the case of Macheng v The State,44 the Court of Appeal rejected the views of O’Brien 
Quinn CJ in Macheng v The State45  that a judge is not a mere umpire and had a duty to 
call a witness who is vital to the case of the accused. Insisting on the adversarial 
approach, the Court, citing the case of an unrepresented accused who is in custody as an 
exception, stated that it is for the accused to present his witnesses in court. The Court 
held that failure of a judge to call a witness would not normally be a ground for appeal 
and that section 20146 should only be resorted to where its use would be essential to 
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achieve justice. It is submitted, therefore, that the Court of Appeal in Macheng47 permits 
a court to call a witness when necessary. This position has been followed in subsequent 
case law. In Nkgageng v The State48  the Court suggested that a court should call an 
expert witness to testify if in its opinion the contents of his affidavit are insufficient. It 
seems that the Court, which did not consider Macheng, went too far. Though courts 
should call witnesses where the interest of justice so dictates, it seems that within the 
context of this case, the Court’s suggestion would amount to the judicial officer taking 
over the prosecution’s case. The result is that the court will be descending into the arena 
to fill in a major gap in the prosecution’s case. Whereas in principle the courts should call 
witnesses if the justice of the case so demands, one does not see how the justice of this 
particular case demanded the calling of the witness in question. In fact, the offence in this 
case49 involved unlawful possession of dagga, a victimless crime. Also, the state has 
trained prosecutors who are expected to conduct their cases with candour. Under the 
circumstances therefore, the justice of the case did not deserve the intervention of the 
judicial officer.  
 
The courts may put questions to any person who is available in court even if he was not 
subpoenaed.50 The purpose of such powers is to assist the court in arriving at a just 
decision.51 South African jurisprudence – even pre-1994 jurisprudence for that matter – it 
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must be noted, supports the inquisitorial methodology to the extent that it aids truth 
finding and the realisation of justice,52 even though that country operates on the 
adversarial model. Perhaps courts should recognise truth finding as their ultimate goal 
and should not be satisfied with the limited truth presented by the parties.53 This will no 
doubt lead to visible changes and deviations in the criminal procedural methodology. But 
a system based on a pragmatic constitutional procedural process is more important than 
legal ideologies, traditions, methods and models. Therefore, if the result of this shift 
assists a disadvantaged accused, it might be the right route to follow as long as a proper 
structure based on effectiveness, efficiency and guided principles is developed.  
 
3 4 Convergence of features 
The challenges of a modern society including rising crime, terrorism, organised crime, 
drug trafficking, victims’ rights, costs and delays have led states to reform their systems 
to the extent that they are willing to borrow from each other.54 Regardless of the system, 
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procedural jurisprudence and practice can reconcile their differing competing values.55 
The characteristics, methodologies, reasoning and values of each procedural system can 
support each other.56 These values are not to be regarded as distinct features that operate 
in the abstract, but as tools central to the approximation of truth.57 The features of both 
systems continue to converge58 in what must be seen as continuing refinements geared at 
arriving at proper decisions and ensuring that the interests of justice are served. In the 
past, certain features of the adversarial system were pitted as sterling characteristics 
applicable only to the Anglo-American tradition. But this is no longer the position.59 For 
example, the German Criminal Procedure Code of 1877, and article 6 of the European 
Convention which has been adopted by several European countries operating the civil 
tradition, contain rules which are in harmony with the adversarial system.60 Recent 
reforms in Italy compelled an author to declare that some civil law systems have “crossed 
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the Rubicon” into the zone of adversarial systems.61 The oral adversarial tradition and the 
written inquisitorial tradition are constantly borrowing from each other as both systems 
continue to converge.62 In civil law countries, increasing importance is being given to 
participation by the parties and their lawyers, with a concomitant shift from pre-trial 
processes to trial adjudication, oral evidence and the right to confrontation.63 Movement 
from adversarialism in common law countries include the requirement of disclosure by 
the parties, the use of pre-trial procedures to protect vulnerable witnesses, greater judicial 
management of proceedings and curtailing the right to silence in some instances.64 
Regardless of whatever virtue is attached to either of these systems, what is important is 
that countries practising both systems have over the years sought to develop them and 
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have not shied away from moving progressively towards internationally recognised 
human right standards.65  
 
It is important that the system of criminal procedure of any jurisdiction should be able to 
balance the interests of the public with the liberties of the individual.66 A criminal justice 
system based solely on interest-based considerations whereby each party engages in 
combat solely for the purpose of winning a case is no longer viable in contemporary legal 
systems. The primary rules of procedure should enable the court to arrive at the truth and 
ensure that the parties act fairly and receive fair treatment. 
 
3 5 Adversarialism and the interest-based system 
3 5 1 Binary application 
The adversarial system is interest-based. The interest-based system manifests itself in a 
binary and a comprehensive form. The binary form finds application in the competing 
interests of the prosecution and accused.67 It represents the limited and immediate 
interests operating in the criminal justice system. In the criminal justice system, the 
prosecution and the accused have traditionally been the focus of proceedings. Their 
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interests in the system are immediate. In its crude state, criminal proceedings was about 
condemning the accused. However, with time, the accused has become a focus of 
protection. The consequences of a conviction are grave and the protection of the accused 
is essential to a fair trial. But the protection of the public from crime cannot be left 
behind. In consequence, criminal proceedings are premised on two stakes. The first is the 
development and more recently, constitutionalisation of fair trial rules that are meant to 
protect the interests of the accused. These rules stem from the realisation that the accused 
runs the greatest risk in the event of a failure of justice. The second stake falls under the 
power of the state. The state has powers to legislate laws governing the criminal process. 
The state from time to time passes laws in the interest of crime prevention and public 
protection. This presents a situation whereby the protection of the accused can be 
compromised as the interests represented by each stake inevitably compete with each 
other. No doubt, the right of the accused features strongly within the concept of 
individual rights, a concept that has gained fundamental importance and recognition. The 
emergence and prominence of individual rights and its displacement of other interests 
play a central role in criminal proceedings. Unfortunately, in the struggle of managing the 
interests of the accused on the one hand and those of the state and public on the other, 
other interests such as those of victims have been sidelined.  
 
3 5 2 Comprehensive application  
The credibility of the criminal justice system is measured by various actors. These actors 
fall into various categories depending on how they interrelate with the system. The actors 
in this regard can be categorised into observers and participants. Each category has 
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various interests in relation to the system, depending on how it interacts with the system 
and how the workings of the system affect individuals or their concerns. In relation to the 
observers, however, their connection with the system is based on perception. Their 
perception is based on how the system is able to demonstrate its regard for equality and 
fairness. Credibility is determined by judicial application of standards of protection and 
constitutional and legal guarantees. The degree to which the courts are willing to enforce 
these guarantees is central to the grades scored by legal systems. For example, in systems 
where courts rigorously enforce rights, the executive is constrained to respect the rights 
of the individual. In effect, the courts manage, influence and supervise standards of 
human rights. Whereas the participants are directly affected by the system, the observers 
may not necessarily be affected by the decisions of the courts. The observers nevertheless 
have an interest in the system. Both participants and observers therefore form part of the 
interest-based system. 
 
3 5 2 1 Objective and subjective observers 
There are two types of observers. The objective observer and subjective observer. The 
objective observer includes persons who are able to make independent, informed and 
detached assessment of the system. Such persons are not directly affected by the outcome 
of litigation. A proper exposure to the complexities of the law equips such persons to 
make a proper examination and analysis of the system and its decisions. Persons such as 
lawyers, academics and journalists belong to this group. They measure credibility on the 
basis of court processes, procedural rules and their implementation. Measuring factors 
include the speed of trials and unnecessary delays, openness, the application of equality, 
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independence and the absence of corruption. The objective observer does not have a 
specific interest. His interest is in seeing justice being done. When justice is done in a 
transparent and open manner, the objective observer has confidence in the system. If the 
perception of the system by the multitude of objective observers who form part of the 
general public is positive, it can be said that there is general public confidence in the 
system. 
 
Like the objective observer, the subjective observer is not directly involved or affected by 
litigation. However, the subjective observer has an obsession or takes on a cause. 
Probably he believes that all offenders of certain kinds of offences deserve sterner 
punishment or long term imprisonment. Therefore, any system that does not continuously 
implement his chosen form of punishment is not performing justice. In this regard, he has 
an interest in the way the system operates. He is fixated and stubbornly opinionated in his 
views. He creates his own norms and values of the system and benchmarks the system 
against them. These are his personal norms and values. Personal norms are usually drastic 
or based on what he perceives as problem-solving, regardless of basic and fundamental 
legal values. To this group belong certain members of the public, including activists. For 
example, an environmental or gender activist might steadfastly want to see a crackdown 
on all crimes directed at the object of his protection, the environment or violent spouses.  
 
3 5 2 2 Myopic and open participants 
There is of course the participant who is directly affected by the system. The outcome of 
the procedures and processes impact on his life. Because of this, his analysis of the 
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system will tend to be based on subjective inclinations. His judgment is conditioned by 
the result of the process or his expectations of the process. His expectations might be 
reasonably subjective, unreasonable, unrealistic or self-serving. Notwithstanding, in each 
case, he assesses the system based on whether his interests or expectations are met. To 
this group belong the accused, victim of crime and the state. The accused who has 
pleaded not guilty wants to be acquitted while the state and the victim expect the 
condemnation of the perceived offender.  
 
There are two kinds of participants. First, there is the myopic participant. The myopic 
participant generally wants an efficient legal system that convicts offenders or perceived 
offenders regardless of whether the system is seen as high-handed on offenders or 
whether arbitrary procedures are used. When the myopic participant says that he wants 
justice, what he really wants is revenge. He measures credibility on the basis of his 
individual nuances, situation, background, and the capacity in which he comes into 
contact with the legal system. His assessment of the system is therefore strictly interest-
based.  
 
The second kind of participant is the open participant. Though he has an interest-based 
stance in that he wants the case to be decided in his favour, he is able to comprehend the 
system and appreciate the reasoning of the court even when he does not get his just 
desserts. As long as the process is transparent he is willing to follow them and to accept 
that evidentially and legally, the results could not have favoured him. He accepts the 
decision of the courts and the process on which it is based, and moves on. Alternatively, 
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he follows regular appeal procedures if he believes that the decision of the trial court is 
wrong. 
 
As has been said, the binary application of the interest-based system relates to the 
interests of the prosecution and the accused. Unfortunately, the prosecution has greater 
advantages due to its support by the state. It is the state’s responsibility to fight crime. It 
does so partly by investigating and prosecuting alleged offenders. Therefore, the police 
and prosecution are state institutions. They benefit from state funding and resources. The 
investigative powers and resources of the police and prosecution are enormous when 
compared with the accused, thereby making the accused the weaker party. An accused, 
therefore, is disadvantaged during investigations and as a courtroom adversary. Equality 
of arms is only guaranteed if the accused is reasonably funded in preparing and 
presenting his defence. 
 
Equality between the parties and a recognition of the right of the accused to defend 
himself and to present his defence bear legitimate reference in the mind of each observer 
and participant. The ability of the accused to call and cross-examine witnesses, to have 
access to information, to give evidence, and to seek legal representation are standards 
which are crucial to the measuring of the application of the equality principle. The 
candour with which these standards are administered by the court and perceived by the 
observer and participant is the basis for the acceptance and credibility of the adversarial 
system. That these standards be applied fairly and equally is crucial to public perception 
of the judicial process, a process that is alien to the majority of the public and can easily 
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be misinterpreted and misunderstood. The operative interests of the parties in the 
adversarial system demand that each party is afforded procedural equality. 
 
Inevitably, fairness is the operative denominator that the observer and participant invoke 
in the deliberation of their interests. Interests are considered as met when the system is 
seen as fair. Equality of arms is a mainstay in the consideration of fairness. A recognition 
of the principle undoubtedly promotes and strengthens the court’s appreciation of the 
accused’s access to substantive and procedural justice, a better application of rules of 
procedure, and the strengthening of those rules that are meant to cater for the 
disadvantaged accused in light of the powers of the state. This will in turn satisfy the 
observer and participant that the requirements of fairness have been met. 
 
3 6 The right to adversarial proceedings 
Adversarialism is interest-based. In this regard, fairness demands that both sides to the 
contest participate equally. Central to the process is formal equality between the parties,68 
allowing a party to respond to each step taken by the opponent. This response component 
ensures that no party is disadvantaged and is central to the realisation of equality. In 
Milatová v Czech Republic,69 the right to adversarial proceedings was emphasised when 
the Court noted: 
                                                 
68
 Van Koppen & Penrod Adversarial or Inquisitorial 2; McEwan Evidence and the Adversarial Process 1; 
Crombag Adversarial or Inquisitorial 22; Safferling International Criminal Procedure 266. 
69
 (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 534; in Singer v United States 380 U.S. 24 (1965), the Court noted that the 
Constitution recognises an adversarial system as the proper method of determining guilt; see also Rowe and 
Davis v United Kingdom (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 1. 
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“The Court further reiterates that the concept of a fair hearing implies the right to 
adversarial proceedings, according to which the parties must have the opportunity 
not only to make known any evidence needed for their claims to succeed, but also 
to have knowledge of, and comment on, all evidence adduced or observations 
filed, with a view to influencing the court’s decision.”70  
 
A whole range of continental inquisitorial procedures have been held by the European 
Court to flout the principle of equality of arms due to the absence of the response 
component. These include procedures that deny the accused the opportunity to participate 
in the proceedings, to respond to the evidence or the prosecutor’s conduct of the case and 
to properly articulate his defence. In Borgers v Belgium71 the Court held that there was 
lack of equal standing between the Procureur-General and the appellant before the Court 
of Cassation and that this breached article 6(1) of the European Convention. In particular, 
the Procureur-General was entitled to state his opinion in open court as to whether the 
appellant’s appeal in a criminal case should be allowed and then retire with the court to 
take part (without a vote) in its discussion of the appeal. By contrast, the appellant and his 
lawyer could not respond to the Procureur-General’s opinion or retire with the judges. 
                                                 
70
 Para 59; See Nideröst-Huber v Switzerland (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 709; “In order to comply with article 6, 
judicial proceedings must be adversarial, a concept which is similar to that of equality of arms. The right to 
adversarial proceedings means, in principle, the opportunity for the parties to a trial to have knowledge of 
and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed.”: Clements, Mole & Simmons European 
Human Rights: Taking A Case under the Convention (1999) 2 ed 165. 
71
 (1993) 15 E.H.R.R. 92. 
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The Court accepted that the Procureur-General was not part of the prosecution and that 
his function was to give an independent and impartial advice to the court in the manner of 
an advocate-general. However, once he mentioned an opinion on the merits of an 
appellant’s appeal, he became an opponent to whose arguments the appellant should have 
been able to respond. In reaching its decision the Court emphasised the importance of 
“appearances” and the increased sensitivity of the public to the fair administration of 
justice. 
  
Pataki and Dunshirn v Austria72 concerned a practice in terms of which the Public 
Prosecutor could present arguments before the Austrian Criminal Court of Appeal whilst 
the appellant had no right of audience. The Commission held that the absence of the 
appellant constituted an inequality which infringed the right to a fair trial. Austria 
changed its law following the Commission’s finding against it.  
 
In Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece73 the Court dealt with a Greek 
legislation which made inevitable a decision against the appellant in his pending civil 
claim against the government. In this legislation the Greek parliament provided that all 
clauses including arbitration clauses in preferential contracts concluded under the military 
regime were revoked and that any arbitration was null and void. It also provided that all 
claims arising from the termination of such contracts were barred by statute. The Court 
                                                 
72
 Nos. 596/59 and 789/60, YB 714 (1983) Com. Rep. 
73
 (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 293; see Harris, O’Boyle & Warbick Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (1995) 209; Simor & Emmerson Human Rights Practice (2001) para 6.085; Reid A Practitioner’s 
Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (2008) 118. 
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found a breach of article 6(1), stating that equality of arms precluded any interference by 
the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the determination 
of the dispute. The Court noted that the legislature’s intervention had taken place when 
judicial proceedings in which the state was a party, was pending. The Court held that the 
notion of fair trial precluded any interference with the administration of justice by the 
legislature designed to influence the adjudication of a legal dispute. 
 
The underlying principle of these cases is that adversarial procedure, including 
procedural equality, is fundamental to a fair trial. Procedural equality includes the right of 
audience and an opportunity for the accused to comment on the case of the prosecution 
and the prohibition of measures, including legislative measures, which disadvantage the 
accused procedurally. The cases signify that procedural rules that operate to the 
disadvantage to the accused will fall foul of the principle of equality of arms.  
  
Though both the adversarial and inquisitorial models set out to do justice, the practical 
methods of achieving it are different.74 The assumed position in the adversarial tradition 
is that justice is served if the parties are treated equally in presenting their case.75 Fairness 
is the mainstay even at the sacrifice of attaining the truth.76 In the inquisitorial system on 
the other hand, the search for the truth is the ultimate goal even at the instance of 
                                                 
74
 Crombag Adversarial or Inquisitorial 23. 
75
 Crombag Adversarial or Inquisitorial 23; Reid notes that equality of arms is linked to considerations that 
proceedings must be adversarial: Reid A Practitioner’s Guide 114. 
76
 Crombag Adversarial or Inquisitorial 24. 
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sacrificing fair play and equality.77 The inquisitorial system does not countenance 
equality and the judge is the instrument of truth finding. The philosophy of 
inquisitorialism is that, since the parties to a contest are basically interested in presenting 
their own side of the case, a “detached and wise adjudicator, using whichever method he 
deems fit, is much better placed to do so [finding the truth].”78 The inquisitorial argument 
is that the outcome of a case should not depend on which party has a better advocate or is 
able to present a “highly selective” version of its case.79   
 
The extent to which the parties are involved in the criminal process implicates the 
equality of the process. Adversarialism guarantees an involvement of the accused in the 
trial process. The accused has an immediate presence in that he presents his evidence and 
cross-examines prosecution witnesses. Inquisitorialism on the other hand involves the 
court having access to a dossier of evidence against the accused and the accused’s right to 
confrontation which demands that he faces and contends with his in court is limited. 
Though it may be argued that the contents of the dossier are of no real consequence 
unless produced orally in evidence, the presiding officer might be indirectly affected by 
knowledge of their contents, often to the detriment of the accused.80  Adversarialism on 
the other hand functions around equality as it recognises two opposing parties engaged in 
                                                 
77
 Crombag Adversarial or Inquisitorial 24. 
78
 Crombag Adversarial or Inquisitorial 24. 
79
 McEwan Evidence and the Adversarial Process 11. 
80
 Safferling International Criminal Procedure 267. 
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combat.81 The procedural polarity of adversarialism therefore enables the parties to 
present their respective cases uninhibited.82 This is essential for fairness.    
 
3 7 Conclusion 
Clearly and without any doubt, the application of the principle of equality of arms 
involves the right to confront, to make and respond to submissions, to cross-examine the 
opponent’s witnesses and to object to inadmissible evidence. These are underlying 
characteristics of the adversarial system which implies that the application of the 
principle lies within the domain of adversarialism. In the inquisitorial system by contrast, 
a dossier forms part of the evidence before the court. The dossier is completed at the pre-
trial stage. The dossier is completed by an investigating judge or public prosecutor and 
their conclusions as well as reports from the testimony of witnesses are placed before the 
court in advance, thereby considerably influencing the court.83 The inquisitorial system 
therefore severely restricts the right of the accused to defend himself. Indeed, the 
European Court and Commission have on a number of occasions found continental 
procedures to flout the principle.  
 
                                                 
81
 Safferling International Criminal Procedure 266; Zappala notes that the adversarial system is more 
suitable to offering protection to the rights of the accused: Zappala Human Rights 16.  
82
 Crombag Adversarial or Inquisitorial 23. 
83
 Stavros The Guarantees for the Accused Person Under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: An Analysis of the Application of the Convention and A Comparison with other Instruments (1993) 
231; Osborne 1993 Criminal Law Review 258-259; Wasek-Wiaderek Equality of Arms 27; Safferling 
International Criminal Procedure 266. 
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It must be noted however that employing the active inquisitorial judge does have some 
positive effects in that he is able to elicit evidence and shed more light on the issues, a 
situation that might not be tenable in the adversarial framework. Rather than relying on 
evidence which is presented to him and the limitations which this might cause, he is able 
to unearth the truth. In this process he may be able to assist the unrepresented accused 
and create some form of balance. While the Botswana criminal procedural system is 
predominantly adversarial, the practice of judicial intervention in assisting the 
unrepresented accused serves well to redress the imbalances in the system. While both 
systems can contribute positively to the enhanced application of the principle, it must be 
noted that conceptually, the principle of equality of arms demands the adversarial 
process. Article 6 of the European Convention from which the principle derives 
application and its attendant rights upon which it grew, is principally framed on the 
adversarial context. It is not surprising therefore that the procedures of civil law 
jurisdictions have on several occasions fallen foul of the principle. The principle involves 
giving appropriate recognition to the presence of the opposing sides, the very premise 
upon which adversarialism operates. Inevitably, the principle demands a right to 
adversarial proceedings. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 NORMATIVE VALUE AND LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
EQUALITY OF ARMS IN DOMESTIC LAW 
4 1 Introduction 
How does the principle of equality of arms become relevant in the scheme of the 
Botswana legal order. After all, it is of international origin and popularly limited to 
international procedural law. Moreover, its normative value does not qualify it as “law”. 
But perhaps, the inability to treat the principle strictly as law gives it some measure of 
flexibility which should make its application even more convenient. To be able to justify 
the application of the principle in Botswana’s legal order, it is necessary to determine its 
normative value. Comparative analysis of a number of jurisdictions demonstrates that the 
principle has received application in domestic law. There is therefore some precedent for 
the application of the principle in the Botswana legal order. 
 
4 2 Normative value 
Equality in proceedings is recognised in international law. It is engraved in article 
14(3)(e) of the ICCPR and article 6 of the European Convention. The European Court has 
formulated equality of arms as a “principle”, on the basis of article 6 of the European 
Convention. It has also been coined as a “requirement” or “concept”.1 However, it would 
appear that it has not attained the status of law. Toney describes the principle as “a lens 
through which the requisite procedural fairness in any criminal proceeding can be 
ascertained. It is a central element of the concept of a fair trial guaranteed by article 6 of 
                                                 
1
 Trechsel Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (2005) 97. 
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the Convention.”2 The principle therefore remains an essential element of a fair trial, non-
observance of which may render a trial unfair.3 In Foucher v France,4 it was described as 
“…one of the features of the wider concept of a fair trial…”5 Consequently, the principle 
is not recognised as a right.6 This results in relativity in its application such that there 
may be no violation if both parties are equally deprived of a fair trial right.7 Thus, in the 
case of Jasper v United Kingdom8 the applicant complained that the results of wire-
tapping were withheld from the defence. The Court stated that both the prosecution and 
defence were prohibited from adducing any evidence which tended to suggest that calls 
                                                 
2
 Toney “English Criminal Procedure Under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Implications for Custodial Interrogation Practices” 2002 Houston Journal of International Law 411 438; 
Bufford notes that the principle “is recogni[s]ed as an uncodified element of the right to a fair trial provided 
in Article 6. Thus, Article 6 makes ‘equality of arms’ a core element of the adversary criminal process.”: 
Bufford “Center of Main Interests, International Insolvency Case Venue, and Equality of Arms: The 
Eurofood Decision and the European Court of Justice” 2007 Northwestern Journal of International Law 
and Business 351 396; while recognising equality of arms as a principle, Silver advocates for the need to 
“…recogni[s]e an implied constitutional right to the equality of arms.”: Silver “Equality of Arms and the 
Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional Right” 1990 Wisconsin Law Review 1007 1032 &1041 
respectively. 
3
 Conte The Judicial Process in Conte, Davidson & Burchill (eds) Defining Civil and Political Rights (The 
Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee) (2004) 117 122; Robertson & Merrills 
Human Rights in Europe  3 ed (1993) 108. 
4
 (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 234. 
5
 Para 34. 
6
 Bufford 2007 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 396. 
7
 Trechsel Human Rights 97. 
8
 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 441. 
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had been intercepted by the state and therefore the principle was respected. It has also 
been held that there was no violation of the principle where both the prosecution and 
accused were absent during an application for leave to appeal proceedings.9 It can be seen 
therefore that a violation of the principle attracts consequences when the accused has 
suffered a disadvantage and not because he was deprived of a “right.” It applies in the 
criminal process in an overlapping form, giving more expression and reality in the 
application of procedural rights.  
 
The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations in its interpretation of article 14 of 
the ICCPR has linked the normative footprint of the principle to the right of equality 
before the courts.10 According to the Committee, the right to equality before the courts, 
which the article sets to guarantee, is important in safeguarding the rule of law. 
According to the Committee: 
 
“The right to equality before courts and tribunals, in general terms, guarantees, in 
addition to the principles mentioned in the second sentence of Article 14, 
paragraph 1, those of equal access and equality of arms, and ensures that the 
parties to the proceedings in question are treated without any discrimination.”11 
 
                                                 
9
 X v United Kingdom Application 5871/72; X v United Kingdom Application 7413/76; EM v Norway 
Application 20087/92. 
10
 General Comment No 32 CCPR/C/GC/32. 
11
 Para 8. 
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The right to equality before the courts ensures equality of arms. This guarantees that the 
same procedural rights are available to both parties unless distinctions are based on the 
law and can be justified on reasonable grounds.12 It can be seen therefore that though the 
principle receives compelling recognition which is of normative value, it has not been 
conceptualised as law but as an integral element in the determination of fairness. 
 
4 3 Express recognition 
There is express recognition of the principle of equality of arms by international and 
internationalised tribunals. The express recognition of the principle by the European 
Court, the European Commission and other internationalised tribunals such as the ICTY, 
ICTR and SCSL have had immediate consequences in that the importance of the 
preparation of the defence case, and to some extent the allocation of resources, have been 
given due consideration. Though equality of arms is considered as a single aspect of the 
right to a fair trial, it is the most crucial factor underlying the fairness of an adversarial 
trial. The European Court recognises equality of arms and the right to adversarial 
proceedings as the two main aspects of a fair trial.13 In the setting of adversaries, fairness 
is likened to sporting activities which involve rules and values like respect for the 
opponent, honesty, self-restraint, the desire for victory but not victory at any cost.14 The 
acknowledgement of the rights of the accused and the fact that the procedure is designed 
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 Para 13. 
13
 Trechsel Human Rights 88; Brandsetter v Austria (1993) 15 E.H.R.R. 378; Jasper v United Kingdom 
supra note 8; Dombo Beheer v Netherlands (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 213. 
14
 Trechsel Human Rights 82. 
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to permit him to defend himself demands equal participation by the accused and the 
ability to do so.  
 
Express recognition of the principle is few and far between in domestic law, especially in 
jurisdictions outside the European Union where article 6 of the European Convention and 
the jurisprudence of the European Court and the Commission are of little consequence. 
However, specific reference has been made to the principle in South African case law. In 
Ex Parte Institute for Security Studies: In Re S v Basson,15 a prominent South African 
research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), had applied to be admitted as 
amicus curiae in a criminal appeal to the Constitutional Court. The intended submissions 
of the ISS were unfavourable to the respondent. The state consented while the respondent 
(the accused) opposed the application. The Court outlined the principles relating to the 
application in question. It noted that in order to be admitted as amicus curiae, the 
applicant should satisfy the court that it will be raising new issues not already covered by 
the parties. The Court was of the view that since the issues that the ISS intended to raise 
had already been covered by the state, there was no need to admit the ISS as amicus 
curiae. Therefore, the application was dismissed. Having discussed the rules relating to 
the admission of an amicus curiae, the Court noted at the end of the judgment: 
 
“As a general matter, in criminal matters a court should be astute not to allow the 
submissions of an amicus to stack the odds against an accused person. Ordinarily, 
an accused in criminal matters is entitled to a well-defined case emanating from 
                                                 
15
 2006 (2) SACR 350 (CC). 
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the State. If the submissions of an amicus tend to strengthen the case against the 
accused, this is cause for caution. This, however, is not an inflexible rule. But it is 
a consideration based on fairness, equality of arms, and more importantly, what 
is in the interests of justice. In these special circumstances we did not consider it 
to be in the interests of justice to admit the applicant as an amicus.”16 
 
The Court did not set out to embrace the principle of equality of arms as a functional part 
of South African law. If this was the intention, the Court would have given a conceptual 
and in-depth analysis of the principle as it did in relation to the amicus curiae question. 
What is clear however is that it did recognise the principle as a part of fairness in criminal 
proceedings. It recognised that criminal proceedings are a contest between the state and 
the accused. It therefore saw unfairness in permitting arguments that would strengthen 
the state’s case and create an unnecessary imbalance. It is clear that the respondent would 
have had an opportunity to respond to the arguments of the ISS. One wonders therefore 
why the Court was of the view that allowing the submissions of the ISS was against the 
interests of justice. The Court did not elaborate and one is left to speculate. Of course, 
though the submission of the ISS was principled and done from purely a human rights 
perspective, the respondent would clearly be disadvantaged as this would have added to 
the already elaborate resources at the state’s disposal. The respondent and his lawyers 
would not have had sufficient resources to counter the manpower in terms of lawyers and 
the amount of research that the ISS would have brought into the forum. Whereas it 
appears from the judgment that the issue of equality was mentioned obiter, the Court did 
refer to the imbalance of the situation as “special circumstances” which one may say is a 
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 Paras 15-16. (Emphasis added). 
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determining factor in the Court’s decision. The normative notion of the Court’s reference 
to equality of arms is not clear. The issue before the Court did not arise from matters 
relating to the constitutional right to a fair trial. Therefore, though mention was made of 
“fairness” and the “interests of justice”, the Court did not link the principle to any 
specific constitutional right or the right to a fair trial. It is not clear therefore whether the 
Court had in mind a general common law fairness or whether the Court was referring to 
the constitutional framework. One cannot infer from the jurisdiction of the Court that it 
could only have been referring to constitutional fairness, and there is no bar to it relying 
on a general common law notion of fairness and justice. Even though several questions 
were left open, the case clearly establishes that imbalances between the state and the 
accused in criminal proceedings may fall foul of the principle of equality of arms. The 
case is significant in that it lays the foundation for the application of the principle in 
South African law. 
 
The principle has been specifically referred to, albeit in passing, in Australian17 and New 
Zealand18 case law mostly in civil and administrative matters. However, in the Australian 
                                                 
17
 R v Rich (Ruling No 2) [2008] VSC 141. 
18
 Ch’Elle Properties (NZ) Ltd v CIR [2005] NZHC 190; Ministry of Fisheries v District Court at 
Christchurch and Ors [2007] NZHC 1093; Chesterfield Preschools Ltd and Ors v The Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [2005] NZHC 37; The Queen v King and Stevens [2008] NZCA 79; The Queen v Philip 
Wayne Tukuafu [2003] NZCA 325. 
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case of Ragg v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria & Corcoris19 the principle received full 
analysis and articulation.  
 
In Ragg, Mr Ragg an officer of the Australian Federal Police had brought six charges of 
tax evasion against Mr Corcoris, a Melbourne property developer. To assist in his 
defence at the committal, Mr Corcoris had issued two summonses to Mr Ragg to produce 
certain specified documents to the Magistrates’ court of Victoria. Mr Ragg made an 
application to a magistrate for orders striking out most of the paragraphs of the 
summonses. The magistrate rejected the application. Mr Ragg then applied to the 
Supreme Court of Victoria for a review of the magistrate’s decision. He contended that 
the summonses were too wide and required the production of a large number of irrelevant 
documents. He further contended that the evidence to be led against Corcoris and certain 
other evidence had already been handed over to him in preparation for the committal. 
Corcoris on the other hand contended that the police had obtained a large number of 
documents during extensive investigations, and that only some of those documents had 
been produced. 
 
Bell J held that the magistrate did not err in upholding the summonses. He noted that the 
right to equality before the law was relevant to the duty of a prosecutor to disclose 
material documents to the accused in criminal proceedings. The Court recognised the 
principle of equality of arms as emanating from articles 14(1) and (3) of the ICCPR to 
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 [2008] VSC 1. The principle was also briefly discussed by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Paul 
Rodney Hansen v The Queen [2007] NZSC 7. 
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which Australia is a party. According to Bell J, the principle is relevant to the issue of 
disclosure. Recognising the superior resources of the state, he noted that the principle of 
equality of arms applies in an adversarial trial. According to him, this gives rise to the 
issue of disclosure by the prosecution. He concluded that the right to equality before the 
courts ensures equality of arms which requires that the same procedural rights be 
provided to all the parties unless distinctions are based on the law and can be justified on 
objective and reasonable grounds. While recognising the principle as an international 
human rights principle, the Court noted the importance of international human rights law, 
noting Australia’s international obligations under the ICCPR. He noted a close interaction 
between the principle of equality of arms as recognised in international human rights 
jurisprudence and a common law duty on the prosecution to disclose, with the former 
strengthening the latter. He noted that without disclosure, there can hardly be equality of 
arms between the prosecution and the accused. 
 
4 4 Implicit countenance  
Though the principle is relatively unknown in domestic jurisdictions, various rights 
which the principle seeks to foster have long been embraced in domestic jurisdictions. 
The Botswana Constitution and Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act consciously ensure 
that a balance exists and that the accused gets his day in court. The principle receives 
implicit countenance in that rights such as the right to cross-examine, the right to testify 
and the right to comment on the submissions of the state are engraved in section 10 of the 
Constitution of Botswana. 
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There are a few cases in Botswana where the need to address the imbalances between the 
prosecution and the defence have been mentioned obiter, thus giving implicit 
countenance to the principle of equality of arms. In Mmopi and Another v The State20 the 
Court noted that an unrepresented accused is under severe disadvantage. As Murray J put 
it:  
 
“When a person is on trial for a serious offence and does not have the advantage 
of legal representation I consider that it is essential that the magistrate should 
offer advice by way of explaining court procedure to such a person. An 
unrepresented accused is under a severe disadvantage. If he is given no assistance 
on matters of procedure that one would not necessarily expect to be known to an 
unrepresented accused person injustice could easily result.”21 
 
The Court noted therefore that there exists a duty on the presiding officer to explain the 
procedure of the court to him. The Court noted in effect that where an accused had 
elected to give evidence in his defence and then upon taking oath states that he has 
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nothing to say, the court has a duty to explain to him that he could use the opportunity to 
explain his side of the story and explain to him what the issues were.  
 
In Motshwane and Others v The State,22 the Court, in examining section 10(2)(c) of the 
Constitution which requires the accused to be given adequate time and facilities to 
prepare his defence, observed that section 10 generally purports to guarantee “the 
protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of an individual facing a criminal 
charge vis-a-vis the state and its powerful agents such as the police, prosecution etc.”23 
The Court stated that the section “affords the individual ammunition to challenge any act 
by the state or its agents that is perceived to offend against the rights of the individual to a 
fair trial as enshrined under the provision…”24 This is a resounding declaration that the 
purpose of section 10 is to protect the rights of the accused as well as to ensure equality 
of arms. 
 
Section 3 of the Constitution, which relates to equal protection under the law, is usually 
applied in relation to substantive rights, more often to cases in respect of discrimination.25 
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 [2002] 2 B.L.R. 368. 
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However, in the civil case of O’Reilly v Gibbons and Another,26 the Court observed that 
it is an integral requirement of the procedural system that the respondent to an application 
to be made in court, be notified. The Court remarked: 
 
“The requirement to notify the respondent of an application to be made to the 
court is an important and integral part of our procedural system. So is the 
requirement to serve on such party the application documents. Not only are these 
principles inherent in the scheme created by Order 12 of the Rules, [of the High 
Court] they readily appeal to our basic sense of fair play, and find unequivocal 
favour in no less an authority than the provisions of our Constitution relating to 
secure equal protection of the law.”27 
 
The principle of equality manifests itself when the Court noted that the need for the 
respondent to file a notice of opposition and answering affidavits is founded on a 
“principle of fairness and natural justice.”28 While the principle is not known in the 
Botswana legal order, the courts implicitly recognise its application as an instrument for 
fair trial rights. This is made possible by the structure and content of section 10 of the 
Constitution. It must be noted however that an express application of the principle and an 
alignment and the appreciation of procedural rights in terms of the principle will do well 
for the full enjoyment of such rights.   
                                                 
26
 [2001] 2 B.L.R. 605. 
27
 609H-610A. 
28
 607H. 
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Recent decisions of the courts of Botswana, binding the prosecution to disclose all 
information obtained during investigation to the accused, enhance equality between the 
parties.29 It must be noted however that these cases, even those that refer to the need for 
procedural equality, do not expressly incorporate the principle of equality of arms. In 
support of its ruling for disclosure, the Court in Ahmed v Attorney-General30 quoted 
passages from several foreign cases. Reference to procedural equality was very scant in 
these quoted passages and the principle was not mentioned. None of the passages quoted, 
except for one,31 incorporated the principle of equality of arms. When the Court finally 
addressed the issue of procedural equality, deriving support from the Namibian case of S 
v Nasser,32 it appeared that the issue of equality merely came into the discussion by 
chance. The Court specifically adopted a passage from this case wherein the Namibian 
court in dealing with the issue of disclosure remarked:  
 
“The State inevitably enjoys an enormous advantage in a criminal trial. It has the 
might of the police force at its disposal, it has a specialised prosecuting authority, 
it has access to expert witnesses and modern methods of communication and, not 
least, it has the power to legislate procedures to be followed. The State and an 
                                                 
29
 Motshwane and Others v The State supra note 22; State v Fane [2001] 1 B.L.R. 319; Ahmed v Attorney-
General [2002] 2 B.L.R. 431; Attorney-General v Ahmed [2003] 1 B.L.R. 158 (CA). 
30
 Supra note 29. 
31
 Aston Little (Communication No 283/1988) Human Rights Committee of the United Nations. Cited at 
454. 
32
 1995 (2) SA 82 (Nm). 
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accused at a criminal trial do not stand on an equal footing and the purpose of art 
12 is to ensure that the imbalance is, so far as possible, redressed.”33 
 
The Court in Ahmed v Attorney-General went on to note that: 
 
“I respectfully adopt that line of reasoning and its conclusion, viz that the issue at 
stake is to redress the imbalance in a criminal trial given the advantages which the 
State enjoys. It is not to balance an accused’s right to a fair trial against the 
interest of the State.”34 
 
As can be seen from the above passage, the reference to Nasser was made solely in 
support of the Court’s rejection of the state’s argument that should the accused have a 
right of disclosure, the state should have a similar right for the sake of equality. Equality 
was not the central issue in the Court’s discussion. Though the Court recognised the 
imbalances in resources between the state and the accused, it appeared to have merely 
stumbled upon the issue in support of its contention. However, Ahmed v Attorney-
General remains the closest the courts have come in recognising the principle in criminal 
proceedings. Except for Motshwane,35 none of the cases finding in favour of disclosure 
made reference to procedural equality. 
 
                                                 
33
 Supra note 32 111B-C. 
34
 Supra note 29 456C-D. 
35
 Supra note 22. 
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4 5 Justifying the application of the principle in the Botswana legal order 
While noting that the Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act36 did 
not apply to the action as it commenced before the Charter entered into force, Bell J in 
Ragg discussed the right to a fair trial under article 14 of the ICCPR to which section 2437 
of the Victoria Charter is similar. The Court stated that the principle of equality of arms 
emanates from article 14 of the ICCPR, reiterating that the principle is an aspect of the 
right to a fair trial. While the Court also noted the foundational relation of article 6 of the 
European Convention in relation to the principle, it understandably focused its attention 
on the ICCPR to which Australia is a party. The Court observed that international human 
rights may be relevant to judicial discretion where the human rights instrument is relevant 
to the matter in question and where the consideration of the instrument is not inconsistent 
with the relevant legislation or common law. The Court noted that an international human 
right in a convention that has not been incorporated into domestic law can be taken into 
account in the exercise of a judicial power or discretion, to strike out the summonses, if 
the subject matter of the case comes within its scope. In the Court’s view, the human 
rights contained in articles 14(1) and (3) of the ICCPR and the principle of equality of 
arms were directly relevant to the issue. 
 
States ratify treaties, thereby undertaking to comply with their terms.38 Article 14 of the 
ICCPR, to which Botswana is a party and to which section 10 of the Constitution is very 
                                                 
36
 Act 43 of 2006. 
37
 Sections 24 and 25 of the Charter provide for various rights relating to a fair hearing. 
38
 Drzemczewski European Human Rights in Domestic Law: A Comparative Study (1983) 20. 
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similar, and article 6 of the European Convention after which section 10 of the 
Constitution is modelled, justify judicial embracement of the principle in Botswana. Of 
course the ICCPR has not been transformed into domestic law and therefore does not 
have consequential binding effect on the Constitution, rules of procedure and judicial 
organ of government.39 In any case, the same procedural norms in the European 
Convention and ICCPR are also found in section 10 of the Botswana Constitution. The 
transposition of the principle into the Botswana legal order should therefore not be a 
difficult task. 
 
In Tomasevic v Travaglini,40 a case involving a court’s duty to ensure a fair trial by 
assisting an unrepresented accused, the Victorian Supreme Court held that international 
human rights are significant in the exercise of judicial powers and discretions. The Court 
stated: 
 
“Apart from the Charter, the ICCPR does not ‘operate as a direct source of 
individual rights and obligations’ because it has not otherwise been incorporated 
into Australian law. But like other international instruments to which Australia is 
                                                 
39
 Drzemczewski European Human Rights 35; “It is a firmly established principle of English constitutional 
law, received as part of the common law received in Botswana, that an international instrument does not 
constitute part of the domestic law until it has been incorporated by an Act of Parliament”: Fombad The 
Protection of Human Rights in Botswana: An Overview of the Regulatory Framework in Fombad (ed) 
Essays on the Law of Botswana (2007) 1 10; Tshosa The Status and Role of International Law in the 
National Law of Botswana in Fombad (ed) Essays on the Law of Botswana (2007) 229 237. 
40
 [2007] VSC 337. 
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a party, the ICCPR has an independent and ongoing legal significance in 
Australian and therefore Victorian domestic law, a significance which is not 
diminished, but can only be enhanced, by the enactment of the Charter.”41 
 
The Court in taking into account the duty to ensure a fair trial by assisting the accused, 
noted the importance of promoting and respecting the right of equality before the law and 
access to justice that are contained in the ICCPR. 
 
Botswana inherited the dualist system from her former colonial master Britain. Therefore, 
international conventions that are ratified or acceded to by the executive only bind the 
state on the international plane. They are not applicable in domestic law unless they are 
translated into law or adopted by domestic legislation. In addition, customary 
international law enjoys direct application. 
 
International human rights law as a subject is a recent and developing area of the law. It 
essentially finds substance in conventions though it may be said that some of the 
principles of these conventions such as the prohibition against torture have crystallised 
into rules of customary international law. It is axiomatic that the courts are bound by 
conventions adopted by parliament, and rules of customary international law. Further, 
there is a presumption that parliament will not deliberately enact laws in breach of the 
country’s international obligations.42 Therefore, the courts as a matter of construction will 
                                                 
41
 Para 72. 
42
 In Attorney-General v Dow supra note 25, Amissah JP noted: “I am in agreement that Botswana is a 
member of the community of civilised States which has undertaken to abide by certain standards of 
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presume that the legislature did not intend to breach the country’s international 
obligations unless this is the clear indication from the statute. The presumption that 
parliament will not legislate in contravention of the country’s international obligations 
supports the argument that international conventions to which the country subscribe, and 
the jurisprudence surrounding them should validly serve as an aid to the interpretation of 
local statutes as well as the Constitution.43 Of course it cannot be said that the precise 
legal status of conventions form the basis of statutory or constitutional interpretation, 
rather it is the philosophy, general purpose and practice behind the conventions that are 
of significance.44 While formal domestication of conventions is significant, the practical 
judicial application of the relevant principles ensures their realisation.45 States are bound 
                                                                                                                                                 
conduct, and, unless it is impossible to do otherwise, it would be wrong for its courts to interpret its 
legislation in a manner which conflicts with the international obligations Botswana has undertaken.” 154D-
E; in the same case, Aguda JA stated: “We have a written Constitution, and if there are two possible ways 
of interpreting that Constitution or any of the laws enacted under it, one of which obliges our country to act 
contrary to its international undertakings and the other obliges our country to conform with such 
undertaking, then the courts should give their authority to the latter.”: 169G-H; Good v Attorney-General 
[2005] 2 B.L.R. 333 (CA); Fombad & Quansah The Botswana Legal System (2006) 224; Fombad The 
Protection of Human Rights 11; Tshosa The Status and Role of International Law 242. 
43
 Clapman Human Rights in the Private Sphere (1993) 15; “… [A]n instrument which has been signed, 
whether or not it has been ratified and domesticated, still has important legal consequences domestically as 
an aid to statutory interpretation.”: Fombad The Protection of Human Rights 11; Tshosa The Status and 
Role of International Law 240. 
44
 Clapman Human Rights 15; Schachter The Obligation to Implement the Convention in Domestic Law in 
Henkin (ed) The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981) 311 317. 
45
 Drzewicki The Status of International Human Rights Instruments in Domestic Law in Rosas (ed) 
International Human Rights Norms in Domestic Law: Finnish and Polish Perspectives (1990) 1 6. 
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under the pacta sunt servanda principle to perform treaty obligations such as ensuring 
their effects domestically.46 However, the ICCPR has not been incorporated into 
domestic law and the question still remains as to what should be the court’s approach to 
those norms of international human rights law that are not binding in the domestic legal 
order.   
 
Consideration for international conventions might be said to breach the transformation 
tradition that Botswana has inherited from Britain.47 But an interpretation that will 
enhance or enforce rights provided for in international conventions and especially those 
to which the country is a party, should always be preferred.48 In any case, it must be 
noted that there are instances where the European Convention was invoked as a guide to 
the interpretation of local law in Britain, even though Britain was not at the time a party 
to the Convention.49 Indications are that the courts in Botswana have no difficulty in 
adopting this approach. Indeed, there is statutory support in Botswana for the use of 
international law as an aid to statutory interpretation. In this regard a court may have 
                                                 
46
 Clapman Human Rights 9-10. 
47
 Clapman Human Rights 18; Fombad The Protection of Human Rights 10; Tshosa The Status and Role of 
International Law 237; Good v Attorney-General supra note 42 337.   
48
 Loucaides Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights (1995) 172. 
49
 Schachter The Obligation to Implement 316; see R v Miah [1974] 1 W.L.R. 683; R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, exparte Bhajan Singh [1975] 3 W.L.R. 225. 
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regard to a relevant treaty as an aid to the interpretation of any enactment.50 This 
approach was supported in Dow in relation to constitutional interpretation when the Court 
declared: 
 
“Even if it is accepted that those treaties and conventions [UDHR and African 
Charter] do not confer enforceable rights on individuals within the State until 
Parliament has legislated its provisions into the law of the land, in so far as such 
relevant international treaties and conventions may be referred to as an aid to 
construction of enactments, including the Constitution, I find myself at a loss to 
understand the complaint made against their use in that manner in the 
interpretation of what no doubt are some difficult provisions of the 
Constitution.”51 
 
There is an emerging constitutional trend requiring domestic courts to employ 
international and comparative law.52 The Angolan,53 Cape Verde54 and South African55 
                                                 
50
 S 24(1) Interpretation Act Cap 01:04. The Court in Attorney-General v Dow supra note 25 154, noted 
that this provision supports the principle that international conventions should be used as an aid to 
legislative and constitutional interpretation; Good v Attorney-General supra note 42.  
51
 Attorney-General Dow supra note 25 153H. In Petrus and Another v The State [1984] B.L.R. 14 (CA), 
making reference to the UDHR and the African Charter, the Court was of the view that as a member of the 
United Nations and Organisation of African Unity (now African Union), it must be presumed that the 
country is willing to be bound by the instruments of those bodies. 
52
 Udombana “Interpreting Rights Globally: Courts and Constitutional Rights in Emerging Democracies” 
2005 African Human Rights Law Journal 47 59.  
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Constitutions provide that constitutional and legal norms related to fundamental rights 
must be interpreted in light of international instruments. The Malawian Constitution 
provides that when interpreting the Constitution, the courts should “where applicable, 
have regard to current norms of public international law and comparable foreign case 
law.”56 Though “international-law-referral” provisions are absent in the Botswana 
Constitution, it is significant that the courts have made references to provisions of 
international conventions that relate to human rights in general, and in relation to fair trial 
rights in particular.57 Even though reference to international law is few and far between, 
there is clear evidence that human rights conventions are regarded as creating human 
rights law. Reference is made not only to conventions but other instruments such as 
resolutions and protocols. These norms are regarded as compelling where such 
conventions have become widely accepted by states even if Botswana is not a party.58 It 
seems that there is an underlying realisation that international law can be employed as an 
important benchmark of the domestic human rights regime. International instruments can 
                                                                                                                                                 
53
 S 21(2). ICL Document Status: 25 August 1992. Available on 
www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ao00000_.html. (Accessed on 30 December 2008). 
54
 Art 17(3). Constitutional Law n. 01/IV/92 of 25 September. Substantially amended in 1995 and 1999. 
Available on http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/capeverde.pdf. (Accessed on 30 December 2008). 
55
 S 39(1). 
56
 S 11(2). Came into force on 18 May 1994. Available on 
www.africa.upenn.edu/Govern_Political/mlwi_const.html. (Accessed on 30 December 2008). 
57
 See Attorney-General v Dow supra note 25; Bojang v The State [1994] B.L.R. 146. In addition, the 
Interpretation Act Cap 01:04 authorises the courts to consider international treaties when interpreting 
domestic legislation. 
58
 Bojang v The State supra  note 57 157. 
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be a compelling source of human rights law. Indeed, the courts should not hesitate to 
embrace international conventions to which the country is a party. In Dow59 the Court 
made extensive references to the provisions of the African Charter in dealing with issues 
of equality before the law, equal protection of the law and elimination of discrimination 
against women. The Court also referred to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women. In Bojang60 reference was made to the UDHR and the 
African Charter in respect of the presumption of innocence. The Court also referred to the 
ICCPR, European Convention, the African Charter and the American Convention on 
Human Rights61 in respect of the right to legal representation. In Attorney-General’s 
Reference: In Re The State v Marapo62 the Court stated that “…international human 
rights norms should receive expression in the constitutional guarantees of this country.”63  
 
Parties to the ICCPR must, regardless of their legal traditions and domestic law, apply the 
guarantees of article 14.64 Clearly, the application of the principle of equality of arms in 
the Botswana legal landscape should be possible without any strain. The basic 
infrastructure exists. What is lacking is the active development of the jurisprudence 
accommodating the application of the principle. 
                                                 
59
 Supra note 25. 
60
 Supra note 57. 
61
 Signed at the Inter-American Specialised Conference on Human Rights, San Josi, Costa Rica, 22 
November 1969. Available on http://www.hrcr.org. (Accessed on 12 July 2009). 
62
 [2002] 2 B.L.R. 26 (CA). 
63
 33E. 
64
 General Comment No 32 para 4. 
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It has been pointed out also that courts in giving deference to international law might be 
stifled by the principle of stare decisis which applies in domestic law.65 This is because 
the decisions of the highest courts bear significant leverage on domestic legal 
frameworks. Domestic courts are bound by decisions of higher domestic courts. Also, 
international law usually has an uneasy status in dualist states in the absence of 
incorporation.66 However, judges should follow the internationalist approach and be bold 
to interpret the law in a manner compatible with international trends even when such 
interpretation is incompatible with domestic trends.67 Botswana can certainly in terms of 
constitutional interpretation benefit from European jurisprudence since its Bill of Rights 
is based on the principles of the European Convention. In this regard European 
jurisprudence on article 6 should become relevant in the interpretation and application of 
the procedural rights provided for in section 10 of the Constitution. 
 
4 6 Conclusion 
International conventions can be valuable sources of legal norms even without forming 
part of domestic law.68 Principles of law that have received universal acceptance by 
frequent embodiment in international instruments bear heavily on and are likely to be 
                                                 
65
 Tshosa National Law and International Human Rights Laws: Cases of Botswana, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe (2001) 69; Tshosa The Status and Role of International Law 237. 
66
 Hunnings The European Courts (1996) 30.  
67
 Hunnings The European Courts 172. 
68
 Tshosa National Law 71. 
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recognised by domestic courts. Such principles are relevant to the development of the 
legal components of a fair trial.69  
 
Recognition and application of the principle of equality of arms in Botswana is possible 
because of the general acceptance by the courts of the vital role international human 
rights values and norms play in the domestic order. Recognition is possible due to a 
number of factors.  
 
First, there is some acceptance that international human rights serve as an aid to 
constitutional construction. Therefore, section 10 of the Constitution may be interpreted 
in line with the principle. Already, the section has been interpreted and applied in a 
manner that avoids imbalances between the prosecution and the accused. 
  
Second, there is a general recognition of international human rights norms in Botswana 
case law. In this regard, they influence domestic law.  
 
Third, the expression of equality of arms as a principle rather than as a rule of law does 
not weaken the case for its recognition. On the contrary, it strengthens it. Being a 
principle, it carries a measure of flexibility which might not apply in relation to the 
domestic application of an international rule of law in a dualist legal system. While it 
remains a principle, its recognition by the main international human rights tribunals, 
gives it a “force of general acceptance” in international law.  
                                                 
69
 Kgolagano v The State [1997] B.L.R. 914 924. 
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Fourth, constitutional and legal foundations of the principle do exist. Section 10 of the 
Constitution generally lays down the foundation for the application of the principle of 
equality of arms. There are also statutory provisions that clearly provide for procedural 
equality. While there is implicit recognition of the principle, it is imperative that the 
courts push the boundaries further by express engagement of the principle as a 
constitutional imperative. Its recognition as an essential element for a fair trial only adds 
to its validity, making it a sine qua non in the realisation of fair trials. It is surprising that 
though the central role played by the principle in relation to fairness has been emphasised 
several times, the European Court, the foremost proponent of the principle has not 
conceptualised it as a constitutional right. Surely, the central role of the principle in 
guaranteeing fair trials, demands that it operates at a higher level. 
 
Fifth, the courts can simply develop and conceptualise the principle as part of the 
common law of the country. This should not be difficult as there is already implicit 
countenance of the principle in case law. Unfortunately, however, reference to equality is 
based on a common law notion of fairness rather than on any theoretical or 
constitutionalised basis. The development of human rights principles is still evolving and 
therefore there is room for expression of the principle. But this is not enough. 
Constitutional alignment of the principle is essential. The principle is central to the right 
of an accused to a fair trial. It lies at the heart of a fair trial and ought to be expressed by 
the courts as such.  
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PART 2 
 
PRE-TRIAL RIGHTS: STATE AUTOCRACY AND THE 
PROTECTION OF THE SUSPECT 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMBALANCES IN THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS 
5 1 Introduction 
The investigation process represents the greatest inequality in the criminal justice 
process. The state is adorned with so much power that equality between the 
prosecution and the defence can only be achieved by imposing limitations on the 
powers of the state. However, the possibility of achieving equality is somewhat 
limited at the pre-trial stage of the criminal process as opposed to the trial process. 
This is principally so in common law jurisdictions where there is no investigating 
judge and the accused is left at the mercy of the police who carry out the 
investigations. The investigation process therefore represents an autocratic process 
wherein the state has monopoly over the process, with minimum opportunity for 
participation and challenge by the suspect.  
 
There are however a number of safeguards for the suspect and limitations on the 
investigative powers of the state. Without limits, the state will possess sweeping 
powers which will intolerably allow the police to obtain evidence and confessions by 
any means such that the accused will be put in a position of substantial disadvantage, 
to the extent that the trial will be a merciless walk-over for the state. Instruments of 
limitation include exclusionary rules. They are latent and mainly gain effect at the 
trial stage wherein the courts may disallow evidence obtained in violation of the 
accused’s rights. There are also procedural requirements such as the requirement for 
warrants. However, even though there is a semblance of limitation of police powers in 
that they are required to obtain warrants from judicial officers to effect searches or 
arrests, this is weakened by three factors. First, such warrants are usually granted as a 
 112
matter of course. Second, requests for warrants of arrest and search warrants are made 
ex parte and the subjects of the search or arrest are not given an opportunity to oppose 
them. Third, there are several exceptions wherein the police can arrest and search 
without a warrant. As opposed to South Africa,1 there are no express pre-trial 
constitutional provisions protecting suspects in Botswana. Pre-trial protection is 
founded on statute and common law. This therefore puts the suspect in Botswana in a 
state of procedural inequality and a distinct disadvantage since constitutional pre-trial 
rights would naturally offer a better framework for the protection of those rights. 
 
Discussion of the principle of equality of arms is usually limited to the trial stage and 
not extended to pre-trial investigation.2 However, a discussion of the imbalances in 
the pre-trial investigation in light of the principle is pertinent for a number of reasons. 
First, the European Commission and the Court have diluted their position in limiting 
the application of the principle to trial rights.3 Second, the Commission and the Court 
when determining fairness, consider the case in its entirety, bearing in mind that a 
breach of a pre-trial right might have a direct impact on the entire proceedings.4 This 
is a truism.5  Third, the presumption of innocence operates even at the pre-trial stage.6 
                                                 
1
 See section 35 (1) & (2) of the South African Constitution. 
2
 Van den Wyngaert Belgium in Van den Wyngaert (ed) Criminal Procedure Systems in the European 
Community (1993) 32. 
3
 Van den Wyngaert Belgium 32. 
4
 Van den Wyngaert Belgium 32. 
5
 As Colvin notes, “Moreoever, if evidence was obtained in a way that violated equality before the law, 
the resulting unfairness could carry through to its use at trial and to an eventual conviction. 
Investigative unfairness would produce adjudicative unfairness because the violation of equality before 
the law would continue throughout the stages of the criminal process…Equality before the law is a 
standard applicable at all stages of the criminal justice process, from the initial deployment of police 
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Therefore, the ability of the suspect to challenge the process at that stage is relevant to 
its fairness. Fourth, as has been said before, inequalities are greater at the pre-trial 
stage. 
 
5 2 Sole-enterprised authority 
The authority to investigate and prosecute crimes lies with the state. This situation 
represents the realities of our contemporary societies. While powers of arrest and 
detention are necessary to investigate and prevent crime, there is a distinct inequality 
when the judicial supervision of the process is limited only to determining whether a 
warrant should be issued. The fact that the police may arrest and detain without a 
warrant, though necessary in certain situations, also negates legal safeguards against 
unwarranted arrest and detention. In Botswana, there are no constitutional provisions 
for legal representation at the pre-trial stage. Suspects remain the “property” of the 
police during the forty eight hours for which they can be legally detained. They are 
objects of the investigation. They have no right of access to information gathered 
during the investigation and are only told what the police wants them to know. There 
are legal instruments regulating the arrest and detention of suspects. While these 
regulations protect suspects from unwarranted police behaviour, they do not 
sufficiently regulate the process when measured in light of the equality principle. 
Warrants only serve to protect substantive rights of liberty, privacy and property and 
do very little to ensure procedural equality. The absence of judicial supervision during 
investigation puts the accused at a disadvantage. Adversarialism underlies a formal 
                                                                                                                                            
resources through to sentences, penal regimes and releases.”: Colvin “Fairness and Equality in the 
Criminal Process” 2006 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 1 2-3 & 11. 
6
 Van den Wyngaert Belgium 32. 
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and theoretical equality between the contestants.7 However, the investigation and 
prosecution of crime is organised and funded by the state. The state is therefore in an 
inevitable position of strength. Fairness requires that the parties are in a position to 
access the investigations equally. The prevailing and traditional state of affairs 
wherein the suspect is unaware of the results of the investigations as and when they 
are carried out, is a negation of the principle of equality. In this regard, the scales of 
equality are skewed heavily in favour of the state. Though warrants and time limits 
serve as instruments for limiting arbitrary use of state powers, the system was 
definitely not developed with equality between the parties as a prerequisite. 
 
Notwithstanding various measures intended to protect the suspect, the pre-trial 
process represents one of state autocracy. The suspect has no official or formal 
powers to investigate. He is often incarcerated during investigations. Ideally, the 
suspect should be able to witness searches, interview witnesses and be made aware of 
the investigation process.8 Contemporary criminal frameworks, however, exclude the 
                                                 
7
 Van Koppen & Penrod Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Comparing Systems in Van Koppen & Penrod 
(eds) Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Justice: Psychological Perspectives on Criminal Justice Systems 
(2003) 1 2; McEwan Evidence and the Adversarial Process (1998) 2; Crombag Adversarial or 
Inquisitorial: Do We Have A Choice? in Van Koppen & Penrod (eds) Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial 
Justice: Psychological Perspectives on Criminal Justice Systems (2003) 21 22; Safferling Towards an 
International Criminal Procedure (2001) 266. 
8
 “It seems then that procedures should be devised which allow the dialectic between prosecution and 
defence to begin at a much earlier stage of the inquiry than is permitted at present in adversarial and 
continental procedures. These would have to provide for the availability of defence lawyers to suspects 
at an early stage if necessary before charge, the full disclosure of information by each side including 
written records of interviews that may later be relied upon, the presence of both sides at certain 
important stages of the inquiry such as, for example, at an identification parade or at interrogation after 
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suspect from any participation in the investigation process. Any attempt by him to 
conduct his own investigations which overlap with the police investigations, will be 
interpreted as interference with the investigations. This clearly leaves the suspect 
hamstrung in a state of procedural inequality. 
 
5 3 Powers of arrest and detention 
Powers of arrest and detention are in principle the preserve of the state. The period 
between arrest and the formal charge represents a period where a suspect suddenly 
comes into contact with state autocracy and police powers. The suspect has several 
rights which converge with police action. The polarisation of individual rights and the 
overall security of society become continuums on opposite ends. These are manifested 
by the fact that the rights to liberty and privacy on the one hand, and the overriding 
necessity to control crime on the other, become matters of competing interests.9 
Perhaps this can be described as the pre-trial manifestation of the interest-based 
adversarial system. Thus, while the accused has an inalienable right of privacy to 
property and personal liberty, the invasion of liberty and privacy is permitted in the 
interests of the detection and control of crime.10 Without such powers, the detection of 
                                                                                                                                            
charge or at a confrontation between the suspect and other witnesses, and the availability to both sides 
of experts to conduct forensic or medical examinations. These rules would have to provide some means 
of enforcement, probably the appointment of an independent magistrate who could always be available 
to both sides and would be present at certain key stages of the inquiry. This magistrate would be able to 
require certain steps to be taken at the request of a party or of his own motion but he would not be a 
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France.”: Jackson “Two Methods of Proof in Criminal Procedure” 1988 Modern Law Review 549 566.  
9
 See generally Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968). 
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 Fenwick Civil Liberties 2 ed (1998) 393. 
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crime would prove to be so arduous that the very essence of the criminal justice 
system will be brought to naught. In essence, the rules governing police powers of 
arrest and detention and their implementation are of crucial importance.    
 
5 3 1 Basis of the powers 
In common law countries (which include Botswana) powers of arrest and detention 
have common law origins, but such powers have with time, become principally 
regulated by statute.11 The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act imposes obligations 
on the police in the exercise of their powers of arrest. Generally, arrests should be 
authorised by a judicial officer. The underlying principle is that the state should not 
exercise arbitrary powers of arrest. The state therefore should be able to arrest and 
detain a person only with the consent of the judiciary, an independent body, after 
furnishing it with information justifying such arrest. A warrantless arrest should be 
the exception. A public prosecutor or commissioned officer may forward an 
application to a judicial officer stating the offence alleged to have been committed 
and that there are reasonable grounds of suspicion against the suspect.12  
                                                 
11
 Healy “Investigative Detention in Canada” 2005 Criminal Law Review 98 106.  
12
 S 37(1) Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. Stating the procedure for obtaining a warrant, 
Aboagye J noted in Aphiri v Attorney-General [1997] B.L.R. 192 200C-D: “It is clear from the 
wording of the section (section 37(1)) that before a valid warrant of arrest can be issued by a judicial 
officer the proper applicant, [sic] for it must either state in his written application that he is in 
possession of information taken upon oath from which there are reasonable grounds of suspicion 
against the person sought to be arrested or to take the informant to the judicial officer for him to swear 
to the information before him. The information upon which the warrant is issued must therefore be one 
obtained upon oath.” (Emphasis appears in law report). 
 117
The Act also contemplates situations where it might be necessary to arrest an offender 
as a matter of urgency or in respect of serious offences. For example a policeman may 
arrest without a warrant if he finds a person attempting to commit an offence or 
clearly manifesting an intention of doing so;13 if the offence is committed in his 
presence;14 if the offence is one other than an offence specified in the Penal Code for 
which the punishment may be a prison term exceeding six months without the option 
of a fine;15 if the person is found in possession of stolen property or house breaking 
implements;16 any person whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of committing 
“any of the offences specified in the Penal Code, other than the offences specified in 
such Code and the other enactments as are set out in Part II of the First Schedule to 
this Act.”17  
 
Aboagye J cautioned in Mosaninda v Attorney-General18 that section 28(b) of the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act does not give the police powers to arrest people 
arbitrarily without a warrant of arrest. According to him “[i]t affords an arresting 
officer a defence to an action against him for wrongful arrest only if in effecting the 
arrest he had reasonable grounds to suspect that the plaintiff had committed any of the 
offences specified in section 28(b)(i),(ii) and (iii).”19 The exercise of the powers 
conferred by section 28(b) should be exercised on an objective basis. Indeed one 
                                                 
13
 S 28 (c). 
14
 S 28(a); Kgosiemang and Another v The State [1989] B.L.R. 12. 
15
 S 28 (b) (ii). 
16
 S 29. 
17
 S 28(b)(i). 
18
 [1994] B.L.R. 411. 
19
 423F. 
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would not expect the legislature to permit the police to make arrests without warrants 
on an arbitrary basis. In the case of Tlharesegolo v Attorney-General20 the plaintiff 
had been arrested and detained “pending investigations” by the police upon 
information received from a vendor that he had sold marijuana to the plaintiff. 
Referring to the section, Collins AJ observed: 
 
“And so, the subjective assessment and suspicions of defendant’s witnesses 
[arresting officers] in regard to plaintiff [suing for unlawful search and 
unlawful detention], although relevant, are to be tested not solely on what was 
going on in their heads but rather whether their heads were properly directed 
and the thoughts going on in them were measured and reasonable on the basis 
of the facts at their disposal at the time they took a decision to arrest and 
detain. This has to be correct because if it is not it means that arrestees or 
detainees might be at the mercy of the unsupported hunches or whims of their 
captors.”21 
                                                 
20
 [2001] 2 B.L.R. 730. 
21
 740B-C; “In order to comply with the requirements of section 28(b) the officer must have a suspicion 
that the individual whom he seeks to detain has committed the offence in question. Suspicion, in my 
view, must be something more than idle speculation but is far short of a firm conviction that the person 
has committed the offence…But mere suspicion is not enough. Suspicion founded on instinct or 
guesswork will not do. The suspicion which forms itself in the mind of the officer must be based on 
grounds which are capable of explanation and can be said to be reasonable”: per Lord Weir JA in 
Aphiri v Attorney-General [2000] 1 B.L.R. 65 68E-F (CA); “Suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a 
state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking; ‘I suspect but I cannot prove’. Suspicion arises at 
or near the starting point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end.”: 
per Lord Devlin in Shabaan Bin Hussein v Chong Fook Kam [1969] 3 All E.R. 1626 1630C-D; in 
Kebafetotse v Attorney-General [2004] 1 B.L.R. 419 427D Mosojane J stated that the police must “act 
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From the above statement, it follows that: 
 
“…There must be an investigation into the essentials relevant to the particular 
offence before there can be a reasonable suspicion that it has been committed. 
A fortiori there can be no reasonable suspicion where, as in this case, there 
was no investigation relating to one of the essentials of the offence.”22 
 
It is true that a full and complete investigation might cause a fatal delay in securing an 
arrest. However, as Sarkodie-Mensah AJ puts it: 
                                                                                                                                            
with great circumspection before they deprive anyone of his liberty without a warrant.”; see also 
Sekobye v Attorney-General [2004] 2 B.L.R. 294; Sekobye v Attorney-General [2006] 1 B.L.R. 271 
(CA); Thokwane v Attorney-General [1998] B.L.R. 221; Moleboge v Botswana Police Service [2006] 1 
B.L.R. 430; R v Van Heerden 1958 (3) SA 150 (T); Minister of Law and Order v Hurley and Another 
1986 (3) SA 568 (A); Duncan v Minister of Law and Order 1986 (2) SA 805 (A). 
22
 R v Nkala and Another 1962 (1) SA 248 (SR) 250D; “It is my experience that it is not uncommon for 
certain officers within the ranks of the police force to first arrest and detain a possible suspect, and 
thereafter, at the convenience of the detail concerned, to institute inquiries and investigations in order 
to ascertain whether the arrest was justified. I sincerely hope that this is not the general, and sanctioned 
practice, for, if it is, I consider that such procedure would be improper and objectionable. It appeared to 
me that it was this undesirable practice that was adopted in the present case. This is unfortunate, for it 
is essential, in my view, for any person entrusted with the signal power of arrest to recognise, and to 
keep constantly in the forefront of his mind, the concept that this power should be exercised only in 
cases of urgency or real necessity. Had the Section Officer carried out his duties on this basis, I do not 
think that the plaintiff would have been arrested at all.”: Reynolds J in Allan v Minister of Home Affairs 
1985 (1) Z.L.R. 339 345G. Cited with approval in Tlharesegolo v Attorney-General supra note 20 
741H-742B where the Court concluded that the police officers jumped the gun and arrested the plaintiff 
before they had reasonable grounds to suspect him. 
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“It is required that the defendant [police] must have sufficient facts from 
which a reasonable man could justifiably conclude that the alleged offence has 
been committed. This implies that the defendant is required to have taken 
reasonable measures to discover the facts. He need not test all the facts. His 
failure to test any particular fact or follow any particular lead which he 
genuinely believed to be irrelevant and unnecessary cannot amount to absence 
of reasonable and probable cause, nor animus injurandi.”23 
 
Persons arrested without a warrant should not be detained longer than forty eight 
hours unless a warrant is obtained for their further detention.24 Where a person is 
arrested with a warrant, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act merely states that 
he shall be brought before a court “as soon as possible.”25 What amounts to “as soon 
as possible” has not been tested by the courts26 because in practice, the police keep to 
the forty eight hours rule even in the event of an arrest with warrant. However, the 
practice of detaining persons for the longest permissible period – that is forty eight 
hours – has not escaped judicial scrutiny. The Court in Tlharesegolo27 noted, and 
quite rightly so, that the police are under the misapprehension that they are entitled to 
detain a person arrested without a warrant for up to forty eight hours on the basis of 
section 36(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. The Court stated 
                                                 
23
 Moleboge v Botswana Police Service supra  note 21 435G-H. 
24
 S 36(1) Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
25
 S 39(5) Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
26
 See Aphiri v Attorney-General supra note 21 69C-70B for a brief reference to the term in respect of 
S 36(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act which relates to arrest without warrant. 
27
 Supra  note 20 742F. 
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categorically that the section does not empower the police to detain persons up to 
forty eight hours. The Court noted that, a person should be detained without a warrant 
only for a reasonable time, to be determined on an objective test. The reference to 
forty eight hours is a maximum period which is prescribed for the benefit of the 
detainee. Unnecessary reliance on the maximum period therefore amounts “to an 
arrogation of ‘rights’ which the legislature never intended.”28 What the section intends 
is that if the forty eight hours were to expire, the police must obtain a warrant for the 
continued detention of the detainee. 
 
Taking into account practical realities of pre-trial investigations, it is extremely 
difficult – as far as arrest and detention are concerned – to create room for the full and 
rigorous application of the principle of equality of arms. Botswana’s justice system is 
principally adversarial, and the police do not conduct impartial investigations. The 
investigations are interest-based (discussed more fully in paragraph 3 5, chapter 3) 
and conducted with the aim to secure a conviction. In additional, pre-trial legal 
representation is not guaranteed. However, one way of trying to alleviate the position 
of the accused, is to set strict rules and standards governing arrest (see paragraph 5 3 3 
below). If arrests and their concomitant periods of detention are strictly controlled and 
limited to what is absolutely required to ensure the smooth functioning of the criminal 
                                                 
28
 743A; also in Kebafetotse v Attorney-General supra note 21 427C-D Mosojane J observed: 
“Contrary to Martin’s belief, however, this section does not give the police a blank cheque to detain a 
suspect for as long as the period of detention does not exceed 48 hours. This section merely allows the 
police a discretion to detain a person arrested without a warrant for up to 48 hours only if there is good 
cause for such detention or the detention is lawful or authori[s]ed by law. The police are not covered by 
this section if they, without good cause or unlawfully, detain a person for 48 hours, or even for less.” 
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justice system, the pre-trial investigative period of inequality can be kept to the bare 
minimum. 
 
5 3 2 Procedural elements of a valid arrest 
The validity of an arrest depends on the proper exercise of the procedural elements.29 
These elements are important, considering the legal consequences that may flow from 
an unprocedural arrest.30 The consequences of an unprocedural or illegal arrest may 
be immediate or latent. An immediate consequence is that if the arrest is illegal, 
technically the suspect is not under arrest and is free to go wherever he wants.31 
Therefore, any charge brought against him for resisting arrest, assaulting or 
obstructing a police officer in due execution of his duty, or escape from custody might 
not stand.32 Also, the arresting party may be liable for assault or false imprisonment. 
In an action for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment the onus lies with the arresting 
party to prove that the arrest was lawful.33 A latent consequence is that a court might 
                                                 
29
 Fenwick Civil Liberties 414; an arrest which is made with a warrant obtained on the basis of false 
information knowingly given to a judicial officer who issued it is unlawful: Aphiri v Attorney-General 
supra  note 12 192. 
30
 Fenwick Civil Liberties 414. 
31
 Fenwick Civil Liberties 414. 
32
 State v Shamukuni Munikasu [1968-1970] B.L.R. 255; State v Setshameko France & Another [1974] 
2 B.L.R. 53. 
33
 “Mr. Maisels, for the plaintiff, advanced two main propositions in support of his contention that the 
onus of proof, in regard to justification for the admitted arrest, rests on the defendants. On the view I 
take of this matter it is only necessary to refer to the first of these propositions, which is that, in actions 
for damages for wrongful arrest, the Courts have adopted the rule that all arrests are prima facie illegal 
and that it is for the defendant to allege and prove the existence of grounds in justification of the arrest. 
In my view that proposition is correct.”: Margo J in Newman v Prinsloo and Another 1973 (1) SA 125 
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refuse to admit evidence elicited or obtained from the suspect. Incriminating 
statements might be rejected from someone who is not warned of his rights, 
particularly his right to remain silent.34  
 
Statutory rules relating to the procedure for arrest in Botswana are terse. The Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act merely provides as a matter of procedure, that the police 
should produce the warrant or notify the suspect of the contents or permit him to read 
it if he so demands.35 It is submitted that the police should have a positive duty under 
the law to produce the warrant and inform the suspect of the reason for the arrest. The 
Act however provides that a person arrested without a warrant should be immediately 
informed of the reason for the arrest.36 Generally, a person effecting arrest should 
                                                                                                                                            
(W) 126G-H. Cited with approval in Mosaninda v Attorney-General supra note 18; Tlharesegolo v 
Attorney-General supra note 20; “I stated in my ruling that every detention of a person by another is 
unlawful unless it is justified.”: Onkabetse v Attorney-General and Others [1989] B.L.R. 120 121H; 
see also Kebafetotse v Attorney-General supra note 21; Thokwane v Attorney-General supra note 21; 
Sekobye v Attorney-General (CA) supra note 21. In the South African case of Minister of Justice v 
Hofmeyr 1993 (3) SA 131 (A) 153D-E the position was set in respect of a claim for damages based on 
unlawful deprivation of property as follows: “The plain and fundamental rule is that every individual’s 
person is inviolable. In actions for damages for wrongful arrest or imprisonment our Courts have 
adopted the rule that such infractions are prima facie illegal. Once the arrest or imprisonment has been 
admitted or proved it is for the defendant to allege and prove the existence of grounds in justification of 
the infraction.” 
34
 Schwikkard Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons in Currie & De Waal (eds) The Bill of Rights 
Handbook 5 ed (2005) 737 752. 
35
 S 39(4) Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
36
 S 36(4) Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act; Onkabetse v Attorney-General and Others supra note 
33. See also Christie v Leachinsky [1947] 1 All E.R. 567 (HL). 
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actually touch the body of the person arrested unless the person submits verbally or by 
conduct.37 
 
5 3 3 Detention 
The right to personal liberty is enshrined in articles 3 and 9 of the UDHR. Article 9 
forms the foundation for safeguards against arbitrary detention in other human rights 
documents as well as domestic documents.38 This right finds expression in section 5 
of the Constitution of Botswana. In a simplistic sense, the right to liberty is breached 
if a person is detained in furtherance of an unlawful arrest or if he is detained longer 
than the legally permissible period. Upon the expiration of this period, the state is 
under a duty to either charge the suspect to court or release him. But it must be noted 
that there is a whole range of possible violations that can take place during this period. 
Also, policing practice involves “inviting” suspects to the police station to assist with 
investigations. There is a misconception that suspects are bound to honour the 
invitation of the police to accompany them to the police station. Strictly speaking, 
they are not.39 They are also entitled to leave at any time. It is unfortunate that 
sometimes suspects having been “invited” to the police station end up being detained, 
as the police usually believe that they have a right of detention for the period of forty 
eight hours. Such detentions are illegal except made in pursuance of a valid arrest.  
 
                                                 
37
 S 46(1) Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
38
 ICCPR art 9(1), ACHPR art 6, European Convention art 5(1); Cook Preventive Detention –  
International Standards and the Protection of the Individual in Frankowski & Shelton (eds) Preventive 
Detention: A Comparative and International Law Perspective (1992) 1.  
39
 O’Flaherty & Heffernan International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: International Human 
Rights Law in Ireland (1995) 51. 
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5 4 Interrogation 
It is axiomatic that pre-trial custodial interrogation of a suspect by the police, is one of 
the methods employed by the police to obtain incriminating statements at a time when 
the suspect is in a vulnerable position. The police have the upper hand and seek to 
take advantage of the suspect. The suspect’s right to silence (see paragraph 5 4 1 
below) and the pre-trial right to a lawyer (see paragraph 5 5 below) seek to restore or 
correct what would otherwise be a most unequal contest. 
 
5 4 1 The right to silence 
5 4 1 1 The privilege against self-incrimination 
The privilege against self-incrimination is based on the premise that the accused or a 
suspect should not be recruited to assist the state in his own prosecution.40 It ensures 
“a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual 
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government 
in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load.”41 This privilege is 
expressed in several ways such as the general right to silence, the right of the accused 
not to testify at his trial and a very crucial right to be informed of his right to silence 
upon arrest.42  
 
                                                 
40
 Dennis “Instrumental Protection, Human Rights or Functional Necessity? Reassessing the Privilege 
against Self-Incrimination” 1995 Cambridge Law Journal 342 345. 
41
 Murphy v Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 378 U.S. 52 55 (1964); see also Redmayne 
“Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: 2007 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 209 232. 
42
 Theophilopoulos “An Analysis of American Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence and its Relevance to 
the South African Right to Silence” 2006 South African Law Journal 516; Lewis “Rethinking Miranda: 
Truth, Lies, and Videotape” 2007-2008 Gonzaga Law Review 199 206. 
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The privilege against self-incrimination or right to silence is widely recognised and 
affirmed by many constitutions worldwide. It is famously echoed in the American 
Fifth Amendment to the effect that “No person…shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself.” It is also found in the constitutions of South 
African,43 Botswana,44 Namibia45 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.46 It is said to prevent the eliciting of self-incriminating statements by 
inhumane means.47 It therefore protects a suspect when faced with custodial 
interrogation. Clearly, the basis of the Miranda48 decision was to institute safeguards 
around custodial interrogation, since such interrogation by itself exerts a heavy toll on 
the individual.49 The Miranda warnings were therefore designed to secure the 
privilege50 by ensuring that incriminating statements are made freely and voluntarily.  
 
                                                 
43
 S 35(1)(a) & 35(3)(h) & (j). See Theophilopoulos “The Historical Antecedents of the Right to 
Silence and the Evolution of the Adversarial Trial System” 2004 Stellenbosch Law Review 161. 
44
 S 10(7). The provision reads: “No person who is tried for a criminal offence shall be compelled to 
give evidence at the trial.” 
45
 Art 12(1)(f). Came into force 21 March 1990. See Flanz & Ward Constitutions of the World issue 
2008. 
46
 Schedule B, Constitution Act 1982, S 11(c). Available on http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter 
(accessed on 14 March 2009). 
47
 Murphy v Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor supra note 41; Van der Walt & De la Harpe 
“The Right to Pre-Trial Silence As Part of the Right to A Free and Fair Trial: An Overview” 2005 
African Human Rights Law Journal 70 86-87. 
48
 Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
49
 Ciarelli “Pre-Arrest Silence: Minding That Gap between Fourth Amendment Stops and Fifth 
Amendment Custody” 2003 Journal of Criminal Law and  Criminology 651 657. 
50
 Ciarelli 2003 Journal of Criminal Law and  Criminology 656. 
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The privilege is a negative procedural right in the process of securing equality. In this 
regard, if the suspect cannot be compelled to say anything, the state cannot use it 
against him. After all, the state has resources to investigate crime. Also, self-
incriminating statements usually assist the state in its investigation. Therefore, the 
accused’s silence reinforces his decision not to assist the state. He can retain a purely 
adversarial stance. Again, should the accused assist the state, he should choose to do 
so voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.  
 
Conceptually, it would appear that there are differences in the right to silence and the 
privilege against self-incrimination in South Africa and Botswana. Section 10(7) of 
Botswana’s Constitution is similar to the United States’ Fifth Amendment. In the 
United States, the Fifth Amendment is a defence against state compulsion. It is 
expressed as a prohibition against compulsion of the accused to incriminate himself. 
However, the application of this provision has been extended by the courts to include 
pre-trial silence. In effect, self-incrimination and the right to silence are viewed 
against the same background with the right to silence being subsumed by the question 
of self-incrimination.51 In effect, the distinction is relatively weak. In South Africa the 
rule against self-incrimination is a rule of statutory procedure on which a witness 
testifying may rely.52 The right to silence is a constitutional right which the accused 
may invoke in criminal proceedings.53 In Botswana, there is no express constitutional 
pre-trial right to silence. However, since section 10(7) is similar in wording to the 
American Fifth Amendment, there is no reason why the privilege should not extend to 
                                                 
51
 Theophilopoulos 2006 South African Law Journal 517. 
52
 Theophilopoulos 2006 South African Law Journal 517. 
53
 Theophilopoulos 2006 South African Law Journal 517. 
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the accused’s pre-trial rights as the American courts have done with the Fifth 
Amendment in the form of the Miranda guidelines. However, a slight variation must 
be noted in Botswana’s section 10(7). While the United States’ Fifth Amendment is 
expressed as a rule against self-incrimination protecting the accused from being 
compelled to testify against himself, Botswana’s section 10(7) is expressed as a right 
to silence. It is a rule establishing a right not to testify at his trial. An extension of 
section 10(7) to the pre-trial investigation in Botswana as the American courts have 
done in relation to the Fifth Amendment would sanctify a pre-trial right to silence in 
Botswana. Consequently, this will have the effect of redressing the imbalances and 
strengthening the position of the accused during pre-trial interrogation. This is very 
significant as there is no judicial supervision at this stage and pre-trial legal 
representation is not expressed as a constitutional right. Whereas the application of 
section 10(7) to pre-trial procedures will assist in redressing imbalances in the system, 
it must be noted that this interpretation of the section is doubtful. As one of the three 
judges in the case of Phiri and Others v The State54 mentioned, the section refers to 
the accused’s constitutional right to remain silent at trial and does not extend to pre-
trial questioning. The inequality which exists at the pre-trial stage is obvious. The 
prosecution may profit at the expense of the accused. 
 
5 4 1 2 Adverse inference from an accused’s pre-trial silence 
The question arises whether an adverse inference can be drawn from the accused’s 
pre-trial silence. In South Africa, the Constitutional Court in S v Thebus and 
                                                 
54
 [1992] B.L.R. 317 (CA), Amissah JP 323. 
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Another55 has held that it was unconstitutional to draw an adverse inference from the 
pre-trial silence of the accused. However, two of the judges56 suggested that it might 
be constitutional to draw such inference if the accused was warned of the 
consequences of his silence. Moseneke J57 noted that the drawing of an inference of 
guilt from a pre-trial silence undermines his right to remain silent and to be presumed 
innocent. According to him such an inference would make the mandatory warning of 
the right to silence a trap. Moseneke J drew a distinction between an inference as to 
guilt and an inference as to credibility on the basis of an accused’s pre-trial silence. 
According to him, an inference as to credibility will not necessarily infringe the 
presumption of innocence. However, he noted that late disclosure of an alibi may be 
legitimately taken into account in determining the weight to be attached to it. He 
noted that a decision of an accused to disclose his defence only when he appears in 
court is legitimate but that he could properly be cross-examined on his decision to 
remain silent and that such cross-examination would go to credit and would not 
amount to an infringement on his right to remain silent. In a separate judgment, 
Goldstone J and O’Regan J reached the same conclusion but concluded that drawing 
an adverse inference from an accused’s failure to disclose his alibi timeously amounts 
to an infringement of his right to remain silent. They also rejected the view that 
drawing an adverse inference infringes the presumption of innocence. According to 
them the Constitution does not stipulate that only the state’s evidence should be used 
to prove the guilt of the accused. They, however, stated that considering the historical 
                                                 
55
 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC). For a discussion of this case, see Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of 
Evidence 3 ed (2009) 308-313; Bekker, Geldenhuys, Joubert, Swanepoel, Terblanche & Van der 
Merwe Criminal Procedure Handbook 8 ed (2007) 263. 
56
 Goldstone J & O’Regan J (Ackermann J & Mokgoro J concurring). 
57
 Chaskalson CJ & Madala J concurring. 
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record of policing, a prohibition on adverse inferences is justified in so far as it 
protects an accused from improper police questioning and procedures.58 They also 
emphasised the need to warn the accused of the consequences of his electing to 
remain silent. They highlighted the unfairness of warning a person in a manner that 
implies no penalty for remaining silent and then proceeding to penalise him for 
exercising that right. They rejected the distinction between inferences drawn as to 
guilt and inferences drawn as to credit. In their view, “the practical effect of the 
adverse inference to be drawn for the purposes of credit, namely, that the alibi 
evidence is not to be believed, will often be no different to the effect of the inference 
to be drawn with respect to guilt, namely that the late tender of the alibi suggested 
that it is manufactured and that the accused is guilty.”59 They also rejected Moseneke 
J’s stance that the accused could be cross-examined for choosing to remain silent as 
this would amount to penalising him for exercising a constitutional right. 
 
Out of the ten judges who heard this case, seven found that it was unconstitutional to 
draw an adverse inference from the pre-trial silence of the accused.60 Four, however, 
thought that if the warning was rephrased so as to inform an arrested person of the 
consequences of remaining silent, an adverse inference might be constitutionally 
sustainable.61 Another three judges ruled that though an adverse inference as to guilt 
was not justifiable, an adverse inference as to credibility was a justifiable limitation 
                                                 
58
 Schwikkard Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons 754. 
59
 S v Thebus and Another supra note 55 para 90. 
60
 Schwikkard Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons 756. 
61
 Schwikkard Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons 756. 
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on the right to remain silent and that an accused could be cross-examined on failure to 
disclose his alibi timeously.62 Four judges specifically rejected this view.63  
 
This case is phenomenal in that the Court though coming up with varying views, has 
set the ground for discussion on the effect of pre-trial silence. What is more 
interesting is that the accused did not elect to remain silent upon arrest but did make a 
statement which amounted to an alibi. His testimony during the trial contradicted his 
alibi. In effect, the real issue at hand was that the accused had made a previous 
inconsistent statement. The importance of the privilege against self-incrimination 
cannot be overstated. It protects suspects from physical and mental abuse during the 
course of investigation. At the same time it leads to the exclusion of credible and 
valuable evidence. As a result it is inevitably in conflict with the public policy of 
combating crime,64 while at the same time redressing imbalances in the system. What 
can be said is that it would be improper to draw an adverse inference as to guilt or 
credibility on the basis of the accused’s election to exercise a legitimate right. 
Equating an accused’s pre-trial silence to substantive evidence of guilt on the basis 
that the circumstances required him to explain himself when asked to account for 
certain actions, would undermine the principle of equality. The presumption of 
innocence implies that the burden lies on the state to prove its case. Not only does 
equating silence as substantive evidence of guilt relieve the state, at least in part, of 
proving the accused’s guilt, it demands that the accused assists the state in its 
                                                 
62
 Schwikkard Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons 756-757. 
63
 Schwikkard Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons 757. 
64
 Zuckerman “The Right Against Self-Incrimination: An Obstacle to the Supervision of Interrogation” 
1986 Law Quarterly Review 43. 
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investigation. This creates inroads into the protection against police coercion which 
might very well arise at a time when the accused has not availed himself of legal 
representation. At best, such silence can only fortify an assertion of guilt when 
considered in light of the rest of the evidence. 
  
5 4 1 3 Protective right or obstacle to truth finding 
Present comment on the privilege against self-incrimination has taken varying 
dimensions. Whereas it is supposed to act as a fundamental protecting mechanism in 
maintaining equality during the interrogation stage, it is seen in some quarters as the 
bane of any meaningful measure of effective law enforcement. One would ask 
whether a self-incriminating statement obtained by unfair means should not be used in 
evidence if its contents are clearly true. If someone is accused of a wrongdoing or 
found at a crime scene, is it not natural that if he is innocent that he would give an 
explanation of his presence there if so required?65 It has been argued that the privilege 
serves as a shield to the guilty.66 The matter at hand therefore is whether this privilege 
is a legitimate protective right or amounts to usurping a legitimate truth seeking 
process. Van Dijkhorst,67 who launches a scathing attack on the privilege, states that 
its historical antecedents are no longer relevant in a complex modern society. He 
states that though originally intended to prevent abuse, the privilege now effectively 
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shields the truth from coming out.68 It has been argued that the use of pre-arrest 
silence as substantive evidence of guilt in the truth seeking process outweighs the 
privilege against self-incrimination.69 
 
What was originally developed to protect persons against cruel systems seems to have 
grown into an instrument which is difficult to justify and manage.70 It is seen as a 
shield for criminals, unnecessary in present society and unnecessary in the criminal 
justice system. It is true that during the period between arrest and trial, the accused is 
potentially exposed to overbearing circumstances due to overzealous policing. What 
is important is that the accused should be informed of his right to silence and the fact 
that any incriminating statement might be used against him at his trial, before any 
questioning by the police commences. In practice, there is really no line between 
when a suspect is arrested or not. It is a well known fact that the police in Botswana 
merely approach and commence questioning of suspects without any formal warning 
in relation to his rights. The police have developed a tendency to rely on incriminating 
statements made by suspects during this period as the main vein of their case. 
Sometimes the suspect would have been incarcerated (prior to questioning) if he 
refuses to “cooperate.” The questioning then restarts and he makes incriminating 
statements. Most of the time, he still would not have been informed whether he is 
under arrest, nor would he be advised of his rights. It seems imperative that a suspect 
should be informed of his rights before the police start any questioning whatsoever.  
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South African cases are divided on the operation of the pre-arrest rights of a suspect. 
In S v Sebejan & Others71 it was stated obiter that a suspect even though not arrested 
or detained is entitled to fair pre-trial procedures including all rights that are open to 
an arrested suspect. The Court stated that a suspect should be cautioned in terms of 
the Judges’ Rules. In S v Langa & Others,72 the Court in distinguishing the case on its 
facts, declined to follow Sebejan.73 In my view, the protection against self-
incrimination commences immediately the suspect has his first encounter with the 
police. If the police are to successfully make use of his statements in evidence, such 
statement should be made under caution whether or not the suspect has been formally 
arrested. Any view to the contrary would seriously undermine the notion that pre-trial 
equality of arms ought to be promoted where possible. 
 
5 4 1 4 Partial state silence 
The state would want the court to draw an adverse inference from the suspect’s 
silence. It must be noted, however, that the state also maintains partial silence. The 
requirement for an arrest only requires that the suspect be told why he is being 
arrested. It does not demand that the state furnish him with details of their 
investigation at that stage. The duty to disclose comes only after the state has 
collected all its evidence and has decided to lay charges. Failure to disclose details of 
the offence to the suspect creates an imbalance and implicates his right to present his 
                                                 
71
 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W); Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles132. 
72
 1998 (1) SACR 21 (T). 
73
 See Du Toit, De Jager, Paizes, Skeen & Van der Merwe Commentary on the South African Criminal 
Procedure Act (2008) 24-56B. 
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case. If he is required to answer questions during investigations, all information 
gathered should be placed before him. Otherwise he is placed in a position of 
substantial disadvantage and procedural inequality. The right of the suspect to 
adequate facilities to prepare his defence, should operate on the basis of procedural 
equality with the state. Fairness demands that this be the case. To keep the suspect in 
the dark and to allow him access to information only after the state has marshalled 
and sieved the evidence, flies in the face of procedural equality. 
 
5 5 Pre-trial legal representation 
The Constitution of Botswana does not expressly extend the right to legal 
representation to the pre-trial stage. In fact, the provision relating to legal 
representation provides that “Every person who is charged with a criminal 
offence…shall be permitted to defend himself before the court74 in person or, at his 
own expense, by a legal representative of his own choice.”75 The question whether 
legal representation applies to the pre-trial stage has unfortunately not been 
determined extensively. Nesereko and Molatlhegi note that it is the practice in 
Botswana to deny suspects access to attorneys during investigations and that when 
they are granted the privilege, they insist that consultations should be in the presence 
of the police.76 This is, to say the least, a ridiculous situation. Molatlhegi suggests that 
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this attitude is encouraged by the very wording of the Constitution. The Constitution 
extends the right to legal representation to “every person who is charged with a 
criminal offence” and not to a suspect. A plausible argument therefore is that if the 
framers of the Constitution intended to extend the right to the pre-trial stage, they 
would have stated so. Applying the expressio unius exclusio alterius canon of 
interpretation, the express mention of certain benefits or burdens implies the exclusion 
of those not mentioned.77 In Bojang v The State,78 while citing the Miranda principles 
in full and referring extensively to the Chief Justice Warren’s declaration on the 
requirement for counsel during interrogation, the Court noted that the wording of 
section 10(2)(d) is different from the American Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and that they have different spheres of operation.79 In embracing the restrictive 
approach the Court noted that “applying the principle that in the interpretation of a 
completely self-governing Constitution founded upon a written organic instrument, if 
the text is explicit, the text is conclusive, alike in what it directs and what it forbids.”80 
Molatlhegi opines that this constitutional interpretation allows an illegality to continue 
unchallenged. In his view, it is restrictive and erroneous.81 He contends that the aim of 
the Constitution is to adopt a purposive approach to the right to legal representation.82 
In my view, there is great merit in this contention. Indeed, the courts have adopted a 
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generous approach to constitutional interpretation.83 In this regard, the courts have 
declared that the Constitution should be interpreted so as to expand the rights of the 
citizen and restrict the powers of the state.84 This approach which has resonated in the 
courts of Botswana should be relied upon to extend the right to legal representation to 
the pre-trial suspect.85 Otherwise, the inequalities between the state and the individual 
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at this stage, cannot sufficiently be bridged. Pre-trial investigations cannot be 
divorced from the trial. The police are tempted to violate the rights of suspects in their 
sole custody. This in itself violates the principle of equality of arms as the suspect is 
at the absolute mercy of the state. Certain rights such as the right to silence and the 
protection against torture which have a direct impact on the fairness of the trial are at 
stake while a suspect is in custody. One would hope that the courts in Botswana adopt 
a purposive approach to legal representation. The Court of Appeal in Lesego Thebe v 
The State86 noted obiter that “a constitution such as the Constitution of the Republic 
of Botswana which guarantees a defendant a fair trial must vouch-safe no less to a 
suspect in the custody of the police.”87 This case faintly echoes American judicial 
pronouncements that legal representation is a prerequisite for legally permissible 
interrogation, unless properly waived.88 Unfortunately the matter has not been 
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determined extensively since then. The Bill of Rights should be given a liberal and 
teleological approach if it were to survive the challenges of society. Legal 
representation is essential to the fairness of the pre-trial process and contributes to 
some extent to the role the equality principle ought to play at this stage. 
 
5 6 Extra judicial confessions  
A confession is defined as “an unequivocal acknowledgment [by an accused or 
suspect] of his guilt, the equivalent of a plea of guilty before the court.”89 Extra 
judicial confessions mostly happen before an accused seeks legal advice. It is 
therefore important that confessions are made freely and voluntarily by suspects, in 
their sound and sober senses and without any undue influence.90 A suspect should not 
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be subjected to fear, prejudice, or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person 
in authority.91 South African law has expressed the requirements of “freely and 
voluntarily” and “without undue influence” to be separate components, both of which 
have to be complied with.92 However, this distinction is, it seems, irrelevant for 
practical purposes.93 Indeed, it was pointed out in S v Mpetha and Others (2)94 that the 
concept of undue influence is wider than being “free and voluntary”. Therefore, if the 
voluntariness of a statement is challenged in a court of law, the onus lies on the 
prosecution to prove that the confession was not induced by any promise of favour or 
advantage, or by the use of fear, threat or pressure.95 An inducement includes the use 
or threat of force, compulsion, or promise of material gain.96 Prolonged interrogation 
may also amount to “an undue influence.”97 Therefore, it is for the state to disprove 
any allegation that a confession was made under circumstances that render it 
inadmissible.98 In South Africa, in addition to the statutory provisions99 that regulate 
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the requirements of a valid confession, broader constitutional guarantees of fairness 
apply. In S v Marx and Another100 it was held that confessions might be excluded in 
evidence where an accused was advised of his right to legal representation upon 
arrest, but not advised of such right when the statement was actually made. The Court 
emphasised that basic notions of fairness apply. It was held that the general question 
in considering the admissibility of evidence, including statements made to a police 
officer, is whether admission will infringe the requirements of a fair trial.101 
Therefore, a confession might meet the statutory requirements but yet remain 
inadmissible on “broader constitutional grounds”.102 Such grounds according to the 
Court include any breach of constitutional pre-trial and trial rights.103  
 
In Botswana, legislation provides for conditions relating to the taking of confessions. 
In terms of section 228(1)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, a 
confession made to a police officer should be confirmed in writing by a magistrate or 
“any justice” who is not a member of the Botswana police. A voluntary confession 
made to a police officer is therefore inadmissible in a court of law, except if it was 
confirmed and reduced into writing in the presence of a magistrate or any justice.104 It 
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follows that if a suspect makes a confession to a police officer, he should be taken 
before a magistrate or justice who will again record a statement from the suspect after 
being satisfied that he is not under any undue influence and that the statement is 
voluntary. Courts strictly apply this statutory provision. In a case where a statement 
was made before an administrative officer who was a district assistant but not a justice 
or magistrate, the court declined to admit the statement.105 The rationale for the 
provision was summarised as follows by the Court of Appeal in the case of Kgaodi v 
The State:106  
 
“The provision prohibits the admission in evidence of confessions made to 
police officers simpliciter. It does not matter whether the confession to the 
police officer is voluntary or not. The object of the prohibition is obviously to 
avoid arguments at trial over whether confessions to police officers were 
freely made, without inducement, physical or otherwise. As is well known, 
allegations are often made of police officers torturing or beating up suspects 
and accused persons or using other unlawful means in order to obtain 
statements which advance the investigation or prosecution of the cases. Some 
of these allegations have been found to be true by the courts although the 
majority of them often turn out to be unfounded. True or not, it is in the 
interest of justice that these charges, or opportunities for them to be made, 
should be minimised, if not altogether eliminated. The prohibition discourages 
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the police from using force or other forms of inducement in extracting 
confessions to bolster up their cases, because if the court would not admit any 
confessions obtained by them at all, there should be no need for them to use 
unlawful methods to obtain them. But in order not to exclude genuine 
confessions made by accused persons even if made to police officers 
altogether, the law permits the admission of such confessions if ‘confirmed 
and reduced to writing in the presence of a magistrate or any justice who is not 
a member of the Botswana Police Force.’”107  
 
The legal requirement and procedural safeguard regarding the voluntariness of 
confessions, is a recognition of the uneven state of affairs between the state and the 
individual at the pre-trial stage. At this stage, state agents secure confessions through 
threats, torture or incentives. The provision is a sterling legal safeguard in that it 
brings the judicial officer into the process. The judicial control and verification of the 
voluntariness of confessions compensate to some extent for the absence of a 
mandatory provision requiring the presence of counsel when statements are made. 
Even if such provision existed, suspects would have had to provide their own 
attorneys since the state only provides attorneys for capital offences, and even so, not 
at the pre-trial stage. Since the majority of people cannot afford attorneys, this 
provision is significant in protecting the large number of people who cannot have 
attorneys present when making their statements. Further, it serves to overcome 
arguments as to whether confessions made to the police are voluntary or not. 
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5 6 1 The admission gap 
Despite the provisions of section 228(1)(ii), there are gaps in the law that permit the 
admission of self-incriminating statements in evidence. The common law of 
Botswana permits this.108 As has been said, suspects are not usually advised of their 
right to remain silent upon arrest. The law requires confirmation of a confession by a 
magistrate. Admissions on the other hand do not fall under the statutory ambit of 
section 228(1)(ii) and the law makes a clear distinction between confessions and 
admissions. Confessions are defined as “an unequivocal acknowledgment [by an 
accused or suspect] of his guilt, the equivalent of a plea of guilty before a court of 
law.”109 An admission on the other hand is an acceptance of certain facts. In the case 
of Desai and Another v The State,110 an appeal from the magistrates’ court, the 
accused persons were charged with unlawful possession of Mandrax tablets. The 
police had found a briefcase in their car and asked them what the contents were. They 
said it was tablets but did not state what kind of tablets. The appellant contended that 
this amounted to a confession and that it should have been confirmed in the presence 
of a judicial officer. O’Brien Quinn CJ rejected this argument and concluded that the 
statement was an admission and therefore admissible. He advanced two reasons.  
 
First, he relied on the reasoning of two authorities. He adopted the definition of a 
confession in R v Becker,111 a definition which is overly narrow. In Becker, De 
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Villiers ACJ stated that an admission of the facts when pieced together may lead to an 
inference of the accused’s guilt. However, according to him, that does not amount to a 
confession. O’Brien Quinn also relied on the case of R v Deacon112 which ruled that 
for a statement to amount to a confession, it must admit to the act and negative any 
exceptions which would exempt the accused from liability. Such formalistic 
definitions have no regard for the informal settings under which incriminating 
evidence is usually obtained and tend to demand a formalised interrogation of the 
suspect which itself encourages abuse.  
 
Second, he held that the police were merely making formal enquiries and that no 
caution was required at that stage. According to him “the police were merely in the 
early stages of their investigation and the question of charging or arresting the 
appellants had not arisen.”113 His view was that when the appellants said the briefcase 
contained tablets, such evidence was merely an admission which was voluntary as no 
threat, promise or inducement was made. One may ask, if a statement can only 
amount to a confession after the accused is formally arrested as suggested. What 
happens during pre-arrest contact between the police and the citizen? One wonders 
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whether his rights remain dormant until the police decide to formally arrest him. The 
distinction between a confession and admission is based on a formalistic artificiality 
that seeks unsuccessfully to distinguish same-set facts.  
 
The police are therefore at liberty to obtain confessions through any means and then 
instruct the accused to appear before a magistrate to rubber-stamp what has already 
been extracted through unfair means. Suspects have been found to still be under the 
influence of the police when making their statements in the presence of a 
magistrate.114  
 
Also, suppose these so-called admissions are not voluntarily obtained, what protection 
does the suspect have? More importantly, it must be stressed that there are no tangible 
safeguards against the unlawful extraction of admissions or pre-arrest confessions as 
they operate outside the protective net of section 228(1)(ii). There is no procedural 
framework for ensuring that the suspect does not speak under duress in respect of 
admissions. In a case that preceded Desai,115 Dyke CJ appeared to have appreciated 
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the dangers of admitting statements made to the police on the grounds that they were 
admissions. In the case of S v Baalakani Moloise116 he doubted the reliability of an 
admission made to a police officer. He noted that if the state is to rely on a statement 
made to police officers, the Judges’ Rules should at least be employed and it should 
be taken down in writing and read back to the accused and he should have signed his 
statement. Though it can be said that Dyke CJ might be replicating section 228(1)(ii) 
of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, his argument is that the statement should 
have been preceded by a warning and caution. Therefore, even if it were argued that 
the statement should be admitted on the basis of an admission, I still strongly argue 
that the accused should be warned and cautioned before he says anything. Though 
Dyke’s requirement for writing seems to duplicate section 228(1)(ii), it appears that 
he was not impressed with the distinction made between confessions and admissions 
and would rather prefer that all statements made to the police were made under 
caution and reduced into writing, more particularly incriminating statements. In this 
vein one would reckon that by insisting on written statements, he in fact had the 
provision in his contemplation. It must be admitted however that in addition to his 
regard for the protection of the accused, Dyke’s contention was equally based on the 
reliability of the evidence of the police. He noted that the policeman was merely 
repeating from memory what the accused had told him and that he did not write it in 
his notebook even though he had one. He therefore wondered how credible the 
evidence was. Bailey also notes a similar problem in the Australian system when he 
writes “…many important protections to individuals during inquiry stages prior to a 
formal prosecution lack legal backing, and leave the citizen potentially exposed to 
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unfair questioning.”117 Foxcroft J in the South African case of S v Agnew and 
Another118 rightly questioned the artificial distinction drawn between admissions and 
confessions. He noted that admissions can be as damaging as confessions. He pointed 
out that if the rule that no one should be permitted to incriminate himself is given its 
full effect, it is difficult to understand how incriminating statements in confessions 
should be treated differently from incriminating words amounting to admissions 
only.119 Therefore, a situation exists whereby a suspect may make several self-
incriminating statements which are admissible in court even though he was not 
warned and regardless of whether such statements were elicited under duress.  
 
In Botswana, a suspect is usually only warned of his right to remain silent when he 
appears before a judicial officer to make a confession. So an accused may make 
several incriminating so-called admissions that can be used against him since 
admissions are admissible in evidence. The distinction between confessions and 
admissions is therefore problematic. The reality of the situation remains that both 
confessions and admissions are incriminating and any exculpatory rules designed to 
protect suspects from making forced statements should be based on the incriminatory 
test. It seems therefore that suspects should be warned and cautioned before pre-arrest 
interviews are conducted.  
 
The right to silence is a fundamental constitutional right and a vital instrument in 
ensuring that the state does not misuse its position of strength and the powers and 
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resources at its disposal. Therefore, the Judges’ Rules must always be followed before 
any questioning commences and an automatic inference of guilt cannot be drawn from 
the exercise of the right to silence.120 
 
5 6 2 Evidence of pointing out 
The requirements of section 228(1)(ii) are further undermined by section 229(2). 
Section 229(2) reads:  
 
“ It shall be lawful to admit evidence that anything was pointed out by the 
person under trial or that any fact or thing was discovered in consequence of 
information given by such person, notwithstanding that such pointing out or 
information forms part of a confession or statement which by law is not 
admissible against him on such trial.” 
 
This provision was a legislative response, overruling the decision in the case of State 
v Ndleleni Dube and Others121 in which it was held that evidence of pointing out 
would be inadmissible if not freely and voluntarily made and if it did not satisfy the 
requirements of section 228(1)(ii). Section 229(2) tilts the advantage at the pre-trial 
process in favour of the state with telling consequences in a number of respects.  
 
First, it opens the floodgates for obtaining information by coercion. It simply means 
that the police can coerce a suspect to give them information of, or lead them to the 
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whereabouts of anything connected with an offence. Therefore, coercion or even 
torture is inadvertently sanctioned, especially in respect of theft related offences. All 
the police need to do is to torture the accused into telling them where the loot is 
hidden.  
 
Second, knowledge of the whereabouts of evidence linked to the offence, does not by 
itself imply guilt. A strictly literal application of the provision can therefore lead to 
distorted conclusions. It must be noted, however, that this provision has received 
judicial endorsement in Botswana. In the case of Nkgatogang v The State122 Aguda JA 
sitting in the Court of Appeal had this to say: 
 
“The view I take of this provision is that it is not meant to permit the 
admissibility of a confessional statement which in law is inadmissible. What 
the subsection says is that it is lawful to admit evidence that an accused person 
pointed out something; and that it is lawful to admit evidence that some fact or 
some thing was discovered in consequence of information supplied by an 
accused person.”123 
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The legal proposition gathered from the tone of this case law is that the information 
from the accused on the whereabouts of the real evidence and the fact that the real 
evidence was found as a result of such information are distinguishable even if it can 
be ruled that the information amounted to a confession. I do not see how any 
disentanglement of the two is possible. In Edwin Seja and Kenosi, in endorsing 
section 229(2), Gyeke-Dako J finds comfort in highlighting that the provision is a 
restatement of the English common law rule that though a confession may not be 
received in evidence for reasons of impropriety, any discovery made as a result of 
such inadmissible confession or act done by the prisoner will be admitted as evidence. 
But this rule of law defeats the very purpose of excluding inadmissible confessions, 
the purpose being to avoid forced self-incrimination, coercion and torture. 
 
For as long as section 229(2) remains in force, the courts need to develop a frame 
work for its just and reasonable application. In the case of State v Honka124 the 
accused was convicted in a magistrate court with the offence of hunting protected 
game without a licence. The evidence is that a police constable introduced himself to 
the accused and told him that he suspected him of unlawful hunting. The accused did 
not say anything but took him to a hunting area where he pointed out two elephant 
skulls. The accused also handed a rifle to him without comment or stating that he used 
it to hunt, nor was there any evidence to that effect. On review, Hannah J noted that 
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the evidence did not show that an offence had been committed. He pointed out that 
the magistrate’s comment that the police could not have reached the scene if he was 
not taken there by the person responsible for the offence showed that he failed to take 
note of the fact that the accused could have innocently gained knowledge of the scene 
in a variety of ways. The learned judge rightly stated that knowledge by the accused 
of the scene, by itself, does not impute guilt. What he did not determine, however, is 
how a court should determine the guilt or otherwise, of an accused who leads the 
police to incriminating evidence.  
 
Clearly, the courts should not be satisfied with the mere fact that the accused had 
knowledge of incriminating evidence. The courts should look beyond that fact and 
examine how the accused came by that knowledge. It must be noted that a person may 
gain knowledge because he participated in the offence, he saw others perpetrating it or 
was given information about the offence. The court should be satisfied that the only 
reason why the accused was able to lead the police to incriminating evidence was as a 
result of his personal knowledge gained by his commission or participation in the 
crime.125 This knowledge should be firsthand, and not gained by secondary means. 
The circumstances under which “pointing out” or “information given” is obtained 
should also be a matter of scrutiny. It is submitted that voluntariness is essential here. 
It might be argued that it does not matter that the pointing out or the information was 
given under duress, since it is a positive indication of the accused’s guilt. But it must 
be noted that for every one guilty person that is unlawfully compelled to make such 
pointing out or give such information, several more innocent people might be put in 
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the same situation.126 This is where the danger of this provision lies. Further, the 
section sanctions compulsory and involuntary participation by the accused which 
violates the privilege against self-incrimination. Evidence obtained in such a manner 
opens the doors to investigative unfairness which in turn taints the fairness of the trial.  
 
The South African Criminal Procedure Act contains a provision127 similar to 
Botswana’s 229(2). The South African courts have taken the provision further by 
requiring that the pointing out or giving out of information must be voluntary.128 But 
it must be noted that before 1991, the courts in South Africa permitted evidence 
obtained as a result of a pointing out even if it was improperly obtained or 
involuntarily given. This was permitted on the basis of a so-called reliability theory 
that an accused’s knowledge of where incriminating evidence was, was relevant to his 
guilt.129 However, in the case of S v Sheehama130 the Court noted that evidence of 
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pointing out were to be viewed as admissions by conduct and that their admission was 
to be governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act dealing with 
admissions and confessions. In effect, they must be freely and voluntarily made. Also, 
in S v Mokahtsa131 where, as a result of extensive interrogation, the accused told his 
wife to hand over money apparently stolen in a bank robbery, and the wife took the 
police to a house where the money was dug up, it was held that the information which 
led to the discovery of the money was an admission by conduct. Since the information 
was given under duress the admission was not made voluntarily and was thus 
inadmissible. Though the reliability theory sounds attractive on the basis that the 
information was given by the accused or the pointing out led to the discovery of 
incriminating evidence, it must be rejected on the basis of fundamentally higher 
values.  
 
First, voluntariness is a key factor. The reliability theory does not consider whether 
the accused voluntarily gives the information. Second, and closely related to the first, 
the theory shows no regard for the ill-treatment and torture to which an accused might 
be subjected in order to obtain the information. Rather, it encourages it. It says to the 
police, “you go and torture the suspect and force him to reveal the incriminating 
evidence. Regardless whether this amounts to a confession, it will be admitted in 
evidence.” Clothing the state with such powers is unnecessary, having regard to the 
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already dominant position of the state in the criminal justice system. It is clear that 
while the reliability theory encourages inequality, voluntariness puts the suspect on a 
pedestal of equality with the state. State powers should be curtailed and kept to the 
relevant minimum so as to maintain the balance between the opposing sides to the 
contest. Third, it disregards the rule that no one should be compelled to give 
incriminating evidence against himself against his will. The element of voluntariness 
is crucial and the courts in Botswana must have regard to this in their application of 
section 228. 
 
5 7 Search and seizure 
Search and seizure involves the invasion of a person’s privacy. His property rights are 
infringed and personal effects and documents seized. However, this is the most 
powerful instrument of police investigation. Without the power to enter and search 
premises, most of the incriminating evidence that can be used to convict criminals 
will not be found and the individual’s property will become the citadel of illegal 
activities and a repository of evidence linking the individual to crime. The absence of 
powers of search and seizure would register a form of “individual centralism”, 
thereby making individual rights so inviolable as to totally negate all other social 
interests.  
 
5 7 1 The power to search 
In terms of the laws of Botswana, the police require written permission to enter and 
search private premises. This authorisation is issued by a judicial officer who should 
be satisfied on oath that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is 
stolen property or anything related to the commission of an offence on the 
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premises.132 The requirement for a search warrant should be seen as the perfect 
compromise that reconciles individual centralism with executive absolutism or state 
autocracy. The state in this regard should however show cause in order to obtain the 
authority to search.133 In Botswana, the practice is that there is no inquiry into the 
information provided by the police and the search is authorised as a matter of course. 
The warrant may direct the police to search the premises and any person found there 
and to seize anything from them. 
 
A warrantless search is also permissible if a delay might defeat the object of the 
search. But there are procedural safeguards which curb state absolutist tendencies. 
The person conducting the search must be of the rank of sergeant or above.134 The 
search must as far as possible be conducted in the day and in the presence of two or 
more respectable inhabitants of the locality where the search is made.135 A police 
officer of the rank of sergeant or above may also search without warrant or grant 
written permission for the search of any premises if he has reason to suspect that 
stolen stock is kept there or anything is kept there in contravention of any law relating 
to intoxicating liquor or habit-forming drugs.136 A judicial officer may order the 
seizure of any document or account book that may be required as evidence in any trial 
at which he is presiding.137 Any person may without a warrant seize counterfeit 
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currency, instruments used for making them, gold and silver dust and related 
materials.138  
 
In making a decision to search without a warrant, the belief of the officer that a delay 
in obtaining a search warrant would defeat the purpose of the search should be based 
on reasonable grounds. In the case of Useya v The State,139 the phrase reasonable 
grounds was given interpretation in relation to section 17(1) of the Drugs and Related 
Substances Act140 which provides inter alia: 
 
“If any police officer has reasonable grounds for believing that any person has 
committed an offence under this Part or any regulations made under this Act 
in relation to this Part he may -    
(a) enter without search warrant upon any land…” 
 
The Court noted that any statutory enactment that curtails individual rights relating to 
liberty, privacy and property are drastic in nature and should therefore be interpreted 
strictly.141 The Court referred with approval to the English case of Inland Revenue 
Commissioners et al v Rossminster Ltd142 where the Court in interpreting “reasonable 
grounds” noted that the officer must in fact have had reasonable cause and that it was 
not enough to show that he had an honest belief. In other words, it had to be shown 
that grounds existed that led to a suspicion or belief before such arbitrary powers 
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could be exercised.143 In a number of South African cases144 the courts applied the 
objective test to the reasonable ground or reasonable belief phrase. In Sigaba v 
Minister of Defence and Police and Another145 the Court held that the phrase 
“reasonable grounds to suspect” should be interpreted objectively and the grounds of 
suspicion should be that which would cause the reasonable man to be suspicious.146 
The objective test was applied in Useya.147 The Court found that the entering of a 
house by the police on “mere curiosity or suspicion”148 and in the absence of 
information that an offence had been committed, will amount to wrongful conduct.149  
The restriction placed on the use of arbitrary police power by the reasonable grounds 
provision serves as a legitimate and necessary limitation on such powers thereby 
reducing the inequalities between statal powers and individual freedoms. 
 
5 7 2 Procedural elements 
A search warrant may be directed to a policeman or policemen named in it, 
authorising them to search any premises, vehicle or any other place including persons 
found in the place of search and to seize items found there.150 A warrant may only be 
executed during the day unless the judicial officer specifically authorises execution at 
night. In effecting the arrest, a policeman is also empowered to search the person 
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arrested and seize any property that may be evidence of a crime.151 The thing should 
be given identification marks152 and kept until the conclusion of investigations or 
trial.153  
 
The extent to which the police are bound to comply with the procedural safeguards 
provided by section 52(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act154 has come up 
for judicial consideration. The Court in the case of Kenosi v The State155 held that the 
provision is permissive in nature and that conducting the search in question in the 
absence of two respectable persons, does not per se render it unlawful. The Court 
reasoned that the use of the words “as far as possible” in the section is indicative of its 
permissive nature.156 The Court pointed out that the purpose of the section is to ensure 
the fairness of the search. It was pointed out however that non-compliance with the 
section should be justified by good and reasonable reasons. It seems, however, that 
even where non-compliance of the section is proved, the admissibility of the evidence 
will not be affected and the accused can only seek remedial measures in other 
proceedings. The courts therefore will not shut their eyes to the guilt of a man on the 
basis that the evidence was tainted, except with regard to confessions. In this regard 
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the laws of Botswana follow the English common law principle that all relevant 
evidence is admissible.157 
 
5 8 The use of exclusionary evidentiary rules in protecting the interests of the 
accused 
The unfairness of the autocratic process of investigations needs to be countered. If 
not, the rights of citizens will be diminished and inevitably become irrelevant. 
Exclusionary rules have become instruments of the courts in protecting the rights of 
the accused. At the same time the courts show their displeasure by putting a damper 
on the excesses of the state. This in effect enhances the equalisation of the accused’s 
position vis-a-vis that of the state.Wasek-Wiaderek states: 
 
“The rule against hearsay and inadmissibility of written documentary evidence 
are the main safeguards for the equal level of bargaining between the parties. 
The court’s power to declare inadmissible the evidence obtained by the police 
at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings allows to balance at the hearing the 
inequalities between the parties which could occur during the pre-trial 
investigation.”158  
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The gathering and presentation of evidence should be guided by rules that ensure not 
only that the evidence is credible and reliable but also that the individual’s rights are 
not infringed. The need to protect the rights of the individual has culminated in a 
number of evidential rules such as the rule against hearsay, possible exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence, identification evidence and opinion evidence. In effect, 
the strength of a case is not determined on the amount of evidence a party can muster, 
but whether it is admissible in court, whether the evidence as a whole establishes 
every element of the offence to the required degree and the effect of the evidence on 
the totality of the case. The prosecution in a criminal case can amass as much 
evidence it can lay its hands on. After all, it has all the resources to do so. But such 
evidence will have no impact on the case if it is inadmissible or is insufficient to 
establish the particular offence. 
 
Absolute power can be misused even when the intention of the perpetrator is 
subjectively noble. Procedural rules are double-functional in that they do not only 
protect the public from police abuse, but in fact allow the police to lawfully invade 
privacy and personal liberty so as to detect or prevent crime.159 In consequence, the 
police have legitimate powers of search, arrest and detention. Procedural rules 
therefore regulate police powers in a positive and negative sense. It empowers them to 
carry out certain acts thereby making legitimate policing activities lawful, but 
prevents them from doing other acts which might unnecessarily infringe on 
fundamental liberties.160 These rules are meant to curb executive excesses, and they 
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play a delicate role of balancing the interests of the state against those of the suspect. 
They also operate at trial level. Mainly, it is then that the courts are given an 
opportunity to measure the compliance of the investigating process in what has 
crystallised into a question of whether violations of due process rights occurred. The 
question whether procedure was violated may affect the court’s attitude towards the 
evidence and may ultimately result in its exclusion. 
 
5 8 1 Exclusionary rules 
The application of exclusionary rules typifies the meeting point in the relationship 
between criminal procedure and evidence. The collection of evidence during 
investigations and its production in court are governed by procedural rules. In this 
regard, the procedural collection of evidence during investigation and the production 
in court reveals two classes of procedure.  
 
First, there is what I call affective procedure. Affective procedure relates to legality 
and processes. Legality simply means that there should be a legal basis for the 
commencement of investigations. There should be a valid basis upon which the state 
can commence investigating an offence and disturb the liberty, privacy and property 
of the individual. The investigation of a crime involves the use of processes and 
procedures. The collecting of evidence and information is a process. The investigation 
of crime and collection of evidence should be done within set legal parameters which 
are in the form of procedures. These procedures are geared towards ensuring that the 
process of gathering evidence against the accused is lawful. They limit the powers of 
the state and ensure that these powers are exercised within reasonable bounds so as to 
protect the accused. 
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Second, there is also procedure used in the presentation of evidence. This I call 
effective procedure. Evidence is obtained by affective procedure and produced 
through effective procedure. Exclusionary rules serve to bar at the effective stage, 
evidence that was improperly obtained at the affective stage. The exclusion of 
improperly obtained evidence is rationalised by a number of considerations. In this 
regard, the courts will not condone an illegality if this brings the administration of 
justice into disrepute.161 Also, the courts will not rely on evidence emanating from 
unreliable circumstances. In this sense exclusionary rules form a safety-catch system 
to ensure that convictions are based on evidence that is credible, safe and reliable. 
While exclusionary rules mark the cornerstone of the due process system, it has been 
argued that they form an unnecessary protection for criminals.162 What becomes clear 
is that while exclusionary rules form an essential instrument in ensuring a fair trial of 
the accused, other rules like the rule against hearsay, if applied too rigidly might result 
in the exclusion of valuable and credible evidence that is necessary for the state to 
secure a conviction of a guilty man. In essence, the decision to exclude evidence or 
not may determine at what stage the interests of the accused ceases to be relevant and 
when the interests of the state become necessary and justifiable.  
 
Exclusionary rules provide some form of remote control over the police when they 
operate in the field in that the police should know that a failure to tow the 
constitutional line would or might lead to the inadmissibility of evidence. 
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5 8 2 The legality principle 
This principle reflects a high standing legal moralistic attitude and a shunning of 
pragmatic flexibility. Evidence obtained by illegal procedure will not be accepted to 
support a conviction163 even when its reliability is not in doubt.164 This approach 
embraces a disciplinary principle by excluding evidence improperly obtained to 
discourage the police from employing underhand tactics.165 It also embraces a 
protective principle which seeks to protect suspects from serious breaches of the 
law.166 
 
5 8 2 1 Illegally obtained evidence 
From a procedural and moralistic point of view evidence should be lawfully obtained. 
Indeed, this position is sustained in a number of countries. In the United States the 
courts originally enforced the exclusionary rule strictly and on a constitutional basis. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged its deterrent effect in that it discouraged the 
neglect of constitutional guarantees.167  
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A gradual shift has taken place as inroads are made into the sanctity of the 
exclusionary rule. The courts have recently held that illegally obtained evidence will 
not be excluded if a policeman acted in good faith upon an apparently valid 
warrant,168 where the link between the illegality and discovery are so attenuated as to 
dissipate any taint169 or in the case of immigration proceedings.170  
 
In Scotland, the courts have recognised a need to balance the interests of the citizen to 
be protected and the interests of the state to secure evidence that will enable justice to 
be done. But there is also a positive recognition that “the interest of the State cannot 
be magnified to the point of causing all the safeguards for the protection of the citizen 
to vanish, and of offering a positive inducement to the authorities to proceed by 
irregular methods.”171 
 
The exclusionary treatment of illegally obtained evidence has long been weakened in 
English common law with the notorious statement of Crompton J in the case of R v 
Leatham172 when he quipped, “it matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it 
would be admissible in evidence.”173 This statement represents the high watermark of 
state interest. In the case of Kuruma, Son of Kanui v R174 the accused was charged 
with unlawful possession of ammunition. The ammunition was found in the course of 
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a search by police officers who, due to their rank, were not qualified to conduct the 
search. The Privy Council reiterated that where evidence is relevant and admissible, 
the court is not concerned with how it was obtained.175 Therefore an irregularity in the 
obtaining of evidence is irrelevant and does not render it inadmissible. Its 
admissibility depends on its relevance to the case.176 In the result therefore, there 
exists a presumptive “inclusionary” approach to all evidence and it seems that the rule 
is that all relevant evidence will be admitted. Interestingly, in the case of R v Sang177 
the House of Lords accepted that as part of a judge’s discretion to ensure that the 
accused receives a fair trial, he has a discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence 
if its prejudicial effect on the minds of the jury will outweigh its probative value. 
Their Lordships, however, went on to state that since the court is not concerned with 
how evidence is obtained, a judge has no discretion to refuse to admit admissible 
evidence on the grounds that it was obtained by improper or unfair means except for 
admissions, confessions and evidence obtained from the accused after the commission 
of the offence. The scope of the discretion and the reference to evidence obtained 
from the accused after the commission of the offence, though made obiter has raised 
considerable controversy as to its true meaning.178 In the view of Lord Roskill it 
would be unfortunate to enlarge the narrow limits of Sang.179 For Lord Diplock, the 
phrase refers to self-incriminating admissions obtained from an accused under 
circumstances that would justify a judge in excluding confessions.180 In Lord 
                                                 
175
 Keane The Modern Law 51. 
176
 Jeffrey v Black [1978] Q.B. 490 497. 
177
 [1980] A.C. 402. 
178
 Keane The Modern Law 53. 
179
 Morris v Beardmore [1981] A.C. 446. Cited in Keane The Modern Law 53. 
180
 Keane The Modern Law 54. 
 167
Salmon’s opinion the decision to exclude depends on the circumstances of each case 
and the category of cases under which evidence will be excluded on the ground that it 
might result in an unfair trial, are never closed. Though little has been done to clarify 
the situation, what is clear however is that the discretion to exclude should not be 
exercised if those who obtained the evidence did so under a bona fide mistake as to 
the true extent of their powers.181 It must be noted that the scope of the discretion in 
Sang182 was expanded by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 in England, 
to include any evidence the prosecution intends to rely on. In effect the discretion to 
exclude is no longer limited only to admissions, confessions and evidence obtained 
from the accused after the commission of the offence. It extends to all evidence 
regardless of when it was obtained or whether it was obtained from the accused or 
some other source.183 The relevant provision of the Act is broadly worded and extends 
to all kinds of evidence184 including evidence of bad character, depositions and 
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documentary records.185 The English courts tend to approach the section on the basis 
of reliability while noting the possibility of exclusion to protect rights.186 
 
The English common law approach of equating relevance with admissibility applies 
in Botswana. In the case of Seeletso v The State187 the appellant was arrested upon 
suspicion of having stolen twenty one motor vehicle tyres and four jerry cans. Upon 
interrogation the appellant led the police to his premises where upon a search they 
discovered the stolen articles. The appellant was charged with and convicted of theft. 
On appeal to the High Court he argued inter alia that the search was conducted 
without a warrant. He further argued that the provisions of section 52 of the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act was not followed. This section provides that in the 
absence of a warrant, the search must be conducted by a policeman of the rank of 
sergeant or above and that such search must, as far as possible, be made in the day 
time and in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality. He 
contended therefore that no article recovered during the search should have been 
admitted in evidence. In rejecting this argument, Gyeke-Dako J stated that the test to 
be applied in considering whether evidence obtained under such circumstances is 
admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. According to him, “If it is, 
[relevant] then barring express statutory provisions to the contrary, it is admissible 
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and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained.”188 The Court 
further recognised a general judicial discretion to exclude evidence that would operate 
unfairly against the accused. This statement was made obiter and no attempt was 
made to define the parameters of the discretion. However, reference was made to a 
number of English and Scottish cases that have dealt with the situation.189 These cases 
were merely listed in support of Gyeke-Dako’s contention. They were not discussed 
and it is uncertain whether the judge was merely referring to them in passing or using 
them as the basis for his reasoning and finding. His approach, however, should be 
followed with the understanding that the principles of English common law of 
evidence apply in Botswana except where expressly excluded.  
 
Gyeke-Dako J however had an opportunity to state the position in specific terms in 
the case of Kenosi v The State190 where he was faced with similar arguments. He 
clearly stated that Botswana law follows English law on the issue of illegally obtained 
evidence and declared that all relevant evidence apart from confessions is 
admissible.191 Though it appears therefore that the position in Sang192 will apply, 
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Kenosi seems to create a slight diversion. In Kenosi, no reference was made to 
admissions and evidence obtained from the accused after the commission of the 
crime. Indeed, admissions are admissible in evidence in Botswana. The Court in this 
case stated as a general rule of law that all relevant evidence is admissible “provided 
that it involves neither a reference to an inadmissible confession of guilt, nor the 
commission of an act of contempt of court.”193  
 
The admissibility of illegally obtained evidence is justified by public interest 
considerations according to the Court of Appeal in the case of Moloi v The State.194 
Again, the argument was similar to the cases referred to above. The appellant argued 
that the police who conducted the search without a warrant had failed to call two 
witnesses as provided by section 52 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. The 
Court did not embark on a discussion of illegally obtained evidence. The Court, it 
seems, regarded the matter as a mere legal technicality. In the words of Lord Wylie 
JA who wrote on behalf of the Court:  
 
“In any event, where relevant evidence has been obtained, albeit in 
circumstances of technical impropriety, it would offend against the public 
interest that it should be excluded on that ground.”195 
 
It must be noted that in all these cases, the courts only dealt with the matter obiter, or 
did not embark on a full discussion even where it was a central issue at hand. 
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5 8 2 2 Entrapment 
A method that the police sometimes use in obtaining evidence is by setting up the 
crime or giving a suspect an opportunity to commit one. Again, the question arises as 
to whether the courts will partake of the fruits of the poisoned tree. The answer 
manifests itself in the courts’ approach to the admissibility of such evidence at the 
trial stage. Because of the inherent immoral pervasiveness of this procedure it results 
in unfairness that should not be condoned by the courts. It is reprehensible to 
encourage someone to commit an offence and then arrest him. Entrapment is 
fundamentally illegal and should be met with the exclusionary approach. Generally in 
the United States, this approach manifests itself in the form of a defence. This defence 
protects people who are caught in unfair traps.196 Since entrapment is a defence, the 
prosecution is unable to rely on evidence obtained by such means. 
 
In English and Roman-Dutch common law, however, an inclusionary approach 
applies. The argument is that entrapment is not a defence to a criminal charge 
principally because when an accused commits an offence, even though he might have 
been encouraged to do so, he does so with the relevant and required actus reus and 
mens rea.
197
 It is argued that several offences are instigated in the first place and the 
fact that the police are the instigator does not affect the guilt of the offender.198 This 
argument flies in the face of reason and is manifestly inconsistent with the principle of 
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equality. The principle operates on the basis that the accused is presumed innocent 
and that it is the state’s duty to detect and prosecute crime, not instigate crime. No 
moral fibre lies in the state prosecuting crime for which it is the author. The principle 
of equality does not fit into a scheme wherein the state is the instigator and at the 
same time the prosecutor of crime.  
 
It would seem that the Privy Council established an inclusionary rule in Kuruma199 
when it acceded to the general admissibility of all relevant evidence but stated as an 
exception that a judge has a discretion to disallow evidence that would operate 
unfairly against the accused such as evidence obtained by trick.200 But this exception 
was shot down in Sang.201 Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
brought back some form of discretion which even extended to evidence obtained 
before the commission of the offence thereby reinstating Kuruma.202 But the Court of 
Appeal stated in R v Smurthwaite203 that the Act has not altered the substantive rule of 
law that the use of an agent provocateur does not afford a defence to a criminal 
charge. While stating that the use of an agent provocateur does not per se create a 
defence, the Court stated that if in the view of the judge, the circumstances in 
obtaining the evidence would have adverse effects on the fairness of the trial, he may 
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exclude it.204 It seems therefore that the courts in England have seen a gradual 
progression towards exclusion.205  
 
More recently, English law has ultimately taken a stance against police practice of 
entrapment. It has recognised that it is unacceptable for the state to lure its citizens 
into committing offences and then prosecute them for it.206 Remedies have 
consequently been developed. The courts are empowered to stay the proceedings or 
exclude the evidence.207 
 
Botswana208 and South Africa209 have followed the inclusionary stance in consonance 
with their common laws.  Recent trends in South Africa and Namibia,210 however, 
show that the law of entrapment has under gone a process of re-engineering in the 
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face of new constitutional orders. A positional shift has occurred in South Africa with 
the introduction of a Bill of Rights and the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment 
Act 1996.211  The latter regulates the setting up of traps and determines the 
admissibility of evidence obtained under such circumstances. Unfair trapping has also 
been met with constitutional scrutiny.212 The fairness of traps is scrutinised to ensure 
that they do not infringe on the rights of citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution213 
including the right of an accused to a fair trial.214 This view is based on the 
proposition that a fair trial refers not only to what happens in court but to the activities 
of the police while they conduct their investigations.215  
 
The courts in Botswana have maintained that entrapment is not a defence even though 
they have expressed their displeasure with the practice. Instead, it is a mitigating 
factor in sentence.216 Several people who are entrapped are not predisposed to commit 
crime in the first place.217 Therefore, where the idea of the crime originates from the 
state and the accused was not predisposed as such, inequality is evident and a 
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conviction on such evidence in my view is a miscarriage of justice and an indictment 
on the entire judicial system. Entrapment, when misused, represents the use of state 
authority and resources against the individual. Many individuals are not predisposed 
to commit crime but vulnerable, leading them to succumb to the temptations of the 
state. Limitations on unfair state activity is a measure in securing equality. The courts 
have a duty to limit the activities of the state in relation to entrapment by refusing to 
admit such evidence. To accept evidence resulting from unfair traps and then rely on 
the circumstances under which the evidence was obtained in mitigation, is a 
contradiction in terms.  
 
The difference between the approach of the courts of Botswana and that of South 
Africa can be attributed to a number of reasons. First, in Botswana, the issue of 
entrapment does not arise often and has not been given a comprehensive review. 
Entrapment has never been challenged in the courts on a constitutional basis. One can 
only hope that perspectives will change as the law develops in this area. Second, and 
more importantly, Botswana’s legal thought is still influenced by English common 
law tradition. The issue has not been seen through the constitutional mirror as in the 
case of South Africa and Namibia. South Africa and Namibia have recent 
constitutional dispensations crafted at a time when human rights were issues of 
serious socio-political concern in those countries and the world at large. Therefore, 
constitutional values have heavy doctrinal impact on the criminal justice system of 
those countries. The courts of Botswana on the other hand, have clung to outdated 
common law principles in respect of entrapment.  
 
 
 176
5 8 3 The reliability principle 
The consequences of conviction in a criminal trial are dire. Therefore, the evidence on 
which the prosecution relies must be cogent and reliable. As such, evidential rules 
relating to admissibility are designed to ensure reliability such that the court can 
safely rely on the evidence. In the search for the truth, evidence should be admitted or 
excluded solely on the basis of reliability.218 The reliability principle finds expression 
in a number of evidential rules such as the best evidence rule219 and cautionary rules 
relating to the weight to be given to identification evidence. Original and firsthand 
evidence is preferred over second-hand and hearsay evidence. In the case of 
identification evidence the court will insist that the circumstances were such that it 
could be safely concluded that the observer was not mistaken as to the identity of the 
accused.220   
 
Some authors have advocated strict adherence to the reliability principle.221 In their 
view the purpose of the courts is to seek the truth while matters of police 
improprietary must be handled in disciplinary proceedings. Investigating 
improprieties is not the duty of the courts and these issues are only collateral to the 
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main issues at the trial. The court is not in a position to thoroughly investigate 
improprietaries at trial. It is unfair that a police officer be left under suspicion at a trial 
which has no mandate to investigate his misconduct.222 It is argued that it is unfair to 
acquit an accused merely because the investigating officer acted improperly.223 The 
exclusion of evidence improperly obtained, it is argued, is to confuse the accused’s 
criminal liability in the case for which he is charged with his rights against those who 
perpetrated violence or threats against him.224 In my view, a strict application of the 
reliability principle will mean that the courts will turn a blind eye to police 
impropriety thereby encouraging unfair practices at the pre-trial stage. 
 
The exclusion of evidence generally serves to counterbalance investigative 
unfairness.225 Whereas police indiscipline, legality and reliability are determinant 
factors in the decision to exclude, there always remains the nagging question that 
guilty accused are allowed to escape justice because of legal technicalities. What is 
important, however, is the fairness of the process. The state should not be permitted to 
use its institutions to obtain evidence by unfair means. The courts of Botswana, it 
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seems, will admit relevant evidence though unlawfully obtained. Perhaps this 
approach prevails due to the absence of a constitutional provision requiring the 
exclusion of unfairly or unconstitutionally obtained evidence.226 A contextualisation 
of the criminal process in relation to equality before the law forms a basis for the 
exclusion of evidence obtained by unfair means. 
 
5 9 Conclusion 
The pre-trial process represents a tension-filled sphere wherein the competing 
interests of the individual and the state comes to the fore most vividly. The 
fundamental individual rights of privacy, personal freedom and the right to silence are 
in stiff competition with public interest demands requiring police powers of search, 
arrest and questioning, all important in the detection and suppression of crime. The 
various legal rules encompassing pre-trial procedure are geared towards protecting the 
substantive rights of liberty, privacy and the inviolability of property. These legal 
rules have developed and manifested themselves in the form of procedural rights. 
Since it is impermissible for the liberty and privacy of the individual to manifest 
themselves by “individualist registration” (a utopian state of affairs, permitting the 
individual to insist on complete inviolability of the right to liberty and privacy) on the 
one hand, and since there is a need to guard against executive absolutism on the other, 
statutory provisions regulate the relationship between the state and the individual. The 
warrant has become a very important and universally recognised instrument for 
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regulating and setting the limits of state intrusion on individual liberty and privacy. 
Warrants are granted by a neutral body, the judiciary, after being persuaded by the 
state that there is reasonable cause to disturb the rights of the individual. Procedural 
rules and instruments that place boundaries on powers of investigation, furthers 
equality by ensuring that the police do not ride rough-shod over the rights of the 
suspect during investigations. A second instrument of safeguard, is time-limits 
relating to the period the state can legally detain a suspect.  
 
The odds are stacked against the suspect if during the pre-trial stage no full 
acknowledgement is given to his passive defence right. The police want the accused 
to cooperate by making testimonial communications. However, the police do not 
share their evidence with the accused. So the accused is in double danger as the police 
take every advantage they can from the accused without any quid pro quo to restore 
the balance. The accused is expected to provide the police with information they do 
not have and yet the accused is restricted in having access to the course of the 
investigations against him. The police have prior knowledge of the evidence and the 
accused starts getting information only when he is charged to court. The prosecution 
is able to prepare their case while the suspect’s lawyer is furnished with the 
statements of prosecution witnesses only when the accused is charged to court. It is 
only then that he starts preparing the defence. In practical terms, the suspect cannot 
conduct effective investigations if he intends to since all vital evidence would have 
been scooped up by the state. This is in essence a sole-enterprised authoritarian 
process which clearly results in substantial inequality. The absence of equality of 
arms at the pre-trial stage can ultimately affect the fairness of the trial and its result. 
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CHAPTER 6  
DISCLOSURE AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING EQUALITY OF ARMS  
6 1 Introduction 
Disclosure represents a key procedural instrument in remedying the autocratic and one-
sided process of criminal investigations. The state conducts investigations using powers 
of search, arrest and interrogation. It gathers evidence in a manner the accused cannot 
match. It collects documents, and lines up and prepares witnesses for trial; a feat the 
accused cannot accomplish. Possibly, the accused would have been in detention during 
investigations, thereby incapacitating him from collecting vital evidence which would be 
scooped by the state before he laid hands on them. Any attempt by the accused to conduct 
his own investigations which overlap with those of the police, will be seen as interference 
with possible state witnesses and obstruction of the investigation process. The appropriate 
remedy to this one-sided feature of the investigation process therefore is that the 
prosecution discloses any material in their possession which “may assist the accused in 
exonerating himself or obtaining a reduction in sentence.”1  
 
It is axiomatic that the prosecution enjoys a disproportionately huge advantage not only 
in obtaining evidence, but also has the liberty of preparing its case for months or years 
prior to charging the accused. That this situation creates inequality is not a theoretical 
statement. It represents the stark realities of the criminal process as we know it today. 
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The state maintains and retains great powers and resources in all spheres of life and the 
criminal process is no exception. The power of the state as against the individual is 
mightiest at the pre-trial stage.  The state has powers to investigate, search and seize; and 
the accused does not.2 In a constitutional democracy this imbalance is redressed by 
compelling the prosecution to share incriminating as well as exculpatory evidence with 
the accused. To assist the accused to face the state in a criminal trial, it is important that 
he is put on full notice of the charges against him, that he be given full information of the 
nature of the evidence before he takes a plea,3 and that he be given sufficient time to 
prepare his defence. As was noted in the English case of R v McIlkenny:4 “Inequality of 
resources is ameliorated by the obligation on the part of the prosecution to make available 
all material which may prove helpful to the defence.”5  
 
6 2 The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence 
The principle of equality of arms seeks to ensure that the accused does not suffer 
significant disadvantage in preparing and presenting his case as opposed to the 
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prosecution which has the support of the state to its advantage.6 Equality of arms means 
that the accused must have knowledge of and an opportunity to comment on all evidence 
adduced or observations filed.7 To this extent, the accused must be granted access to 
records and documents in the prosecution’s possession and to comment on such 
documents and other evidence produced during trial.8 This includes material which 
exculpates the accused and material on which the prosecution does not intend to rely.  
 
The right of the accused to adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence is provided 
for by section 10(2)(c) of the Constitution of Botswana. The right to adequate time and 
facilities means that the accused must be given sufficient time to prepare for trial and to 
be able to effectively put his case and arguments before the court.9 The essence of this 
requirement is to achieve equality of arms between the prosecution and defence which is 
essential to a fair trial under section 10 of the Constitution of Botswana.10 The 
measurability of adequate time will naturally depend on the circumstances of each case, 
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the complexity of the case and the number of witnesses to be called by the prosecution. 
The issue of facilities can be extensive and nebulous as it encompasses both physical 
materials required by the accused and procedural access to information within the 
knowledge of the state and which are crucial to the accused’s case. If the accused is 
remanded the state will be obliged to provide him with stationery, equipment and services 
as well as any legal literature he may own.11 Where the accused is not remanded the state 
may, where the accused is unable to do so, secure his witnesses and provide him with 
statements of state witnesses. This provision furthers the principle of equality of arms and 
seeks to ensure that the accused is not disadvantaged. The question whether the accused 
is entitled to the statements of prosecution witnesses has been controversial in the courts 
of Botswana. This question has been particularly relevant to magistrate courts where no 
depositions of prosecution witnesses are prepared for the benefit of the accused.  
 
6 2 1 Access to statements 
The question of disclosure in Botswana has beset the judiciary for several years. The 
jurisprudence on this question can be divided into two periods.  
 
The first period spans from 1993 commencing with the case of Kenosi v The State.12 The 
Court of Appeal in that case established that the prosecution was not under a duty to 
provide the accused with statements of its witnesses.  
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The second period commenced in 2001 when the courts started moving away from the 
common law position of Kenosi until the Court of Appeal finally overturned its earlier 
decision in Kenosi in 2002, in the case of Attorney-General v Ahmed,13 thereby bringing 
an end to the rule of non-disclosure or docket privilege.  
 
6 2 1 1 Kenosi and the rule of non-disclosure 
The Court in Kenosi held that the prosecution was not under a duty to furnish the accused 
with statements of possible witnesses. In so doing, the Court likened such statements to 
those made by clients to their attorneys in civil litigation which are covered by attorney-
client privilege. The Court accordingly stated therefore that the statements of prosecution 
witnesses were privileged. The Court also mentioned that the prosecution may waive this 
privilege. In recognising the duty of all parties to litigation to assist a court in arriving at 
the truth, the Court affirmed a positive duty on the prosecutor to make statements of 
prosecution witnesses available to the defence for cross-examination, where there is 
material discrepancy between a statement made by a witness and his evidence. 
 
6 2 1 2 Kenosi and privilege 
The Court in Kenosi drew a parallel between statements of prosecution witnesses and 
those made by a client to his attorney in civil cases. The premise on which such 
comparison is based results in a flawed conclusion. First, this is a wrong reading of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
disclosure was the rule, Hannah J noted as an exception that the state should disclose the identity of an 
informant if that would tend to show that the accused was innocent. 
13
 [2003] 1 B.L.R. 158 (CA). 
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concept of client-lawyer privilege. It must be noted that the concept of confidentiality on 
which the privilege is premised, does not permit one side to conceal evidence from the 
other and spring it by surprise during trial. In fact, civil litigation amply caters for 
transparency and open disclosure of evidence and exchange of documents prior to trial. In 
civil proceedings the parties are able to exchange pleadings so that they are acquainted 
with the case of the other side. A party may even apply for and compel the other side to 
provide further details if the information contained in the pleadings are insufficient. 
Parties are also required to make discovery and produce copies of documents they intend 
to use in advance of trial. These mechanisms of disclosure are not always available in 
criminal proceedings.  
 
Second, civil proceedings are quite different in terms of their results and the 
consequences for the accused in the future. Unlike civil proceedings, the reputation and 
liberty of the accused are at stake in criminal matters. A conviction may result in loss of 
liberty or disqualification from certain privileges or rights that may permanently affect 
the life of the accused.  
 
Third, charge sheets, which are meant to provide accused persons with information of the 
allegation made against them, contain a minimum of information. The accused has a right 
to know the facts constituting the allegation against him. These lie in the statements of 
witnesses and other documents.  
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Fourth, the use of client-attorney privilege in civil proceedings as a basis for non-
disclosure in criminal cases is not in order. Civil proceedings are private in nature, 
affecting two or more individuals. Criminal trials on the other hand are public. The 
general public is interested in seeing that justice is done. Prosecutors are public 
institutions in which members of the public are stakeholders. Therefore it is in order that 
the process is as transparent as possible and the accused be fully informed of the charges 
against him. 
 
The Court in Kenosi also put a positive duty on the prosecutor to provide the defence 
with copies of statements for cross-examination if there is a material discrepancy between 
the evidence of a witness and his statement to the police.14 But, since the prosecutor is in 
exclusive possession of all statements, it is he and he alone who determines what 
amounts to a material inconsistency and when it is necessary to produce a statement. One 
can therefore say that he is the sole judge on this matter. One must also not lose sight of 
the fact that production of a statement at this stage will disrupt the proceedings since a 
defence attorney may require an adjournment to study the statement or recall previous 
witnesses, a situation which could have been avoided had full disclosure been provided 
                                                 
14
 See also the South African case of S v Naude 2005 (2) SACR 218 (W) where it was held that the 
prosecutor has a duty to point out inconsistencies in a witness’s statement and evidence. The Court held 
that failure by the prosecutor to inform the regional magistrate of such inconsistency resulted in an unfair 
trial since the content of the statement may have had an impact on the magistrate’s finding of credibility of 
the complainant, a single witness in the case. The Court noted that the prosecutor has a duty to ensure that 
the accused gets a fair trial and thus, even though statements are no longer privileged, the prosecutor has a 
duty to point out inconsistencies to the court if the defence counsel fails to do so. 
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beforehand. The preferred situation is that full disclosure be made before the trial 
commences. 
 
The Court in establishing that the prosecution has a discretion to determine whether there 
is material discrepancy, did so on the basis of what it termed a special relationship 
between the prosecution and the court. The Court noted that the prosecutor stands in a 
special relation to the court and, therefore, the prosecutor has a duty to disclose a serious 
discrepancy between the evidence of a witness and his previous statement. This suggests 
that the accused is not entitled to full disclosure and that the prosecution can choose what 
to disclose. It creates inequality and disregards the imbalances in resources between the 
prosecution and the accused. The accused has no facilities to conduct investigations and 
should be entitled to all information collected by the state whether they implicate or 
exculpate him. Criminal trials should not be conducted by ambush and the accused 
should be aware beforehand of the state’s allegations against him. The Court’s 
recognition of discretion on the part of the state whether to disclose, as opposed to a right 
on the part of the accused to disclosure, violates the principle of equality of arms. The 
Court’s recognition of a special relationship with the prosecution goes against the tenet of 
the neutral function of the judicial officer in the adversarial process.    
 
6 2 1 3 The “special reason” rule 
The rule in Kenosi was partly eroded in the case of Motsumi v The State.15 In this case, 
the Court rejected counsel’s argument that the accused was entitled to the statement as of 
                                                 
15
 [1996] B.L.R. 905 913. 
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right. The Court stated that the accused was not entitled to such statement unless he 
advanced special reasons why the statement should be produced. Certain issues need to 
be noted about this case. First, the Court suggested that a special reason will arise in a 
situation where the evidence of a witness contradicted his statement. However, it did not 
set out a formula as to how the accused could investigate whether the evidence 
contradicted the statement since he has no access to it in the first place. In effect, this 
brings us back to the situation in Kenosi. Second, counsel for the defence did not rely on 
any authority in support of his argument for disclosure.16 This was quite unhelpful having 
regard to the fact that Kenosi, a decision of the Court of Appeal, then represented the law. 
Of course, one can only speculate that had the Court been alerted to a number of cases 
that had embraced disclosure, its conclusion could have been different. Third, it seems 
quite clear that in the face of Kenosi, a decision of a higher court, the Court in Motsumi 
felt bound by the doctrine of stare decisis.17 
 
The special reason rule is based on an onus requiring the accused to furnish the court with 
reasons why disclosure should be made. In this regard, the accused has no general right to 
access information but should rather justify disclosure.18 This position had earlier been 
reached in Pandor.19 In that case, the Court noted as an exception to the privilege rule, 
                                                 
16
 In subsequent cases where the disclosure principle was accepted, defence counsel in their arguments, 
relied heavily on foreign authorities that had embraced the principle. 
17
 This doctrine did not prevent the High Court from ruling in favour of disclosure in subsequent cases 
however. 
18
 Kenosi v The State supra note 12; Motsumi v The State supra note 15.  
19
 Supra note 12. 
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that the identity of an informer may be revealed to show that the accused is innocent only 
if the accused can show “that good reason for disclosure exists.”20 This rule is averse to a 
general right of disclosure which should assist to equalise the imbalances between the 
state and the accused. It rather permits disclosure for special or good reasons that should 
be justified by the defence. It must be noted that the accused has limited information in 
the first place. Therefore, the justification of disclosure by the accused is a Herculean 
task. 
  
6 2 1 4 Movement from Kenosi towards disclosure 
Notwithstanding Kenosi, the legal fraternity did not allow the matter to rest. A multitude 
of court applications were launched, attacking the principle of non-disclosure on the 
grounds that it infringes the constitutional right of an accused to be availed adequate 
facilities to prepare his defence. Finally in 2001, the position started to change with the 
result that a number of High Court decisions consistently ignored or sidelined Kenosi. In 
the case of Ndala v The State21 Lisimba J sitting in the High Court, was able to cast doubt 
                                                 
20
 181H. 
21
 Miscellaneous Criminal Application No F 95 of 2001 (unreported); in Bosch v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 
71 (CA) the Court rejected the appellant’s argument that failure by the prosecution to disclose to the 
defence that a prosecution witness had been granted immunity from prosecution amounted to a miscarriage 
of justice. The defence had contended at the trial that the witness had a motive to murder the deceased and 
argued that disclosure would have enabled counsel for the appellant to prove the witness’s connection with 
the crime; otherwise he would not have required immunity from the prosecution. The Court held that there 
was no miscarriage of justice as the defence was carried on on the basis that the witness in question was the 
murderer and he was exhaustively and extensively cross-examined in this regard. The witness was probed 
on his motive during cross-examination and the issue was fully advanced before the court. It could not have 
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on Kenosi. In that case, Lisimba J emphasised that the accused should not be taken by 
surprise at the trial and that he should come to his trial fully prepared to answer the 
charges against him. Lisimba J rejected the state’s argument that the word “facilities” 
should be limited to physical facilities and equipment. He stated that it included 
disclosure of information, documents and materials in possession of the state. He took the 
view that the so-called rule of privilege in Kenosi was obiter and did not bind the High 
Court. He found support for this view on account of the fact that in Kenosi the 
prosecution consented to disclose the statement. On this basis he concluded that 
disclosure was not an issue in Kenosi. In my view, a reading of Kenosi shows differently. 
Though the Court in Kenosi acknowledged that the prosecution consented to disclosure, it 
is clear that the Court was at the same time firmly establishing the principle of non-
disclosure as the law. Lisimba J’s stance is representative of a pro-active protective 
approach. It is indicative of the evolutionary process of the protection of human rights by 
the courts. When examined against Kenosi and Motsumi, Ndala affirms the possibility of 
judicial innovation even in the face of the stare decisis principle. Such bravery would 
certainly raise the eye brows of legal purists, but it was a move that opened the gates and 
shifted the tide towards disclosure. 
 
In State v Fane,22 the Court relied solely on the statutory provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act in coming to a conclusion that statements in the police 
                                                                                                                                                 
been advanced further by the disclosure of immunity by the prosecution. The disclosure of immunity 
therefore could not have added anything to the case of the defence.  
22
 [2001] 1 B.L.R. 319. 
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docket were not privileged. In that case, defence counsel during the cross-examination of 
a witness requested the prosecution to furnish him with a previously recorded statement 
made by the witness, in order to impeach the credibility of the latter. The state objected, 
claiming that the document was privileged under Roman-Dutch common law, citing 
Kenosi in support of its argument. According to Mwaikasu J, the court in Kenosi failed to 
take into consideration the provisions of section 9823 of the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act. This statutory provision in his view, overrides the common law position.24 
The Court noted the mandatory nature of the provision and found that statements of 
witnesses in possession of the prosecution are not privileged. According to the Court, 
section 98 overrules the common law position. However, disclosure as permitted by this 
case appears to be of limited application. First, the decision is strictly based on statute 
and section 98 applies only to persons committed for trials in the High Court. The Court 
also clearly directed its attention only to proceedings in the High Court. This makes the 
rule meaningless as most cases are heard in the magistrates’ courts.  
 
                                                 
23
 “Every accused person who is committed for trial or sentence for any offence, shall be entitled to 
demand, and to have within a reasonable time in that behalf, from the person who has the lawful custody 
thereof, a copy of the depositions of the witnesses upon which he has been so committed and of his own 
statement and evidence (if any), and the person who has lawful custody of such depositions, statements and 
evidence shall deliver a copy thereof to the person aforesaid or his legal representative on payment of a 
reasonable sum not exceeding seven thebe for each folio of 100 words, or, in any case where counsel is 
assigned by the court to defend the accused pro deo, shall deliver a copy thereof to the accused or such 
counsel free of charge…” 
24
 State v Fane supra note 22 323. 
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Second, section 98 and the Court, specifically limited disclosure to statements and not 
other documents or evidence that may be in possession of the prosecution. The decision 
is therefore of limited application. The effect of this is that the prosecution is still able to 
keep vital evidence from the defence.  
 
Third, the Court did not emphasise the importance of the need for the accused to prepare 
his defence. The Court talks about the need for the accused to inspect the statements “at 
the trial”25 and the need to supply the statements “to the defense when needed in the 
course of the cross-examination to test the credibility of any prosecution witness who has 
testified before the court.”26 Indeed the Court was limited by the arguments of counsels. 
Defence counsel requested the statement for the purposes of impeaching the witness. The 
constitutional right to disclosure was not raised. Therefore the Court did not address the 
wider question of disclosure and the need for the accused to be furnished with 
information timeously so as to prepare in time thereby enhancing equality between the 
prosecution and defence. Whereas the case was a significant contribution towards lifting 
the sacred veil of privilege, it did not go far enough nor did it bring the question of 
equality into the equation. 
  
The case of Motshwane and Others v The State27 marks a departure from the common 
law position to that of constitutional proceduralism. In this case, the rule of non-
                                                 
25
 322G-F. 
26
 323C-D. 
27
 [2002] 2 B.L.R. 368 delivered on 18th November 2002. 
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dislcosure suffered another blow and the equality principle was actually embraced. 
Phumaphi J totally regarded the issue as one of constitutional interpretation, noting that 
the rule in Kenosi represented the common law. The Court made an excursion into cases 
that had embraced disclosure as a constitutional right, relevant for the attainment of a fair 
trial.28 He relied on the cardinal rule of constitutional interpretation which demands that a 
generous and purposive interpretation is required when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
The Court also appeared to have been fortified by Ndala where a similar review was 
made of Canadian, South African and Namibian cases that have embraced disclosure. 
The Court, however, disagreed with Lisimba J that the views expressed in Kenosi were 
obiter. According to the Court, Kenosi laid down the common law position whereas the 
present matter was one of constitutional interpretation.29 Phumaphi J noted that the 
statements were relevant to enable the accused to prepare in full and respond to the case 
he has to meet.30 The Court in following the generous and purposive approach, 
interpreted the word “facilities” to include providing statements to the accused in advance 
of trial.31 While noting that Nassar32 dealt only with superior courts, Phumaphi J sought 
to apply the rule to all courts, observing that the distinction between inferior and superior 
                                                 
28
 R v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. This case was restated in R v Taillefer [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307; S v 
Nassar 1995 (2) SA 82 (Nm); Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of Transvaal and Another 1995 
(2) SACR 761 (CC). 
29
 Supra note 27 385. 
30
 384. 
31
 384. 
32
 Supra note 28. 
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courts is irrelevant in respect of issues dealing with fundamental human rights.33 This 
case is very significant in that the Court interpreted the meaning of the term “facilities” in 
relation to the need for procedural equality. In so doing, it reflects European 
jurisprudence.34 In an attempt to interpret the term, the Court noted that “The spirit of the 
section is that accused persons shall be tried in a free, fair and transparent atmosphere 
that will enable them to defend themselves without any impediments.”35 Interestingly, the 
Court did not refer to any cases that have dealt with the principle of equality. However, 
the Court demonstrated an appreciation for the imbalances between the prosecution and 
defence, and the need to redress such imbalances. In this regard Phumaphi J noted:  
 
“In my view the section is intended to guarantee the protection of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of an individual facing a criminal charge vis-à-vis the state 
and its powerful agents such as the police, prosecution, etc. It is intended to 
ensure that whenever the state and/or it agents decide to prosecute an individual it 
is done fairly and strictly within the framework of the law, in a transparent 
manner. Put in a different way, the section [10 of the Constitution] affords the 
individual the ammunition to challenge any act by the state or its agents that is 
                                                 
33
 378. 
34
 In Can v Austria supra note 9, the European Court interpreted “adequate facilities” to mean that the 
accused must be afforded an opportunity to prepare for his defence without restriction. In Jespers v 
Belgium, supra note 1 the Commission, referring to equality of arms, interpreted “facilities” to mean that 
the accused should be given an opportunity to acquaint himself with information gathered throughout the 
investigations for the purposes of preparing for his defence. 
35
 384E-F. 
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perceived to offend against the rights of the individual to a fair trial as enshrined 
under the provision, subject only, to derogations provided for in the same 
section.”36 
 
The case makes an implicit countenance of the principle of equality of arms. It would 
appear that the court was more interested in the general concept of fairness and 
transparency. In so doing, the inequality in the criminal process was recognised and the 
need for balance emphasised. The stringing in of the need for equality on the basis of 
general fairness and transparency clearly fortifies the assertion that the equality principle 
is a fundamental requirement for a fair trial. The Court also noted that the section enables 
the accused to contest the evidence of the state, a fundamental requirement for equality. 
   
In another case in the High Court, Ahmed v Attorney-General,37 Collins J made no 
attempt to maneouvre around Kenosi but rather launched a scathing attack on the 
principle of non-disclosure. Though Collins J in Ahmed arrived at the same conclusion as 
Lisimba J in Ndala, it appears from his judgment that he arrived at his decision oblivious 
of Ndala.38 It is remarkable that two judges within a short space of time chose to deviate 
from Kenosi, oblivious of what the other was doing. Collins J stated clearly that full 
disclosure of prosecution witness’s statements is a sine qua non for a fair trial. According 
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 383F-G. 
37
 [2002] 2 B.L.R. 431. 
38
 He stated that he only had sight of Ndala after he had made up his mind and was in the concluding stages 
of his judgment. The Ndala judgment was delivered on the 31st October 2002 and Ahmed on the 5th 
December 2002. 
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to him the state is however entitled to refuse disclosure if it can show on a balance of 
probabilities that such disclosure might reasonably impede the ends of justice or 
otherwise be against public interest. He suggested a number of situations where the state 
may refuse disclosure. The situations are: 
1. Where the information sought to be withheld will disclose the identity of an 
informant which it is necessary to protect. 
2. Where such disclosure might imperil the safety of an informant. 
3. Where the information will disclose police techniques of investigation which it is 
necessary to protect. 
4. Where such disclosure would otherwise not be in the interest of the public or the 
state. 
 
In relation to police diaries he drew a distinction. According to him the accused should 
show on a balance of probabilities that their disclosure is necessary for the preparation of 
his defence. His reasoning is that police diaries contain written matters that the 
investigating team would discuss among themselves in furtherance of the investigation. 
The diary may contain certain confidential information relating to various investigation 
techniques, the identity of informers, discussions between police officers reduced to 
writing and other discussions which might not be in the public interest to disclose. 
 
One of the findings of Collins J deserves comment. In the course of the argument, the 
state averred that if it was required to disclose statements of prosecution witnesses, the 
accused should be required to reciprocally disclose defence statements in order to 
 197
maintain equality. Collins J rejected this argument. In so doing, he adopted the position 
of a Namibian court39 before which a similar provision of the Namibian Constitution40 
came up for determination. Collins J stated that the provision is concerned with the rights 
of the individual and not the protection of the interests of the state. Therefore, when 
determining what is required to enable the accused to have a fair trial the court does not 
balance his fundamental rights against the interests of the state. He noted that the state 
enjoys an enormous advantage in a criminal trial, as it has the police force at its disposal 
as well as prosecutors and access to expert witnesses and modern methods of 
communication and powers to legislate procedures to be followed. According to him 
since the accused does not stand on an equal footing with the state, the provision is meant 
to redress the imbalance and the accused may maintain a purely adversarial role toward 
the prosecution. Collins J clearly encapsulated the need for equality, recognising 
disclosure as a way of bridging the inequalities between the state and the accused. This 
stance is similar to the stance of the Canadian Supreme Court when it stated that the 
accused may maintain a purely adversarial stance towards the prosecution and has no 
obligation to assist the prosecution.41  
 
Ahmed is a classic example where the principle of equality of arms received implicit 
countenance in Botswana and disclosure was recognised as an instrument for redressing 
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 S v Nassar supra note 28. 
40
 Article 12 of the Namibian Constitution 1990. 
41
 R v Stinchcombe supra note 28. 
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the imbalances in the criminal justice system. It denotes that disclosure is an accused-
based right that counters the might of the state.  
 
The Court’s rejection of the state’s assertion that the defence should also disclose, is 
significant. It underlies the fact that the principle of equality is intended to ensure that the 
defence has the means to prepare and present its case on equal basis with the prosecution 
which has all the resources of the state on its side.42 It clearly brings the equality principle 
within the realm of accused-based rights, bringing the accused at par with the prosecution 
in the presentation of the defence. It also demonstrates that statements taken by the 
defence in preparation for hearing are privileged. This ensures that the state is not able to 
use these statements to influence potential defence witnesses. The defence will be 
severely limited in seeking out information on its own if those who have potential 
information for them are aware that their identity and information will end up in the 
hands of the state. Potential defence witnesses will shy away from testifying. Witnesses 
are generally vulnerable, but defence witnesses are more vulnerable and the state is in a 
better position to seek out its witnesses and bring them to court should they be elusive 
due to fear or unwillingness. It must be noted, however, that while it will be inimical to 
the interests of the state to disclose details of its case and to list its witnesses (perhaps 
with the exception of alibi witnesses), basic disclosure such as the disclosure of special 
defences might be necessary and justifiable.43 
                                                 
42
 See Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic A/K/A/ “Dule” Separate opinion of Judge Vohrah on prosecution motion 
for production of defence witness statements, decision of 27 November 1996. Available on 
www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/61127ws21.htm (accessed 12 August 2008). 
43
 See para 6 3 below. 
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6 2 1 5 The rule of disclosure 
The state appealed against the judgment of Collins J and the matter was finally settled in 
the Court of Appeal44 where the judgment of Collins was affirmed, thereby firmly 
establishing the rule of disclosure. The Court of Appeal established disclosure as the 
rule45 and privilege the exception. The Court confirmed that the accused is entitled to 
statements of witnesses, whether or not the state wishes to call them, and also copies of 
all documents relevant to the charge. The Court, however, recognised some special 
situations where some limitations are necessary. Two situations were listed.  
 
                                                 
44
 Attorney-General v Ahmed [2003] 1 B.L.R. 158 (CA); in  Bosch v The State supra note 21 Nganunu CJ 
sitting in the Court of Appeal noted obiter 104E-F: “In terms of section 10 of our Constitution a person 
accused of a criminal offence must receive a fair trial before an impartial court within a reasonable time. It 
seems to me that within certain circumstances a non-disclosure of information held or known by the 
prosecution to the accused person which information may have a material impact on the case of the accused 
may amount to a violation of the requirements of a fair trial.”; Lord Justice Steyn also emphatically noted 
in R v Winston Brown [1995] 1 Cr. App.R. 191 (CA) 198F-G: “In our adversarial system, in which the 
police and prosecution control the investigatory process, an accused’s right to fair disclosure is an 
inseparable part of his right to a fair trial. This is the framework in which the development of common law 
rules about disclosure by the Crown must be seen.”  
45
 However in Masilo v The State [2006] 1 B.L.R. 250 (CA) the Court suggested that even where the 
defence was not given the statements, it was not a fatal irregularity as no failure of justice had occurred as 
the evidence establishing the identity of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the offence and his guilt 
was overwhelming. It was held in Moraeng v The State [2007] 1 B.L.R. 657 that the documents should be 
translated if the accused is unrepresented and cannot understand the language in which they are written. 
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First, if a witness’ statement discloses the name of a police informant or contains 
information which might expose his identity, it is possible that his life could be 
endangered. The state under such circumstances has a duty to protect its informant.46  
 
Second, police diaries should not normally be disclosed to the defence as they are likely 
to contain confidential matters which might bear on investigation techniques which the 
accused has no particular right to discover and which will not assist him in preparing his 
defence. But if there is a particular issue about which the defence needs particular 
information, they would be entitled to ask for the diary.47 But as opposed to the view of 
Collins J, the Court placed the onus on the state to justify the non-disclosure of the diary. 
The Court, however, emphasised that privilege should only be exercised on rare 
occasions. The state should show that they have good reasons to exercise the privilege, 
and that this will not hamper the defence in the preparation of their case.  
 
This case overrules the common law position, giving the question of disclosure 
constitutional alignment. It significantly enhances the truth finding process by opening 
the police docket to the accused. It also practically changes the role of the police and 
prosecution in Botswana. Its practical effect is that when the police collect information, 
they do so for their benefit as well as the benefit of the accused. This ensures that the 
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 See also Pandor v The State supra note 12 181; see also the South African case of Shabalala and Others 
v Attorney-General of Transvaal and Another supra note 28. 
47
 For example if the witnesses’ statements disclosed to the defence throw some discrepancy on the 
whereabouts of a police officer at a particular time, the defence may be entitled to seek disclosure of this 
information contained in the police diary. 
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parties are treated equally. The cliché that the prosecutor is a disinterested combatant 
with an eye only for the truth, becomes more than mere rhetoric. His role is significantly 
changed to that of a true minister of justice with a duty to carry out his functions 
impartially and act with objectivity. The decision is based on the constitutional right to a 
fair trial. With access to prosecution materials, the credibility and reliability of the 
prosecution witnesses can be tested. Significantly, disclosure may shorten trials as the 
defence may be in a position to admit the statements of witnesses whose evidence they do 
not wish to contend with.48 Disclosure also enhances the principle of equality within the 
adversarial context. The recognition of inequality between the state and the accused was 
significant in the determination of this case. The case therefore signifies the effect of the 
principle of equality and the extent to which it can dictate the application of fair 
procedures in the criminal justice system.  
  
The disclosure rule was also established in English common law prior to England’s 
adoption of the Human Rights Act.49 English courts have articulated a balancing act to be 
performed by the courts when the state objects to disclosure on public interest grounds. 
On the one hand is the desirability to preserve public interest, and on the other, the 
interests of justice. Where the interests of justice concern the liberty of the individual, 
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 S 373 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
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 See R v Maguire and Others [1992] 2 W.L.R. 767 (CA) (regarding scientific evidence. On this case see 
also Barrie “Criminal Law: Failure of Prosecution’s Expert Witness to Disclose Information – Whether 
Material Irregularity” 1992 De Rebus 836; R v Ward (Judith) [1993] 1 W.L.R. 619; R v Keane [1994] 1 
W.L.R. 746; [1994] 2 All E.R. 478 (CA). This rule was extensively modified by the English Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 c 25. 
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much weight should be attached to the interests of justice.50 Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ51 
in adopting the “balancing act” approach, emphasised that the disputed material should 
be disclosed if it would establish the innocence of the accused and avoid a miscarriage of 
justice. Lord Taylor also recognised a duty of the defence in the determination of the 
matter when he had this to say: 
 
“Accordingly, the more full and specific the indication the defendant’s lawyers 
give of the defense or issues they are likely to raise, the more accurately the 
prosecution and judge will be able to assess the value to the defense of the 
material.”52   
 
In South Africa the Constitutional Court ushered in the disclosure rule in the case 
Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of Transvaal and Another.53 In that case the 
Court had to consider a) whether the common law rule in R v Steyn54 establishing that 
police dockets were privileged was consistent with the Constitution, and b) whether the 
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 R v Governor of Brixton Prison ex P Osman (No1) [1992] 1 All E.R. 108. 
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 R v Keane supra  note 49; Barrie “Evidence: Disclosure of Police Sources of Information to Defence – 
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 1954 (1) SA 324 (A). This case was authority for the proposition that statements of witnesses made to the 
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(3) SA 740 (T); R v Clarke 1955 PH 1 H78 (DCLD); S v Alexander and Others (1) 1965 (2) SA 796 (A). 
See Bursey “Privilege and Police Pocket Books” 1992 The Magistrate 122 for a discussion of the non-
disclosure principle in South Africa.   
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common law rule of practice which prohibited the accused or his representative from 
consulting with prosecution witnesses without the prosecution’s permission was 
consistent with the Constitution. 
 
On the first question Mohamed DP stated that accused persons should ordinarily have 
access to all statements in the police docket. The police, however, may be able to resist 
such disclosure on the grounds that they may expose the identity of an informer or police 
methods of investigations. He stated that no rigid rules were desirable and that it was for 
the courts to exercise their discretion based on the circumstances of each case. The Court 
noted that a blanket docket privilege was unreasonable and not justifiable in a democratic 
society. In cases where there was a reasonable risk that disclosure will act against state 
interest, the courts would have to exercise proper discretion in balancing the right of the 
accused to a fair trial against legitimate state interests in furthering the ends of justice.55 
 
On the second question the Court stated that the rule that prohibited the accused or his 
representative from consulting with the prosecution witnesses without the consent of the 
prosecution in all cases and regardless of the circumstances, was inconsistent with the 
Constitution. In the Court’s view, an accused had a right to consult a witness without 
permission if his right to a fair trial would be compromised by the absence of such 
consultation. The Court was of the view that it was for courts to exercise their discretion 
in balancing the rights of the accused against the interests of the state. 
 
                                                 
55
 Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of Transvaal and Another  supra note 28. 
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The question whether a judicial officer has a duty to inform an accused of his right of 
access to police docket has been addressed in South African law. This question was 
considered in the case of S v Shiburi56 where the majority of the Court held that such a 
duty exists. Satchwell J stated that the right of access to police docket was central to the 
right to adduce and challenge evidence which was a valuable component of the right to a 
fair trial. The right of access in her view is a vital part of cross-examination, a right of 
which accused persons are usually informed. Where an accused is unrepresented, these 
rights would be rendered nugatory if the accused was unaware of his right of access to the 
docket. She rejected the argument that such a duty would amount to the judicial officer 
descending into the arena as the duty of the judicial officer to assist an unrepresented 
accused is well established. The majority also held that while failure to inform the 
accused of this right will amount to an irregularity, the accused would have to prove 
actual prejudice which led to a failure of justice in order to warrant a setting aside of the 
conviction. 
 
The South African case of S v Mayo and Another57 is quite instructive on the question of 
access to police diaries. The question here was whether the pocket book of a police 
officer was privileged. During cross-examination of the investigating officer, defence 
counsel applied that his pocket book be produced. The state opposed the application, 
contending that it was privileged in that it disclosed the identity of the informer. It was 
further contended that it may contain a privileged statement. In other words it might 
                                                 
56
 2004 (2) SACR 314 (W). 
57
 1990 (1) SACR 659 (E). 
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contain part of the brief of counsel for the state. The Court dismissed these arguments. 
The Court noted that relevant material must not be excluded whether they are in issue or 
relevant to matters in issue. The Court emphasised the need for openness in legal 
proceedings both criminal and civil. The Court recognised that while policy, privilege 
and other restraints on free exchange of information may sometime defeat the production 
of all relevant information, such instances should be kept to an absolute minimum. The 
Court noted that it is normal and in the course of the duty of the police to record certain 
information in their pocket books. It was noted that the fact that some of these entries 
may later be used for the purpose of compiling privileged statements does not make the 
content of the pocket book itself privileged. The Court, however, declined to admit the 
pocket book as it was not relevant to the matters at hand. Like Ahmed, it is clear that the 
rule of disclosure takes precedence over privilege in the South African legal system. 
 
European jurisprudence has significantly noted the centrality of disclosure in maintaining 
equality in the adversarial context. It is in this respect that the European Commission 
noted in Jespers v Belgium58 that when the prosecution gathers evidence, it does so for 
the prosecution and the accused. The accused is therefore entitled to evidence collected 
by the prosecution, for the purpose of exonerating himself or securing a reduction in his 
sentence. Similarly, the European Court in Lamy v Belgium59 held that when the accused 
first appeared before the chambre du conseil for a determination whether to confirm his 
                                                 
58
 Supra note 1. 
59
 (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 529. See also Azzopardi “Disclosure at the Police Station, The Right of Silence and 
DPP v Ara” 2002 Criminal Law Review 295 297. 
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arrest, non-access of defence counsel to documents in possession of the prosecution 
deprived him from properly challenging the lawfulness of his arrest warrant. The Court 
noted that it was essential that defence counsel had access to the documents in order to 
challenge the lawfulness of the arrest warrant. The Court specifically noted that the 
prosecutor on the other hand was familiar with the case file while the defence was not, a 
situation which fails to meet the principle of equality of arms. 
 
In Jasper v United Kingdom60 the Court weighed the competing interests in the criminal 
process when it noted: 
 
“…[T]he entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right. In 
any criminal proceedings there may be competing interests, such as national 
security or the need to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or keep secret police 
methods of investigation of crime, which must be weighed against the rights of 
the accused. In some cases it may be necessary to withhold certain evidence from 
the defence so as to preserve the fundamental rights of another individual or to 
safeguard an important public interest. However, only such measures restricting 
the rights of the defence which are strictly necessary are permissible under Article 
6(1).”61 
 
                                                 
60
 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 441. 
61
 Para 52. 
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The state has the necessary apparatus to access and retain documents and real evidence 
and secure witnesses in preparation for trial. Even in the unlikely of cases where 
individuals have the resource to conduct private investigations, they usually do not have 
half the resources of the state and the legal backing to access, search for and retain 
evidence. In any case, most of the vital evidence would already be in the state’s 
possession even before the commencement of trial. The state is able to gain prior access 
to evidence which effectively denies the accused access to such evidence. Effectively, the 
accused is usually not in a position to access evidence. This greatly disadvantages the 
accused if the prosecution were able to keep this evidence exclusively to itself, thereby 
rendering the trial unfair. McIntyre notes in relation to the ICTY: 
 
“The power of seizure granted to the prosecution is a very powerful weapon in its 
hands. By seizing material, the prosecution denies such accused persons accesss 
to that material. Experience has demonstrated that the results can be seriously 
deleterious to the rights of those accused. In one case, in which the accused 
became aware of the seizure by the prosecution, the prosecution waited over six 
months before providing the accused with a copy of the documents. In another 
case, in which the accused was unaware of the seizure by the prosecution, the 
accused had obtained an order requiring the relevant Bosnian authorities to 
produce the documents which was not complied with. Only after the trial had 
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ended was it discovered that the documents had been in the possession of the 
prosecution throughout trial.” 62  
 
6 3 Pre-trial defence disclosure  
The dominant argument against defence disclosure is that it infringes core constitutional 
rights such as the presumption of innocence,63 the right to silence and the privilege 
against self-incrimination.64 On the other hand, defence disclosure can be evaluated from 
a theoretical standpoint, in that criminal trials seek to discover the truth.65 Practically, it 
enhances efficiency, prevents ambushes by the defence and makes trials less complex and 
shorter.66 In Botswana and South Africa there is no general duty on the defence to make 
disclosure. However, the question of defence disclosure has been discussed in Botswana 
and South African case law in relation to the alibi defence. In Botswana the duty to 
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 McIntyre “Equality of Arms – Defining Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” 2003 Leiden Journal of International Law 269 280-281. 
63
 McEwan Co-operative Justice and the Adversarial Criminal Trial: Lessons from the Woolf Report in 
Doran & Jackson (eds) The Judicial Role in Criminal Proceedings (2000) 171 179; McEwan Evidence and 
the Adversarial Process (The Modern Law) 2 ed (1998) 18. 
64
 Sharpe “Article 6 and the Disclosure of Evidence in Criminal Trials” 1999 Criminal Law Review 273 
284. In Williams v Florida 399 U.S. (1970) Black J questioned whether any form of defence statement (in 
this case an alibi) was compatible with the Fifth Amendment. 
65
 Griffith Pre-trial Defence Disclosure: Background to the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Pre-trial 
Disclosure) Bill 2000 Briefing Paper No 12/2000 introduction. 
66
 McEwan Co-operative Justice 178; McEwan Evidence and the Adversarial Process 17; Leng “Losing 
Sight of the Defendant: The Government’s Proposals on Pre-Trial Disclosure” 1995 Criminal Law Review 
704 706. 
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disclose an alibi prior to trial is founded on the common law. The duty is based on 
practical considerations. In the case of Mogatla v The State,67 the Court noted that since 
the state has a duty to rebut the alibi evidence, the accused has a duty to put the state on 
notice before the trial commences so that the state is afforded an opportunity to 
investigate it.  The Court noted:  
 
 “Now, according to the law of evidence, the onus of proving that an alibi 
is false rests on the prosecution. It therefore, accords with common sense 
that, where an accused person relies on an alibi as a defence, notice of it 
should be given to the prosecution before the commencement of the case 
in order to afford the State the opportunity to verify the truth or falsity of 
the alibi. It is normal for a person against whom a charge is levelled to 
inform his accusers at the earliest possible moment that evidence tending 
to show that by reason of his presence at a particular place or in a 
particular area at a particular time he was not, or was unlikely to have 
been at the place where the offence was alleged to have been committed, 
at the time of its alleged commission.”68 
          
Mogatla was followed in Ross v The State69 where Lesetedi J had this to say: 
 
                                                 
67
 [2001] 1 B.L.R. 192 (CA). 
68
 199E-F; State v Molatlhegi alias Sekukuru [2007] 3 B.L.R. 507. 
69
 [2003] 1 B.L.R. 563. 
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“The onus is upon the prosecution to prove the falsity of an alibi when it is being 
raised by the defence. As to prove the falsity of such a defence would require the 
prosecution to investigate the said alibi and also to present before the court 
evidence negativing such alibi should the need arise, it is imperative that notice 
that such defence would be raised and its nature or particulars should be given to 
the prosecution before or at the commencement of the trial to give the prosecution 
the opportunity to investigate it, and not to be just sprung up on the prosecution 
during the presentation of the defence case.”70 
 
Though the legal effect of failure to disclose an alibi was not discussed in Mogatla, the 
Court in Ross briefly mentioned that the court is entitled to consider it as an afterthought 
and reject it. Though it is clear that the Court was referring to the case in question rather 
than setting a general rule of law, the relevant facts were that throughout the case, the 
accused did not mention his alibi, nor did he put it to the state witnesses in cross-
examination. The situation was the same in the Mogatla case. In fact, in that case the 
accused in cross-examination was more concerned with whether the prosecution 
witnesses could identify him or attest to the clothing he was wearing when he committed 
the offence. To make matters worse, the accused himself did not testify as to his alibi. 
The issue was left to his last witness. A reading of these cases leaves one with the 
impression that they were determined with reference to the specific facts in issue. In July 
v The State,71 an appeal from the magistrates’ court, the Court confirmed as correct the 
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 565G-H. 
71
 [2006] 1 B.L.R. 496. 
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factors considered by the magistrate in determining the credibility of the accused’s alibi. 
These were: 
1, that no questions were put to the prosecution witnesses suggesting that the accused was 
elsewhere when the offence was committed. 
2, that the accused failed to put forward the defence when confronted by the investigating 
officers.72 
The above factors are quite similar to those considered in Mogatla. While one cannot 
discern a firm rule to the effect that an alibi should be excluded as a result of failure to 
disclose it, it is clear that the court should examine the alibi evidence, and that failure to 
disclose is a relevant factor in determining its acceptability. Mogatla represents the law 
and, therefore, failure to disclose timeously diminishes the weight to be attached to the 
alibi evidence.  
 
The South African Constitutional Court in S v Thebus and Another73 held that it was 
constitutionally impermissible to draw an adverse inference from the pre-trial silence of 
the accused.  Two of the judges, however,74 suggested that such inferences might be 
constitutional if the accused had been warned of the consequences of silence.  Although 
adverse inferences from silence are prohibited, the Court made it clear that there may 
well be adverse consequences to remaining silent. Consequently, it is permissible to take 
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 506; Nyembe v The State [ 2008] 1 B.L.R. 129 (CA). 
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 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC). 
74
 Goldstone J and O’Regan J. 
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the late disclosure of the alibi into account in determining what weight should be attached 
to the alibi evidence.  
 
Some jurisdictions for obvious practical reasons recognise the duty of the defence to 
disclose special procedural steps or specific and special defences it intends to take during 
trial. In Canadian common law, the defence is required to make timely and adequate 
disclosure of an alibi.75 The defence also has a duty to give the prosecution notice of any 
application it intends to make under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom.76 The 
defence is under an obligation to give written notice of its intention to adduce evidence of 
a complainant’s previous sexual activities.77 In England, the defence is required to furnish 
the court and prosecution with a defence statement setting out the general nature of its 
defence and stating matters in respect of which it will take issue with the prosecution in 
respect of indictable offences. If it sets up an alibi, it is required to give particulars.78 
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 Maude “Reciprocal Disclosure in Criminal Trials: Stacking the Deck Against the Accused, or Calling 
Defence Counsel’s Bluff?” 1999 Alberta Law Review 715 717; Costom “Disclosure by the Defence: Why 
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While it is true that the state will in the majority of cases be able to anticipate the defence 
of the accused, the disclosure of specific defences does not disadvantage the accused in 
practical terms and any resistance to such an approach in my view is merely theoretical. It 
is clear that every person accused of an offence, particularly the innocent, knows what his 
defence is. In the situation where reliance is placed on special defences which require 
rebuttal based on investigation and especially scientific investigation, the state will be 
disadvantaged if not put on notice. After all, the burden lies with the state to disprove the 
defence of the accused. Recognition of defence disclosure in Scottish law presents a 
perfect example of this reasoning. 
 
In Scottish law the accused is required to disclose ten days before trial, a special defence 
plea in respect of an alibi, insanity, automatism, identification and self-defence. 
Disclosure of a defence relating to any impairment of the mind is justifiable on the basis 
that it is a matter within the peculiar knowledge of the defence. Rebuttal may also require 
the support of scientific evidence. Therefore, the prosecution will be forced to take an 
adjournment to consult with experts or produce its own expert evidence in order to rebut 
the assertion of the defence. Disclosure of a defence involving an impairment of the mind 
or self-defence does not really infringe the right to silence or presumption of innocence 
since such defences imply that the accused actually committed the act. His argument is 
that no offence was committed under the circumstances. Thus the argument for non-
disclosure on such grounds are mere theoretical and have no practical basis.  
                                                                                                                                                 
a defence has to be given.” – Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Cm 2263 (1993) 97-98; 
McEwan Co-operative Justice 178; McEwan Evidence and the Adversarial Process 16. 
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Pre-trial defence disclosure leads to efficiency in the proceedings. It prevents the defence 
from ambushing the prosecution and raising last minute defences that will require rebuttal 
and further investigation by the prosecution. Of course, the issue of defence disclosure 
should be approached carefully and must be narrow in application. Indeed the defence 
should not be expected to be burdened with the wide scope of disclosure required of the 
prosecution. This will only serve to exacerbate the already prevailing imbalance between 
the parties. The matter of paramount importance in addressing the question of defence 
disclosure is the question of fairness of the trial. The question to be answered at the end 
of the day is whether defence disclosure of specific and limited facts will infringe fair 
trial rights or enhance fairness and truth finding for all practical purposes. The latter is the 
justification for limited defence disclosure. 
 
6 4 The charge 
It is a fundamental requirement of a fair trial that a) the state informs the accused of the 
charges against him79 and b) the evidence is communicated to him in a language he 
understands. The requirement that the accused has a proper understanding of the charge 
and the evidence is a prerequisite to his being able to defend himself. This requirement is 
guaranteed by two constitutional provisions. Section 10(2)(b) of the Constitution 
provides that every person shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in a 
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 State v Keboletse [1979-1980] B.L.R. 74; Basupi v The State [2000] 2 B.L.R. 1 5 (CA); Rankalo v The 
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language he understands and in detail, the nature of the offence with which he is 
charged.80 Section 10(2)(f) provides that the accused shall be provided with an interpreter 
if he does not understand the language of the court. 
 
The procedural manifestation of section 10(2)(b) is expressed by the Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence Act which provides that an indictment charging a person with a criminal 
offence in the High Court shall be in writing81 and should be served on the person.82 
Similarly, in magistrates’ courts the summons containing the charge against the accused 
                                                 
80
 “…[T]he purpose of the laying of a charge or an indictment is to bring to the notice of the accused the 
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should be served on him.83 A summons or indictment should contain sufficient 
information of the offence with which the accused is charged together with necessary 
particulars to provide reasonable information as to the nature of the offence.84 The 
primary function of the indictment or summons is to inform the accused of the charge 
against him. In this regard, it is of importance that he be informed of all the elements of 
the offence.85 Disclosure of detailed allegations is crucial to the ability of the accused to 
defend himself.86 This was considered by O’Brien Quinn CJ in State v Mompati87 when 
he noted that the accused must be given as exact a date as possible on which the offence 
was alleged to have been committed. Citing the defence of alibi as an example, he noted 
that vagueness as to date will hinder the accused in giving his evidence.88 It should be 
noted that “the principle of equality of arms is not respected where the accused is not 
served with a properly motivated indictment.”89 To this end, defective charges should be 
rendered invalid for non-compliance with the principle of equality of arms in so far as 
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they fail to properly inform the accused of the charges against him or deny him the ability 
to properly prepare his defence.90 
 
It must be noted that the purpose of the charge sheet is to inform the accused of the 
allegations against him. Therefore, proper and reasonable disclosure of information will 
supersede the requirement for exactness. While it is important that all the essential 
elements of the offence are averred in the charge sheet,91 the court will not quash a 
charge sheet where the accused is sufficiently informed of the case he has to meet.92 
Therefore, where the flaw in the charge sheet is not so serious as to be fatal or does not 
prejudice the accused, the court will not interfere with a conviction based on it.93 What is 
of importance is that the charge gives the accused the state’s allegations such that he is 
able to defend himself. In July v The State94 Mosojane J gave a clear articulation of the 
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situation, drawing a distinction between a charge that is defective due to some 
technicality but nevertheless discloses the offence to the accused on the one hand, and a 
charge that discloses no offence on the other. In his words: 
 
“It seems to me elementary that where in charging a person, a wrong section of 
the law is cited but the offence is nonetheless correctly described in a manner that 
the accused cannot be said not to have understood what he was charged with, such 
a charge, though technically defective does not vitiate the proceedings taken 
under it. To argue otherwise is to be pedantic. In my view, the only basis upon 
which an argument of this nature could prevail would be where the charge was 
cast in such vague terms that no offence is disclosed or the accused could not 
have appreciated what he was charged with.”95 
 
In effect, where it is clear that the accused was aware of the allegations against him, and 
was properly able to defend himself, suffering no prejudice, a technical error in the 
charge sheet will not vitiate the proceedings.96 
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6 5 Conclusion  
The theme of equality runs implicitly through all the cases that ruled in favour of 
prosecution disclosure. Without expressly stating so, it becomes abundantly clear that 
inequality between the parties and the disadvantaged position of the accused is the core 
justification for disclosure.  
 
The existence of the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions as an organ funded by 
public funds and assisted by the police in the gathering of evidence leads to a great 
disparity between the prosecution and the accused as far as resources are concerned. The 
police have massive manpower and resources and are able to investigate crimes and 
gather evidence relating to all sides of the dispute. That the state is able to take its time, 
perhaps months if not years, to gather evidence and decide when to prosecute, gives it a 
head start over the accused.  
 
The police also have instruments to collect evidence in the form of powers of search and 
seizure. There is no comparable institution or organ of state that assists the accused in the 
gathering of evidence and prosecution of his case. This remains so even though the 
Constitution provides that the accused should be provided with adequate facilities to 
present his defence. One wonders whether the legal system of Botswana will reach a 
stage where an office of the defence assisted by investigators will be set up. This trend is 
developing in relation to international tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
leading the way in this regard.  
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The lack of legal representation in Botswana makes the plight of the accused even more 
precarious. To some extent the constitutional and legal framework provides for 
disclosure. The state is required to put the accused on notice in relation to charges 
proffered against him. Full disclosure is required in relation to the particulars and details 
of the offence. The courts have been liberal in relation to their interpretation of the 
constitutional demand that the accused be given adequate time and facilities to prepare 
his defence. By moving away from privilege, as enunciated in Kenosi, to disclosure, the 
laws of the country have been brought in line with international standards. Surely, to deny 
the accused access to relevant information is a breach of the principle of equality of arms 
and results in a denial of fair trial as the accused’s ability to properly defend himself and 
present his case would have been compromised.   
 
As has been stated before, the state maintains great powers in the criminal process. A 
suspect, though presumed to be innocent, is treated as a villain during the investigation. 
The police in Botswana make full use of their “right” to detain suspects for the prescribed 
forty eight hours limit, even for very minor offences. This is usually done on the pretext 
that suspects will interfere with the investigations. But often, detention is resorted to for 
no obvious reason at all. Suspects have no say at all in the way investigations are 
conducted. One would suggest a new approach whereby suspects are incorporated into 
the investigation processes. Suspects should be provided with information collected 
against them. Such disclosure should be made promptly, not during or a few days before 
trial. Details should be given of real evidence and suspects should be provided with 
copies of documents obtained by the state. Suspects should, where possible, be allowed to 
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witness searches and seizure of evidence. In other words, the accused should as far as 
possible be able to prepare his defence as the state prepares for prosecution. He should 
have full access to, and information of evidence obtained against him. This will go a long 
way in equalising the inequalities between the state and the accused. 
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PART 3 
 
TRIAL RIGHTS: LEVELLING THE PLANE WITH 
ACCUSED-BASED RIGHTS 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND EQUALITY BEFORE THE 
LAW 
7 1 Introduction 
Prosecutorial powers are wide, but the rights of the accused generally serve to counter the 
inherent imbalances in the system.1 The extent to which these rights of the accused are 
realised, play a vital part in ensuring a fair trial. Perhaps the most significant of these 
rights is the right to legal representation. Legal representation and the provision of legal 
aid are key indicators in determining whether the principle of equality of arms is attained. 
No matter how fair the process, how generous the prosecutor and how helpful the court to 
the accused, if he is made to stand trial unrepresented and face a trained prosecutor, he is 
immediately and fundamentally disadvantaged.2 So significant is the right that it has 
received universal recognition in democratic societies. Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR 
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 Silver “Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional Right” 1990 Wisconsin Law 
Review 1007 1038. 
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 In the civil case of Airey v Ireland E.C.H.R. (1979), Series A, No 32; (1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 305 314-315, the 
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“It seems certain to the Court that the applicant would be at a disadvantage if her husband were 
represented by a lawyer and she were not. Quite apart from this eventuality, it is not realistic, in 
the Court’s opinion, to suppose that, in litigation of this nature, the applicant could effectively 
conduct her own case, despite the assistance which, as was stressed by the government, the judge 
affords to parties acting in person.”  
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provides that every person charged with a criminal offence is entitled to legal assistance 
of his own choosing and to have legal assistance assigned to him if he cannot afford one 
where the interests of justice so require.3 The right to legal representation as pronounced 
by article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention has been developed in line with the 
principle of equality of arms, with the result that legal representation becomes mandatory 
in certain circumstances.4 Concepts like equality before the law, access to justice and 
other procedural rights remain hollow promises if the right to legal representation is not 
attainable.5 The right to legal representation should ideally include the provision of a 
lawyer by the state where the accused cannot afford one. In Botswana, there is a 
constitutional right to legal representation without a concomitant provision of legal aid. 
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 See also article 7(1)(c) of the African Charter; Hatchard “The Right to Legal Representation in Africa: 
The Zimbabwean Experience” 1988 Lesotho Law Journal 135. 
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 In Boner v United Kingdom (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 246 it was held that legal representation and legal aid 
were required where an appellant was sentenced to a prison term of eight years; Harlow Access to Justice 
as Human Rights: The European Convention and the European Union in Alston (ed) The EU and Human 
Rights (1999) 186 203; Robertson & Merrills Human Rights in Europe 3 ed (1993) 97. 
5
 Harlow Access to Justice 186; Traest & Gombeer “The Autonomy of Defense and Defense Counsel” 
2007 Ius Gentium 97; Schroeter “Attorney Representation: An Essential Right or Not?” Washington State 
Access to Justice Board http://www.wsba.org/atj/committees/jurisprudence/attyrep.htm (accessed 20 
November 2007). The European Court of Human Rights has relied on the principle of equality of arms to 
ensure that unrepresented litigants in civil cases present their cases properly and satisfactorily. In this 
regard the Court held that the state should provide legal representation for unrepresented litigants in civil 
cases in an adversarial system: see Airey v Ireland supra note 2. 
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Legal aid is central to equality of arms.6 Therefore, the main obstacle to the full 
realisation of the right is the availability and allocation of funds for legal aid.7  
 
7 2 Constitutional provisions 
7 2 1 Scope of the right 
The right of an accused to legal representation at his trial is guaranteed by constitutional 
and procedural provisions. It is a fundamental right and is entrenched in the Constitution 
of Botswana.8 Section 10(2)(d) of the Constitution provides as follows: 
 
                                                 
6
 Clayton & Tomlinson The Law of Human Rights I (2000) 649. 
7
 As Lester notes, “…It was well understood that poverty, ignorance and fear among would-be litigants, the 
obscurity of the law, and the cost of delays of litigation, were major impediments to the attainment of 
genuine equality before the law.”: Lester Legal Aid in A Democratic Society (1974) paper read at a 
conference Legal Aid in South Africa hosted by the Faculty of Law, University of Natal, Durban, 1973-7-2 
to 1973-7-6, published by Faculty of Law University of Natal Durban South Africa (1974) 1 2; Frynas 
“Problems of Access to Courts in Nigeria: Results of a Survey of Legal Practitioners” 2001 Social and 
Legal Studies 397 406; Reyntjens Africa – South of the Sahara in Zemans (ed) Perspectives on Legal Aid: 
An International Survey (1979) 12 13-14; Bekker “The Right to Legal Representation, Including Effective 
Assistance, for an Accused in the Criminal Justice System of South Africa” 2004 Comparative and 
International Law of Southern Africa 173 179. 
8
 Tebbutt JA in Moroka v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 134 139E-F declares: “There is in the common law a 
fundamental right of an individual to have access to legal advice and to legal representation. That right of 
an accused person to legal representation is now also enshrined in section 10 of the Constitution of 
Botswana.”; Chanda v The State [2007] 1 B.L.R. 400 (CA).  
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“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be permitted to 
defend himself before the court in person or, at his own expense, by a legal 
representative of his own choice.” 
 
The scope of this provision is limited. The accused is entitled to legal representation only 
if he can afford one. The state does not have a constitutional duty to provide him with 
legal representation. Rather, the Constitution burdens the accused to provide legal 
representation “at his own expense.” On the other hand, the state has a permanent and 
well funded directorate of public prosecutions which is well staffed by qualified lawyers. 
The directorate has support staff, materials, vehicles, equipment and office space all over 
the country. On the other hand, the accused generally speaking, has no resources 
provided for him. The constitutional recognition of the right to legal representation does 
not operate on the principle of equality but rather sanctions the absence of a legal aid 
system. By providing that the accused is entitled to legal representation at his own 
expense, the Constitution directs the state not to provide legal aid to the indigent. Also 
there is no constitutional provision for legal representation at the pre-trial stage. Though 
section 10 of the Constitution is modelled after article 6 of the European Convention, the 
provision relating to legal representation marks a glaring and deliberate departure from 
article 6(3)(c) which specifically require that the accused be provided with legal 
representation if he cannot afford one and if the interests of justice so require. 
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7 2 2 Application of the right 
Case law states that section 10(2)(d) requires that the accused has a right to brief a legal 
practitioner and be given time to do so.9 This provision accentuates the time-honoured 
right of an accused to engage legal counsel and is mandatory in application.10 This is in 
conjunction with the fact that the right to legal representation is essential if an accused 
were to get a fair trial within the context of an adversarial system.11 The concept of the 
right to fair trial spans over a number of areas, from the accused’s right to be represented 
by counsel of his own choice to his right to be provided with counsel at state expense 
under certain circumstances and the attendant limitations that go with the realisation of 
the right.12 The right to counsel presupposes that the court or the state should not in any 
way prevent the accused from securing an attorney.13 Therefore, if a trial court willfully 
excludes or prevents the accused’s counsel from representing him, or refuses to allow the 
accused reasonable time to engage the services of counsel, this will amount to a denial of 
justice.14 So where counsel withdraws unexpectedly from a case, and the accused is 
suddenly abandoned, the court should grant an adjournment to afford him an opportunity 
                                                 
9
 Richard Macha v The State [1982] 1 B.L.R. 98. 
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Room Right for the Knowlegeable Suspect?” 1997 South African Journal on Human Rights 458 459. 
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 Maposa v The State supra note 10; Mosala and Others v The State [1996] B.L.R. 978. 
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to secure the services of another counsel.15 Failure to do so will amount to a denial of his 
constitutional right to legal representation.16 The constitutionalisation of the right to legal 
representation is a reflection of its importance. It is a core right of immediate relevance to 
anyone facing trial.17 It is clear from section 10(2)(d) that the right to legal representation 
does not include the right to legal aid. The constitutional right to legal representation in 
Botswana therefore falls foul of the equality principle. Without the right to legal aid, 
section 10(2)(d) of the Constitution is no more than a pious promise as far as the indigent 
accused is concerned.  
 
7 3 Procedural provision 
The Constitution apart, the entitlement to legal representation should be observed as a 
matter of procedure. The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act regulates the procedural 
content and operation of the right. The proper application of the procedural elements of 
this right is crucial in the determination of its field of application as a constitutional 
requirement. The right to legal representation is clearly relevant to the realisation of other 
fair trial rights. For example, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act18 makes it clear 
that either the accused or his counsel may cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses. 
                                                 
15
 Maposa v The State Supra note 10; Mosala and Others v The State supra note 14. 
16
 Molatlhegi v The State (Practice Note) [1990] B.L.R. 477; Mazibuko v The State [1994] B.L.R. 460. 
17
 In the South African case of S v Pitso 2002 (2) SACR 586 (O) the Court describes the right to legal 
representation as the right closest to an absolute right in the Bill of Rights. 
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 S 176. 
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Also, at the close of the trial, the accused or his legal representative has a right to address 
the court.19  
 
7 4 The right to be informed of the right to legal representation 
The question arises whether there is a duty on a judicial officer to inform the accused of 
his right to legal representation.20 The law in Botswana in this regard is not fully 
developed and fairly unclear. The right to be informed of the right to legal representation 
does not seem to have achieved constitutional status. The views of Gyeke-Dako J in 
Bojang v The State21 are somewhat wavering. In this case, the magistrate did not advise 
the accused of his right to legal representation. Though she had consulted with a lawyer 
before she was charged, she decided to proceed without him as the prosecutor and a 
police officer had told her that the matter was a simple one and did not require a lawyer. 
She was convicted on a plea of guilty and sentenced to a prison term of nine months of 
which three months were suspended. At first Gyke-Dako J expressed the right as a 
constitutional requirement when he stated:  
 
“Section 10(1) of our Constitution speaks of a ‘fair hearing’ being afforded to 
every accused person who appears before our courts. It is for the attainment of 
this goal that certain rights are conferred on accused persons by our laws. To what 
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 S 180(4). 
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 See Mohamed “Right to Representation Reiterated” 2001 De Rebus 53. 
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 [1994] B.L.R. 146; see Quansah Judicial Attitudes to the Fair Trial Provisions in the Botswana 
Constitution in Fombad (ed) Essays on the Law of Botswana (2007) 65 67-68 for a discussion of this case. 
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use are those rights to a beneficiary if that beneficiary does not even know of their 
existence and is not told or reminded of their existence?”22  
 
He noted that on the first appearance of an accused the judicial officer should inform him 
of his right to defend himself. If he states that he requires legal representation and that he 
will be able to pay, the court should adjourn the case for a sufficient period to enable him 
to secure legal representation. But he watered down this statement when he stated:  
 
“Having regard to the present state of our laws on the subject, the above 
suggestion, however salutary it may be, is only a desirability, a breach of which 
will not per se amount to an irregularity vitiating the proceedings.”23  
 
The purport of the first quotation above then becomes questionable. It becomes doubtful 
whether his Lordship was emphasising the right to be informed of legal representation as 
a constitutional right or whether he was stating that the importance of the right to legal 
representation makes it vital that the accused be so informed. It is doubtful whether he 
was aligning the right to legal representation or the right to be so informed, to the 
constitutional requirement for a fair trial. He continued:  
 
                                                 
22
 159H. 
23
 160D-E; Rakgole v The State [2008] 1 B.L.R. 139 (CA); Phologolo v The State [2007] 1 B.L.R. 61; 
Moroka v The State supra note 8; Masango v The State [2001] 2 B.L.R. 616; Ramogotho v Director of 
Public Prosecutions [2007] 1 B.L.R. 334 (CA); Chanda v The State supra note 8. 
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“Having expressed my complete agreement with the principle that failure of a 
presiding officer to inform an unrepresented accused of his right to legal 
representation may only vitiate the proceedings if such failure results in a 
miscarriage of justice, I now turn to consider whether or not in the circumstances 
of this case, a miscarriage of justice was occasioned through the absence of the 
suggested advice to the applicant per se.”24  
 
A constitutional right is a fundamental one. That his Lordship was willing to condone its 
breach on the grounds that no prejudice occurred to the accused leads one to construe his 
conflicting statements to the effect that he did not regard the right to be informed of the 
right to legal representation as a constitutional right and fundamental rule of law, but 
rather as a rule of convenience.25 It appears that the Court was merely stating that the 
only way the constitutional right of the accused to legal representation can be realised is 
by a legal duty on judicial officers to inform him accordingly. But if this is so, why is the 
duty to inform not a fundamental constitutional requirement?  
 
On the basis of Bojang, the failure to advise an accused of his right to legal representation 
will depend on whether the irregularity amounted to prejudice to the accused with each 
case depending on its peculiar facts and circumstances.26 Similarly in Leow v The State,27 
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 Molatlhegi is however of the view that the purport of the judgment is to the effect that there exists a 
constitutional duty to inform the accused of his right to legal representation. Supra note 13 464. 
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 See also Rakgole v The State supra note 23; Phologolo v The State supra note 23; Moroka v The State 
supra note 8; Melore v The State [1998] B.L.R. 449; Masango v The State supra note 23; Ramogotho v 
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Lesetedi J also commented that there existed no constitutional or statutory duty on a 
judicial officer to inform the accused of his right to legal representation. He, however, 
noted that it is a salutary rule of practice which has developed to ensure a fair trial. This 
approach was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Moroka v The State28 where the Court 
noted that the duty to inform an accused of his right to legal representation is not 
mandatory but a salutary practice, the failure of which would not necessarily vitiate the 
proceedings except where a failure of justice occurs.29 It is clear that in the Botswana 
legal order there exists a duty on the judicial officer to inform the accused of his right to 
legal representation.30 The consequences of failure to do so amounts to an irregularity 
which may vitiate the proceedings only if the accused suffers prejudice. That the right to 
information in respect of such a crucial right is not a constitutional right is both 
                                                                                                                                                 
Director of Public Prosecutions supra note 23; Chanda v The State supra note 8. See also the South 
African case of S v May 2005 (2) SACR 331 (SCA); Pillay “Case Reviews” 2005 South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 400 402. 
27
 [1995] B.L.R. 564. 
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 Supra 8; Matlapeng v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 161 (CA). 
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 140. 
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 Bojang v The State supra note 21; see the Namibian case of S v Kau and Others [1993] NASC 2; 1995 
NR 1; see also the South African case of S v Moos 1998 (1) SACR 372 (C); In S v Mbambo 1999 (2) SACR 
421 (W) the accused was charged with a offence which carried a mandatory life sentence by virtue of S 51, 
52 and 53 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. The trial Court advised the accused of the 
right to legal representation. However, the Court did not inform him of the possibility of life sentences if 
convicted, nor was he encouraged to exercise his right to legal representation. It was held that these failures 
constituted irregularities and therefore not in accordance with justice as contemplated by the Act. See also S 
v Nkondo 2000 (1) SACR 358 (W); S v Manale 2000 (2) SACR 666 (NC). 
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unfortunate and mundane. It seems that this approach is partly due to three factors. First, 
there is no positive duty on the state to provide legal representation for the accused. 
Second, the right to be informed of the right to legal representation is one of recent 
origin.31 Third, the legal system has not embraced and does not recognise the import of 
the principle of equality of arms in relation to procedural rights. It is my view that had the 
principle been embraced as a fundamental rule of constitutional proceduralism, the 
demand that the accused be made aware that he may engage counsel will definitely 
receive application as a rule of constitutional practice. Lack of legal representation 
immediately results in procedural inequality and consequently has a telling and negative 
impact on the fairness of the trial. Failure by the court to inform the accused of the right 
significantly disadvantages him in the course of the trial. It therefore goes to the core of 
fundamental fairness that the accused be informed of the right. 
 
It is wrong to use the absence or presence of prejudice as a criterion for determining the 
consequences of judicial failure to advise the accused of such a fundamental right. A 
procedural right is of no value unless the bearer of the right is aware of it. Prejudice is a 
relative term. When does prejudice arise and how is it assessed? Does it occur when an 
accused is convicted? Is it possible to say that no prejudice occurred if an unrepresented 
accused is convicted even though he was not made aware that he can hire an expert? An 
attorney is able to raise several issues that an unrepresented accused cannot. Therefore, 
one can never know how different the proceedings would have turned out had an accused 
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 Sarkin “Restructuring the Legal Profession and Access to Justice: The Duty of Law Graduates and 
Lawyers to Provide Legal Services” 1993 South African Journal of Human Rights 223 224. 
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been represented. To state therefore that the failure to advise the accused of his right to 
legal representation is cured by the lack of prejudice is highly presumptuous. The fact 
remains that several cases do not go on appeal and several people can suffer dire 
consequences for failure to brief an attorney just because they were unaware of their right 
to do so. In an adversarial system, the fact that an accused has to defend himself without 
legal expertise results in inequality which in itself, I submit, amounts to prejudice. It is 
vitally important therefore that he should be made aware of this right. Legal proceedings 
should be handled by those specially trained in the field. The demand therefore that an 
accused should be made aware of his right to legal representation is as fundamental as the 
right which such information seeks to protect. Equality of arms demands informed 
participation of the accused in the trial. The right to be informed of the right to legal 
representation is a clear demonstration of the underlying connectivity that the principle 
plays in relation to various procedural rights. The principle therefore forms the 
foundation for the full application of various procedural rights.  
  
The South African Constitution declares in clear terms that an accused must be promptly 
informed of his right to legal representation.32 This serves as the basis of this essential 
right to access information in that country’s legal order and makes it fundamental to the 
procedural process. In consequence, a judicial officer has a bounden duty to inform an 
                                                 
32
 S 35(3)(f); see also section 73(A) South African Criminal Procedure Act. In South Africa, where an 
accused declines legal representation, the presiding officer has a duty to encourage him to exercise his right 
to legal representation especially in cases of serious offences: S v Mitshama & Another 2000 (2) SACR 181 
(W); Cowling “Recent Cases - Criminal Procedure” 2000 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 368 
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accused of his right to legal representation. Failure to inform an accused of his right to 
legal representation therefore may result in a failure of justice.33 The courts in their bid to 
protect the rights of the accused have established that when an accused is facing a serious 
charge and elects to represent himself, the judicial officer should ensure that the accused 
is not labouring under some misunderstanding, and if he is, the matter must be put right.34 
South African jurisprudence is informed by the reasoning that it is meaningless to advice 
an accused of his right to legal representation if he is unable to afford one. This was 
recognised in the old order35 and has been embraced by the new constitutional order 
which demands that an accused must be informed of his right to have a legal practitioner 
assigned to him if substantial injustice would otherwise result.36 In my view, a failure to 
inform the accused of his right to legal representation can only avoid scrutiny when it is 
clear from the proceedings that he was aware of such right and opted not to exercise it.37 
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 As Walia J stated in Morobatseng and Others v The State [2003] 1 B.L.R. 466 468F, referring to the duty 
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The Namibian Supreme Court held in S v Kau and Others38 that since the right to legal 
representation is a constitutional right, the court has a duty to inform the accused of this 
right except when it is apparent that the accused is aware of the right. The Court noted 
that there were exceptional circumstances where failure to inform the accused of this 
right will not breach a fair trial. In this regard, the Court noted that failure to inform 
persons who are aware of the right (such as educated or knowledgeable persons, or 
lawyers) will not breach the requirements of a fair trial. The Court noted that the 
appellants were illiterate and did not understand the proceedings and that under the 
circumstances, they should have been informed of their right to legal representation. 
 
7 5 Equality before the law 
Equality before the law is unattainable if the accused is unrepresented.39 The guiding 
hand of counsel and the reality that an unrepresented accused faces the risk of improper 
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 Supra note 30. 
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 Ramirez & Ronner “Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville’s Tribute to the Sixth Amendment” 2004 California 
Western Law Review  103 142-144; “The response in the Anglo-American jurisdictions to the indigent, and 
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Undefended Accused 10-11; “The first and basic requirement for making the right to legal representation 
accessible to all accused persons is the duty to inform them about its existence and, in particular, how, 
when and why it should be exercised. This duty is squarely based on the principle of equality before the 
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conviction has long been recognised in American jurisprudence.40 This is especially 
crucial when the accused faces serious punishment such as capital punishment or 
imprisonment. The unrepresented accused lacks the skill to properly prepare his defence, 
though he may have a perfect one. The importance of the guiding hand of a lawyer and 
the inequality suffered by the self-actor is epitomised in the words of Sutherland J in 
Powell v Alabama:41 
 
“Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the 
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining 
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules 
of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant 
to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without 
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 Powell v Alabama 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Betts v Brady 316 U.S. 455 (1942). As Lord Devlin remarks, 
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it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not 
know how to establish his innocence.”42 
  
In Botswana, the severe disadvantage suffered by an unrepresented accused was 
recognised in the case of Mmopi and Another v The State43 where Murray J had this to 
say: 
 
“When a person is on trial for a serious offence and does not have the advantage 
of legal representation I consider that it is essential that the magistrate should 
offer advice by way of explaining court procedure to such a person. An 
unrepresented accused is under a severe disadvantage. If he is given no assistance 
on matters of procedure that one would not necessarily expect to be known to an 
unrepresented accused person injustice could easily result.”44 
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 69; this passage was cited with approval in the case of Leow v The State supra note 27; in relation to 
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The recognition of the disadvantage suffered by an unrepresented accused is clear from 
the passage. The case implicitly recognises the need for equality, and bemoans the 
attendant inequality that occurs in the absence of legal representation. It clearly 
recognises equality as a fundamental requirement for fairness. The case further highlights 
the need for procedural equality and also highlights the fact that procedural inequality 
results in the case of an unrepresented accused. 
 
7 6 The duty to afford the accused an opportunity to secure legal representation  
The court is duty bound to grant the accused an opportunity to secure an attorney.45 This 
is all too important to ensure equality before the law. While the state has a standing and 
ready prosecutorial team, defence lawyers are engaged on ad hoc bases. It is only fair that 
the accused be given time to secure legal representation. However, the accused in turn 
has a duty to secure an attorney within a reasonable time. In Basupi v The State,46 the 
Court noted the unacceptability of delay occasioned by frequent adjournments and the 
adverse consequences of such delays to the administration of justice.47 The courts have 
recognised that antecedent to the accused’s right to legal representation is the demand 
that he be given reasonable time to exercise the right.48 However this does not grant the 
accused a licence to seek unnecessary adjournments or counsel to be absent without 
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 Bojang v The State supra note 21 160. 
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 [2000] 2 B.L.R. 1 (CA). 
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 9; Maphane v The State [1991] B.L.R. 60. 
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trying to inform the court.49 As was noted by O’Brien-Quinn CJ in Richard Macha v The 
State:50 
 
“The position, therefore, is that an accused has the right to brief a legal 
practitioner and that he must be given reasonable time in which to do so. 
However, if the accused does not avail himself of his right and opportunity within 
a reasonable time or if he seeks unnecessary or unreasonable adjournments or if 
his legal practitioner fails to appear in Court without making a reasonable effort to 
get in touch with the Court to explain his absence and seek an adjournment a 
Court is entitled, in interests of the expeditious administration of justice, to try the 
case in the absence of the accused’s Counsel.”51 
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 Marumo v The State [1990] B.L.R. 659 662; Basupi v The State supra note 46; in Maphane v The State 
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 101; see Talane v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 150 (CA) where it was held that the accused had not been 
deprived of his right to legal representation as he did not avail himself of legal representation, having been 
given several adjournments to do so; Mosala and Others v The State supra note 14. 
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The courts have a duty to ensure that the accused gets a fair trial. Therefore, when the 
accused has engaged the services of an attorney and he fails to turn up on the trial date, 
the court has a duty to find out from the accused the reasons for his absence. The court 
should permit them to contact their attorney or to secure another one if they so request.52 
Denial of legal representation will be unjust when it involves positive rather than passive 
conduct. Gaongalelwe J gives a classic demonstration of denial of legal representation in 
answer to his rhetoric thus: 
 
“Can deprivation of such a fundamental right be imputed to the court for its 
passivism? In my view deprivation of such a right would be constituted by an 
express refusal by the court. For instance, where the court refuses his application 
for postponement or adjournment when he so demands.”53 
 
Three consequences flow from this position. First, that the duty is on the accused to 
secure legal representation. Second, the accused should desire a postponement for the 
purposes of securing legal representation. Third, when the request is reasonable the court 
should afford him the opportunity to secure one. The question whether the request is 
                                                 
52
 Lesetedi and Another v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 393; Basima v The State [1999] 1 B.L.R. 202; Mosala 
and Others v The State supra note 14; Dikgang v The State [1999] 2 B.L.R. 154; see however, Ngwenya v 
The State [1983] B.L.R. 187, where is was held that where a lawyer fails to turn up and does not make 
efforts to contact the court, it may be assumed that the services of a lawyer has not been secured, and the 
court is entitled to proceed.  
53
 Masuku v The State [2004] 2 B.L.R. 239 242F-G; see also State v Ramatswidi [2005] 1 B.L.R. 452; 
Mosala and Others v The State supra note 14. 
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reasonable will depend on whether the accused repeatedly requests postponements to 
secure legal representation, and fails to do so, thereby causing unnecessary delays. 
Further, the accused may have to show that he has taken reasonable steps to secure legal 
representation.  
 
7 7 Access to justice and legal assistance    
7 7 1 The provision of legal aid 
Equality before the law and access to justice are enhanced by equal access to the court 
and it procedures.54 The rationale of the Court in the Airey55 case is that states are not 
only under a duty not to obstruct access to court but to ensure that access is effective and 
practical. Legal assistance determines whether or not an accused can effectively 
participate in the trial. Equality and fairness can therefore be adequately guaranteed by 
committing substantial resources to the provision of legal aid.56 In Botswana (as in 
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 Lester Legal Aid in A Democratic Society 1; Harlow argues that access to court is a human right: Harlow 
Access to Justice 203; in Golder v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 524 it was noted that the right of 
access to court was an inherent element of the European Convention and that refusing the applicant access 
to a solicitor was in breach of article 6(1); see also Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom (1985) 7 E.H.R.R 
165; Artico v Italy (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 1. 
55
 Supra note 2. 
56
 S v Kau and Others supra note 30; Steytler The Undefended Accused 10; As Bekker notes, equality 
before the law means that an accused should not be denied access to the courts because of poverty: Bekker 
2004 Comparative and International Law of Southern Africa 179; “Equality before the law is so manifestly 
incompatible with the possibility that an important right may be available only to a wealthy minority (those 
who can afford counsel) that judicial steps towards the elimination of this possibility cannot be regarded as 
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several third world commonwealth countries where there is no comprehensive legal aid 
scheme) the state provides pro deo attorneys only in respect of cases that carry the capital 
punishment. The approach in such countries is that in cases requiring capital punishment 
it is presumed that the interests of justice require that the accused be represented and 
therefore be entitled to legal aid.57 There is no such presumption in other cases. In non-
capital cases the issue of legal aid is determined on whether it is desirable in the interests 
of justice. A similar trend obtained in the United States prior to 1963.58 Prior to 1963, 
while counsel was only provided for an indigent in capital cases, in other cases the courts 
examined each case to determine whether the absence of counsel would result in a trial 
that is “offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right…”59 The 
approach of determining each case to enquire whether the “special circumstances” of 
each case demanded the presence of an attorney was developed. The special 
circumstances test was used to overturn several convictions where the accused did not 
have an attorney.60 But in 1963 in Gideon v Wainwright,61 the Court emphasised the need 
for legal representation in all cases of serious offences.  This case involved a felony and 
                                                                                                                                                 
a fundamental innovation.”: Van Zyl Smit “Indigence and the Right to Counsel: S v Khanyile 1988 (3) SA 
795 (N)” 1988 South African Journal on Human Rights 363 366. 
57
 Mohamed s/o Salim v R 1958 E.A.L.R. 202. 
58
 In 1932 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment required the provision of 
counsel  at least in capital cases: Powell v Alabama supra note 40; Lentine “Gideon v Wainwright at Forty-
Fulfilling the Promise?” 2003 American Journal of Trial Advocacy 613 615. 
59
 Betts v Brady supra note 40 472; Franck Comparative Constitutional Process: Cases and Materials 
(1968) 426.  
60
 Gora Due Process of Law (1977) 39. 
61
 (1963) 372 U.S. 335 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 83 S. Ct. 792 93 ALR2d 733. 
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there remained an uncertainty as to whether the decision related only to serious offences. 
However, the situation was clarified in Argersinger v Hamlin62 where it was held that no 
person may be imprisoned unless he was represented, whether the offence was classified 
as petty, misdemeanour or felony, unless the accused had waived such right. Argersinger 
was interpreted in Scott v Illinois63 to mean that the appointment of counsel for an 
indigent accused is only required if imprisonment is actually imposed and not if it is 
threatened or authorised.  
 
In South Africa, the Constitution provides that a legal practitioner shall be assigned to an 
accused by the state and at state expense if substantial injustice would result.64 The 
                                                 
62
 (1972) 407 U.S. 25 32 L. Ed 2d 530 92 S. Ct. 2006; Torcia Wharton’s Criminal Procedure III 13 ed 
(1991) 240-242; Senna & Siegel Introduction to Criminal Justice (1978) 287-291; Gross Legal Aid and its 
Management (1976) 37; McQuoid-Mason 1989 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 58-59. 
63
 (1979) 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 383 99 S. Ct. 1158. The Court noted: “Although the intentions of the 
Argersinger Court are not unmistakably clear from its opinion, we conclude today that Argersinger did 
indeed delimit the constitutional right to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings. Even were the 
matter res nova, we believe that the central premise of Argersinger-that imprisonment is a penalty different 
in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual 
imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel. Argersinger has 
proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but 
necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States. We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed 
counsel in his defense.”  
64
 S 35(3)(g); see Van As “Legal Aid in South Africa: Making Justice Reality” 2005 Journal of African 
Law 54 58 for the Legal Aid Board’s guide as to when “substantial injustice would otherwise result.”  
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Constitutional Court has identified certain factors in deciding whether substantial 
injustice would arise from failure to provide legal representation. These factors include 
the complexity or simplicity of the case, the ability of the accused to defend himself and 
the gravity of the possible consequences of conviction.65 Therefore, though legal 
representation is guaranteed as a right, the Constitution does not ensure that everyone 
gets legal representation at state expense except where substantial injustice would 
result.66 However, should the Legal Aid Board, having regard to its guidelines and 
policies, decide not to provide an indigent accused with a lawyer, a court may overrule 
their decision if in its view the provision of counsel is essential to a fair trial.67 The 
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 S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis 1995 (2) SACR 125 (CC); Legal Aid Board v Msila and Others 1997 (2) 
BCLR 229 (E); Budlender “Access to Courts” 2004 South African Law Journal 339 342; Mgcina v 
Regional Magistrate, Lenasia and Another 1997 (2) SACR 711 (W). These criteria had earlier been set by 
Didcott J in S v Khanyile and Another 1988 (3) SA 795 (N) 815, having adopted them from the United 
States Supreme Court decision of Betts v Brady supra note 40. It was stated in S v Lombard en ’n Ander  
1994 (3) SA 776 (T) (a case dealing with the Interim Constitution whose provisions on legal representation 
are similar to those of the present Constitution) that substantial injustice would occur if the state does not 
provide legal representation for an offence for which imprisonment is possible. Bekker “The Right to Legal 
Counsel and the Constitution” 1997 De Jure 213 221; Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A 
Commentary on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1998) 307-313.  
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 Ellmann “Weighing and Implementing the Right to Counsel” 2004 South African Law Journal 318 319. 
It was held in S v Ambros 2005 (2) SACR 211 (C) that the obligation under S35(3)(g) is not necessarily 
satisfied by the setting up of a Legal Aid Board and that where the Board rejects an application for legal 
representation the state should still consider whether substantial injustice would result if the accused were 
unrepresented. This case recognises that some people who do not qualify for legal aid may be unable to 
defend themselves.   
67
 S v Du Toit and Others (2) 2005 (2) SACR 411 (T). 
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entrenchment of legal aid in the Constitution sets to strengthen equality of arms within 
the adversarial system.68  
 
In England, “any question as to whether a right to representation should be granted shall 
be determined according to the interests of justice.”69 In considering the “interests of 
justice” what has come to be known as the Widgery criteria is employed.70 The criteria 
include consequential factors and factors relating to legal complexity.71 These include 
whether the accused is likely to loose his liberty, the likelihood that he may suffer serious 
damage to reputation, whether the proceedings may involve complex questions of law, 
tracing, interviewing or cross-examination of expert witnesses, and whether the accused 
will be able to understand the proceedings or state his case. These criteria typically 
                                                 
68
 SA Law Commission Simplification of Criminal Procedure  (A More Inquisitorial Approach to Criminal 
Procedure – Police Questioning, Defence Disclosure, the Role of Judicial Officers and Judicial 
Management of Trials) Discussion Paper 96 Project 73 (2001) available on 
http://www.saflii.org/za/other/zalc/dp (accessed 11 December 2007) para 3.2; as Steytler points out, “To 
ensure equality before the law, the only solution is to provide legal aid for accused who are too poor to 
employ a lawyer.” Steytler The Undefended Accused  236. 
69
 Sch 3 para 5 Acces to Justice Act 1999 c 22; Young & Wilcox “The Merits of Legal Aid in Magistrates’ 
Courts Revisited” 2007 Criminal Law Review 109 110. 
70
 The criteria emanates from Report of the Departmental Committee Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings 
Cmnd 2934 (1966) (HMSO London) para 80. The Committee was chaired by Widgery J. For a 
commentary on the Report see Griew “The Widgery Committee on Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings” 
1966 Criminal Law Review 246. 
71
 Young & Wilcox 2007 Criminal Law Review 111; see also S v Khanyile and Another supra note 65. 
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represent the significant role played by counsel, which cannot in anyway be covered by a 
self actor.  
 
In Botswana, by contrast, the Constitution requires the accused to engage legal 
representation at his own expense.72 The state therefore has no duty to provide the 
accused with counsel. The only legal obligation on the court is to permit him to secure 
legal representation. The non-application of the principle of equality of arms results in a 
negation of a full and proper recognition of the right to legal representation. In my view it 
is a fundamental path of legal reasoning that an accused should be represented in respect 
of an offence where imprisonment is certain if convicted. A need to ensure legal 
representation in cases of serious offences cannot be understated. Therefore, an accused 
should be represented in all cases where he faces the prospect of imprisonment.73  
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 S 10(2)(d); “In spite of Botswana’s impressive economic growth rates in the last decades, the majority of 
its population is poor and unable to afford adequate legal services.”: Fombad The Protection of Human 
Rights in Botswana: An Overview of the Regulatory Framework in Fombad (ed) Essays on the Law of 
Botswana (2007) 1 21; “…[T]he current economic situation of many Batswana render the fundamental 
rights, especially those of access to legal representation, nugatory in view of their inability to access legal 
services to uphold or vindicate their rights.”: Quansah “Legal Aid in Botswana: A Problem in Search of a 
Solution” 2007 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 509 511.  
73
 Argersinger v Hamlin supra note 62; Gross notes that legal aid is necessary to add any meaning to the 
right to legal representation: Gross Legal Aid 33. Gyeke-Dako J states that depending on the resources of 
the state, legal representation must be provided “where there is the probability of the accused losing his 
liberty even for a day.”: Bojang v The State supra note 21 158 G-H; Ashworth notes, “…[I]t is contrary to 
the principle of equality before the law that the ability to defend oneself adequately against a criminal 
charge should depend on one’s financial resources. Thus, to allow legal representation without providing 
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The constitutional provision that legal representation is available to the accused at his 
own expense is contrary to the notion of fairness. It makes the constitutional guarantee of 
legal representation an empty declaration. One would therefore recommend that legal 
representation be provided in respect of all cases that attract minimum sentences. One 
may ask what kind of system is it that passes minimum prison sentences, reverses the 
onus of proof and hails the accused into court without the assistance of an expert to 
defend him?74 This is oppressive in design. The state cannot have its cake and eat it. The 
trial of a person under such circumstances is an act and a sham, where the fate of the 
accused is predestined by state policy. It gives the prosecution monumental advantage in 
the proceedings and deprives the accused of his right to equality before the law. The 
criminal process is unfairly skewed in favour of the state and the trial is reduced to mere 
formal and procedural steps aimed at conviction. Under the circumstances, there is an 
urgent demand for the institution of a legal aid system.   
 
7 7 2 Inadequacies in state funded defence 
The right to legal representation is only attained and equality met if the accused is 
afforded adequate representation. The provision of legal representation by itself does not 
satisfy the operation of the right. While the law on the right to quality legal representation 
                                                                                                                                                 
state funding for the indigent would be to respect the right of the innocent not to be convicted only in so far 
as they have money, and would fail to ensure equal access to justice.”: Ashworth Legal Aid, Human Rights 
and Criminal Justice in Young & Wall (eds) Access to Criminal Justice (1996) 55 57. 
74
 Several statutes in Botswana have minimum sentences and reverse onuses. See paragraph 8 5 1 chapter 8. 
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is still developing in Botswana,75 the law of South Africa is more comprehensive in this 
regard.76 A key problem with legal aid systems is quality representation.77 In this regard 
the experience of the practitioner and the diligence with which he conducts the case, are 
usually matters that compromise the quality of representation and thus the fairness of the 
trial.78 That quality representation is an essential component of the right to legal 
representation is reflected in the well-developed legal tradition and dilectual-based 
concept of placing a high duty of care on counsel to his client. The experience of counsel 
and his dedication to pro deo cases often impact on the quality of representation. The 
remuneration in respect of pro deo cases is usually low, thereby attracting mostly junior 
counsel, or resulting in less time and attention being given to such cases. Practising 
lawyers with several years’ experience loose interest in criminal matters.  In S v Huma 
and Another (1)79 Claassen J highlighted the practical problems encountered by pro deo 
counsel when he opined: “Pro deo counsel is, however, in a peculiar and difficult 
position, because he does not normally have the assistance of an attorney, nor funds to 
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 See Ditshwanelo and Others v The Attorney-General and Another (No. 2) [1999] 2 B.L.R. 222. 
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 S v Halgryn 2002 (2) SACR 211 (SCA); S v Mofokeng 2004 (1) SACR 349 (W); S v Charles 2002 (2) 
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 Moore “Alternative Strategies for Public Defenders and Assigned Counsel” 2004 New York Review of 
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pay for the proper preparation of the accused’s defence.”80 He also alluded to the fact that 
pro deo counsel are mostly junior counsel. Consequently, there is an imbalance if the 
accused is represented by a lawyer with a significantly lower level of experience and 
limited resources, than a prosecutor who in addition to his experience will be assigned 
one or more junior counsel who will assist with research. Accused persons are short-
changed because more experienced attorneys are not prepared to accept the fees allocated 
under legal aid schemes and this implicates the principle of equality. Accused persons 
who cannot afford or do not possess the quality of legal resources possessed by the 
prosecution, are placed at a substantial disadvantage.81 The more complicated the 
charges, the more profound the effects of insufficient legal resources will be.82  
 
It was pointed out earlier that there is a manifest and disproportionate imbalance between 
the prosecution and the defence in terms of resources. The office of the prosecution is 
well-established and funded by state resources. However, several accused persons go 
undefended because of the non-availability of legal aid in Botswana.  It is a fundamental 
pillar of fairness that an accused be given adequate facilities to put up his defence.83 The 
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 409A-B; in S v Mayo and Another 1990 (1) SACR 659 (E) Jones J also referred obiter to the fact that 
junior counsel are usually assigned to do pro deo work; see also S v Siebert 1998 (1) SACR 554 (A) in 
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 Meernik “Equality of Arms? The Individual vs. The International Community in War Crimes Tribunals” 
2003 Judicature 312 314. 
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 Meernik 2003 Judicature 315. 
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lack of funding for legal representation is a recipe for disproportionality in competing 
interests. An effective prosecution without an effective defence flouts the equality 
principle for theoretical as well as practical purposes. Therefore, a comprehensive legal 
aid system needs to be established and provided for in the national budget just as state 
prosecution is budgeted for. For the prosecutor and defence to have procedural equality 
of arms, indigent accused persons must be supported by an adequate level of resources. 
The rationalisation of a system that takes into consideration the remuneration of attorneys 
for the defence, considering issues like their experience and complexity of each case so 
as to bring in experienced attorneys, will enhance quality representation.84 The 
Constitution of Botswana clearly states that legal representation is at the expense of the 
accused, thereby absolving the state of any duty to provide legal aid. Therefore, the 
rationalisation of access to legal representation remains purely a procedural matter 
without any consideration to resources and affordability. Though the state provides legal 
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 It should be noted however that the Trial Chamber and ICTR Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Clément 
Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana Case No. ICTR-95 – 1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Reasons), 1 June 
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representation for capital offences, there is a vast number of offences that are complex in 
nature, ladened with statutory reverse onuses, mandatory and lengthy minimum 
sentences, for which the state has no duty to provide legal representation. At the risk of 
sending accused persons to lengthy prison sentences, the state is able to say that it has 
limited resources to assist with legal representation. This is a sad state of affairs.85 
 
7 8 Legal and procedural limitations 
Though the courts have been strict in the application of the right to legal representation, 
employing a pro-active protective approach, they have at the same time made it clear that 
this right like any other is not absolute. If the right were to have an unlimited field of 
application, it will be open to abuse. The right encompasses a duty on the accused to 
make efforts to secure legal representation within a reasonable time. The courts are not 
expected to wait indefinitely for the accused. Therefore, the accused should avail himself 
of his right within a reasonable time. In determining what a reasonable time is, the court 
must weigh the rights of the individual against the rights of the state, bearing in mind that 
justice should be done expeditiously by the courts.86 The courts should ensure that the 
judicial process is not stifled by unnecessary adjournments.87 When the process in 
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securing legal representation results in unnecessary delays, the right to a trial within a 
reasonable time is implicated.88  
 
The limiting aspect of the right involves a number of considerations which are best 
described by negative expressions. Though courts must afford accused persons certain 
latitude to defend themselves by employing counsel, they must not allow the process of 
the court to be abused by the seeking of unnecessary adjournments.89 The right to legal 
representation means that the court must not prevent counsel who is entitled to appear 
before the court from acting for the accused. It does not mean that the court is obliged to 
postpone the case until counsel finds it convenient, where he has been given adequate 
notice.90 The exercise of the right to legal representation is subject to the accused making 
the necessary financial arrangements and securing a lawyer who is available to perform 
his mandate having regard to “the court’s organisation and the prompt dispatch of the 
business of the court.”91 Therefore, “…the convenience of counsel is not overriding.”92 
The position was aptly explained in the case of Marumo v The State.93 In that case, 
defence counsel was present in court when the trial date was fixed and he consented to 
the date. Counsel was absent on the trial date and did not communicate reasons for his 
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absence to the court. The trial magistrate therefore proceeded with the trial. On appeal, 
Livesey-Luke CJ had this to say: 
 
“In my opinion the above recited facts show that the appellant was given full 
opportunity to exercise his right to be represented by a legal practitioner of his 
own choice. There is no basis for saying that the court deprived him of his right to 
legal representation. On the contrary it was his counsel who failed to appear to 
represent him, although he had full knowledge of the date fixed for the trial… 
There is no doubt that the right of an accused to be represented by a counsel of his 
own choice is not only a fundamental but also an important right. This is borne 
out by the fact that it is entrenched in the Constitution. It means that an accused 
has the freedom of choosing a legal practitioner, who is entitled to practise before 
the court, to represent him, provided of course that the services of the legal 
practitioner will be at the accused’s and not the State’s expense. But, in my 
opinion, that right does not include a right or licence on the part of an accused or 
his counsel to delay or frustrate court proceedings. The important consideration is 
the convenience of the court. Neither an accused person, nor his counsel has the 
right, fundamental or otherwise, to dictate to the court that it should hear his case 
at the convenience of the accused or his counsel. So if the counsel of an accused 
person’s choice fails to appear in court to defend him on the date fixed for the trial 
after adequate notice of the date fixed has been given, and the trial proceeds it is 
not the court that has deprived him of his right, but on the contrary it is his 
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counsel, assuming he had been properly briefed, who has failed to fulfill his 
obligations to his client and thereby prevented him from enjoying his right.”94 
 
Livesey-Luke CJ made it clear that the court should not be inconvenienced. He stated that 
neither the accused nor his counsel has a right, fundamental or otherwise, to dictate to the 
court that it should hear the case at their convenience. Citing the dictum of Wilkinson CJ 
in the American case of R v Raselo and Benson95 he stated that if a legal practitioner is 
not likely to be available on the scheduled date of trial, he should not act for the accused. 
According to him, the accused would have been deprived of his right to legal 
representation if he is prevented by the state in any of its manifestations, whether judicial 
or executive, from securing counsel and not when counsel fails to appear without 
reasonable excuse.96 
 
Also, the choice of counsel operates within certain parameters, as an accused’s right to an 
attorney of his choice is limited to attorneys that are entitled to practise in the courts of 
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 Marumo v The State supra note 49 662A-E; see however Thapelo Tshipo v The State High Court Cr. App 
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Botswana.97 Like several other countries, only attorneys who are admitted to practise at 
the bar in Botswana are entitled to represent accused persons in her courts. An accused 
cannot look further afield.98 The right of an accused to an attorney is also subject to the 
availability of the attorney. The inability of an accused to procure the services of a 
particular attorney does not by itself justify an adjournment.99 A court is not obliged to 
keep proceedings in abeyance pending the availability of the attorney. Though the 
accused is entitled to select whom he wishes to represent him, if his choice is not 
available, he is obliged to look elsewhere.100 
 
The constitutional demand for the expeditious administration of justice was highlighted 
in the Maphane101 case. In that case the accused was arraigned on the 31st October 1989. 
On that date he informed the court of his intention to employ the services of an attorney 
and was put on bail in his own recognisance. The matter was adjourned to the 29th 
November 1989 and another adjournment was made to the 29th December 1989. On that 
date a trial date was fixed for the 31st January 1990. On the 31st January 1990 no lawyer 
was present. The accused named a lawyer but said that he was not in court and that he 
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was unable to proceed on his own. The trial magistrate proceeded as there was no 
indication that the named attorney would appear. He also took into consideration the fact 
that the state had brought its witnesses who had travelled from very long distances. On 
appeal, Gyeke-Dako J recognised the right of an accused to brief and be defended by 
counsel at his trial, and to be given reasonable time to do so. He however pointed out that 
if the accused does not avail himself of this right within reasonable time or if his legal 
representative fails to appear in court without making reasonable effort to get in touch 
with the court to explain his absence and seek an adjournment, then the court is entitled 
to proceed. He based his argument on section 10(1) of the Constitution which demands 
expeditious administration of justice.  
 
The Maphane case was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Bapusi.102 In that 
case several postponements were taken as the result of unexplained absences of the 
accused’s attorney. Four adjournments were taken between 19th April 1995 and 28th July 
1998 to enable the appellant (who was charged together with another person) to secure 
appropriate legal representation. In dismissing the appeal, Steyn JA delivering the 
judgment on behalf of the Court stated thus: 
 
“It must also be borne in mind that it is not only the prejudice to the appellant that 
had to be considered by the court, but also the unacceptability of the delay 
occasioned by the frequent postponements and the consequences of such delay on 
                                                 
102
 Supra note 46. 
 258
the course of justice. The prejudice suffered by appellant’s co-accused was also 
an important consideration.”103   
 
In short, one may say that the right to legal representation is a fundamental right in 
respect of which an accused must not be deprived. He is entitled to a reasonable time to 
secure an attorney though this should not result in unnecessary delays. Once a trial date 
has been fixed attorneys are expected to be present. 
 
7 9 Conclusion  
An appreciation of fair trial rights in light of the principle of equality of arms will give 
the right to legal representation a new meaning, creating a positive duty on the state to 
provide the accused with legal representation if he cannot afford one. The constitutional 
right to legal representation in Botswana unfortunately does not operate on the guarantee 
of equality of arms. The constitutional and legal framework regarding legal 
representation fails to recognise the relationship between legal representation and the 
accused’s right to equality before the law. It does not impose a burden on the state to 
provide legal representation for the accused but rather makes the right conditional on the 
accused providing legal representation at his own expense. Functionally, the system only 
seems to proscribe a conduct that prevents an accused from securing legal representation. 
In this regard, the constitutional right to legal representation is inadequate. Equality of 
arms demands that an accused be advised of his right to legal representation and be 
provided with a lawyer if he cannot afford one.  
                                                 
103
  9B-C. 
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Whereas prosecutors are in the permanent employment of the state, defence counsel 
usually work on hourly rates and are employed on a contractual basis. As opposed to the 
more permanent relationship between the state and prosecutors, the relationship between 
the accused and his attorney are more transient and fluid, based on ad hoc monetary 
considerations. The adversarial system can only be fair when counsel for the prosecution 
and accused operate on a level of relative equality. Therefore, the issue of funding and 
resources are crucial challenges to the attainment of legal representation.   
 
Botswana is a developing country with scarce skills and resources. Though there are 
strong macro economic indicators, resources are scarce and there is a deficit of legal 
skills. This poses a challenge to the provision of legal assistance for accused persons. 
Under the circumstances, one would suggest that, as a starting point, the state should 
provide legal representation in respect of capital offences and offences for which prison 
sentences are mandatory.104 This should be incrementally extended to other offences in 
order of seriousness. The state should make the allocation of funds in this regard a 
paramount objective of state policy. One would further suggest the introduction of a 
community legal services programme.105 In this way, lawyers on completion of their 
studies would engage in pro deo or legal aid work for a period of time or total number of 
hours so as to repay the debt owed to society whose taxes paid for or contributed to their 
university fees. Law degrees, or perhaps practising certificates, would only be awarded 
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 These include rape, grievous harm, robbery and stock theft. 
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 Sarkin 1993 South African Journal on Human Rights 224. 
 260
upon completion of service.106 The programme should be legislated and contractually 
regulated so that prospective law students understand the ramifications of pursuing a law 
degree.107 The programme could form part of the degree curriculum or pulillage. Where it 
is part of pupillage it will be the duty of the pupil master to ensure that he takes on cases 
of indigent accused persons and that pupils work on them with his supervision. Practising 
lawyers, law students and paralegals could also be required to contribute their services.108 
Naturally, the issue of resources will arise. Young graduates should not be allocated 
complicated cases as this will be a disservice to them and the accused. It must be noted, 
however, that such services should serve as a temporary immediate necessity and the 
government should take quicker steps in setting up a legal aid system.  
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 Sarkin 1993 South African Journal on Human Rights 227. 
107
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CHAPTER 8 
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND THE REVERSAL OF PROOF 
8 1 Introduction 
It is arguably a universal rule of law, that the state bears the burden to prove its case 
against the accused.1 So notorious is the rule that it has become a cliché. The question 
is, to what extent is this well acclaimed rule true. During the inquisition, the accused 
practically had a duty to establish his innocence. It is not surprising therefore that 
notwithstanding the capacity of the modern state to investigate and prosecute crime 
and the consequent demand that the prosecution should prove its case, there are still 
instances where the burden lies with the accused. While reversal of proof is supported 
by the common law and is well embedded in statutes, it is clear that the movement 
from the inquisition to the placing of the modern proof on the prosecution, has not 
resulted in a complete break with the past. While there are arguably practical reasons 
that dictate that the accused be called upon to explain certain matters relating to his 
innocence, the constitutionality of some of these circumstances are questionable. 
More importantly, the state has all the resources and infrastructure to investigate and 
prosecute crime. The accused on the other hand has no such means. Therefore, 
requiring the accused to prove certain issues relating to his innocence puts him at a 
significantly disadvantaged position and violates the principle of equality of arms and 
the presumption of innocence.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Kofele-Kale “Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and Interests in Combating 
Economic Crimes” 2006 International Lawyer 909 915. 
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8 2 The human right to be presumed innocent  
8 2 1 The basis of the right 
The procedural actualisation of the right to be presumed innocent lies with the 
allocation of proof. The presumption of innocence guards against erroneous 
convictions and is an aspect of a fair trial.2  
 
The general rule that the prosecution bears a burden to prove its case beyond 
reasonable doubt has gained universal recognition. Article 11(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyone charged with an offence shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial. This 
provision gives content to this principle as an international legal norm. The principle 
is also to be found in article 14(2) of the ICCPR and article 7(1)(b) of the African 
Charter. This rule of law is also well established in the English common law and was 
reaffirmed in the English locus classicus of Woolmington v DPP3 by Lord Sankey. 
The rule has been endorsed by the Constitution of Botswana4 as well as its case law.5 
 
The presumption of innocence, therefore, is a universally recognised human right, 
which forbids a presumption of guilt in relation to the accused. To call upon the 
accused to prove his innocence, is contrary to the spirit of a democratic order. The 
presumption of innocence is a central basis for the recognition and preservation of the 
                                                 
2
 Paul Rodney Hansen v The Queen [2007] NZSC 7. 
3
 [1935] All E.R. Rep 1; Mancini v DPP [1942] A.C. 1; see also the South African case of R v Ndhlovu 
1945 AD 369; the Botswana case of State v Boy Ntibela [1968-1970] B.L.R. 74. 
4
 S 10(2)(a). 
5
 Johnson Seane v The State [1968-1970] B.L.R. 19; Regina v Khan [1964-1967] B.L.R. 83; State v 
Oake [1981] B.L.R. 228; Bosch v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 71 (CA). 
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concept of human dignity.6 The threat to liberty, social stigma and psychological harm 
which a person accused of a crime is subjected to makes the presumption crucial to a 
society committed to fairness.7 The demand that the prosecution proves each element 
of the offence, though lacking any theoretical connection with the principle of 
equality, procedurally and substantively supports the principle. Proof by the 
prosecution is an assurance that weak as the plight of the accused is in the criminal 
process, he is not unnecessarily burdened by being called upon to prove his 
innocence, especially in light of the resources available to the state to prove his guilt. 
In any event, it is to be assumed that the prosecution charges an accused to court on 
the basis of evidence which suggests reasonable prospects of success. 
 
8 2 2 Qualifications of the right 
8 2 2 1 The common law exception of insanity 
Of course, human rights are usually subject to exceptions. Notwithstanding the 
general recognition of the presumption of innocence, practical considerations 
sometimes require certain information from the accused that demonstrate that he 
cannot be held culpable for an offence. The defence of insanity represents a well-
known and widely recognised exception to the general rule.8 The burden is on the 
accused if he raises the defence of insanity. This common law principle has received 
statutory endorsement. In Botswana, section 10 of the Penal Code establishes a 
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 Hoctor “Dignity, Criminal Law, and the Bill of Rights” 2004 South African Law Journal 304 307. 
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 R v Oakes 1986 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200. 
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 Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 C.L.R. 192; Paizes “A Closer Look at the Presumption of Innocence 
in our Constitution: What is an Accused Presumed to be Innocent of?” 1998 South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 409; Denning “Presumptions and Burdens” 1945 Law Quarterly Review 379 382; 
Dlamini “The Burden of Proof: Its Role and Meaning” 2001 Stellenbosch Law Review 68 84. 
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presumption of sanity in respect of persons charged with any offence. Section 11 of 
the Penal Code provides that a person shall not be liable for a criminal act if at the 
time of commission he suffered from a disease of the mind which caused him not to 
appreciate his conduct. It follows therefore that the accused has a duty to prove 
insanity or a disease of the mind, on a balance of probabilities.9  
 
8 2 2 2 Statutory exceptions 
A second qualification lies in relation to exceptions created by statute.10 Statutory 
exceptions usually place the burden on accused persons to explain certain facts on a 
balance of probabilities. The placing of an evidential burden on the accused is well 
recognised in respect of regulatory offences. The legitimacy of such burdens is 
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 State v Mase [1979-1980] B.L.R. 70 71(CA); State v Saamu [1989] B.L.R. 191; State v Mogampana 
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251; Kgaodi v The State [1996] B.L.R. 23 (CA); State v Gaopatwe [1997] B.L.R. 523; State v Motlhale 
[2002] 2 B.L.R. 283; State v Masupe [1992] B.L.R. 1; State v Collet Mothibi [1974] 2 B.L.R. 21; State 
v Moyo [1985] B.L.R. 239; Kaome v The State [1999] 2 B.L.R. 187. See also Cole “Determining the 
Constitutionality of Reverse Onus Clauses in Botswana” 2008 African Journal of International and 
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Exception” 1988 Criminal Law Review 221; Quansah Law of Evidence 37. 
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guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 10(12)(a) makes it crystal clear that no law 
that imposes on any person charged with a criminal offence the burden of proving 
particular facts shall be inconsistent with section 10(2)(a). Section 272 of the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act gives content to this constitutional provision. It provides 
that where a person carries on an occupation or business or is in possession of an 
article or is in an area whereby he is required to obtain a licence, permission or 
authorisation, it shall be presumed that he does not have such licence or permission 
unless he proves the contrary. It is submitted that such burdens should be evidential 
only, and should not relieve the prosecution of the ultimate burden. A statutory 
exception that effectively relieves the prosecution of the burden of proof, places the 
accused at the risk of improper conviction. 
 
 8 3 The rationale of the burden of proof  
There are clear and principled arguments why the burden of proof should lie with the 
prosecution. First, logic and common sense dictates that a party making an allegation 
must establish it. This correlates with the presumption of innocence which prescribes 
that an accused is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.11 The problem with legal 
proof however is that proof is determined not on the “whole” of the evidence. Rather, 
the whole is established upon proof of each element, some of which might be difficult 
for the prosecution to establish in explicit terms.  
 
The relative ease with which the prosecution can discharge its burden represents a 
second reason for placing the burden on it. There are vast inequalities between the 
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 Nobles & Schiff “Guilt and Innocence in the Criminal Justice System: A comment on R (Mullen) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department” 2006 Modern Law Review 80 81 & 91. 
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state and the individual. With all its resources, it is relatively simple for the state to 
collect and produce enough evidence in order to secure a conviction.12 The state has a 
professional crime gathering organisation (the police) to its advantage.13 The police 
have special powers of arrest, detention, entry into property and seizure of 
incriminating evidence – a matter already dealt with in chapter 5 above. The state has 
the resources and experts to do forensic analyses of evidence. The prosecution decides 
when to proffer charges and therefore has the advantage of being well prepared for 
trial.14 The state has a great advantage in that it is able to investigate cases in advance 
and even before the accused is charged. Because of its resources it is able to secure 
and interview a large number of witnesses and gather substantial evidence. This 
                                                 
12
 “The resources that are mobilised by the state for the purpose of gathering evidence to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that an accused has committed a particular offence are immense by comparison to 
those generally available to the accused. Listening devices, telephone intercepts, forensic scientists, 
surveillance, power to search and seize, powers to compel answers to questions, informants and the 
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significant repository of information related to the offence under investigation.”: Hinton “Unused 
Material and the Prosecutor’s Duty of Disclosure” 2001 Criminal Law Journal 121 121; Dlamini 2001 
Stellenbosch Law Review 80; Bakken “Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: 
Beyond the Adversarial System” 2008 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 547 581; “A 
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analysis: because the presumption is inherent in a proper relationship between the state and citizen, 
because there is a considerable imbalance of resources between the state and the defendant…It is 
surely fundamental that the prosecution should establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” (emphasis 
added): Ashworth “Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence” 2006 South African Law Journal 63 
75; Silver “Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional Right” 1990 
Wisconsin Law Review 1007 1038. 
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 Ashworth 2006 South African Law Journal 71; State v Jaba [1987] B.L.R. 315 319. 
14
 Roberts “Taking the Burden of Proof Seriously” 1995 Criminal Law Review 783 786. 
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clearly puts the accused in a position of inequality. The state is therefore able to amass 
evidence and prepare well before charges are drafted, in effect giving the prosecution 
a head start. The accused does not have the resources to go after witnesses. Nor does 
the accused have police powers to investigate crime. A sure way of creating equality 
is by the fair allocation of the burden of proof between the adversaries.15 It is not easy 
for an accused - especially for an innocent man who has no intention to invent 
evidence - to account for his past actions, motives or movements. As Roberts notes, 
guilty persons might be concerned with and invest time in covering their tracks and 
setting up false alibis, but innocent persons are not usually concerned with proving 
their innocence except when called upon to do so. It is quite difficult for an accused to 
prove lack of knowledge, motive or intent, which reverse burdens often demand, 
thereby making rebuttal a formidable task. To put unreasonable onuses on the accused 
therefore severely inflames the already natural imbalances that exist between both 
parties.  
 
Christie and Pye argue that accused persons must be able to challenge the existence of 
a presumed fact with ease, thereby making it possible to defeat a presumption 
unfavourable to them.16 They state that theoretical analysis counts for nothing in the 
absence of structured criminal procedural rules that enable the accused to carry out 
sufficient enquiry so as to be able to rebut a presumption.17 Christie and Pye postulate 
practical situations including the ability of the accused to access information from the 
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 Dlamini 2001 Stellenbosch Law Review 80. 
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 Christie & Pye “Presumptions and Assumptions in Criminal Law: Another View” 1970 Duke Law 
Journal 919. 
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 Christie & Pye 1970 Duke Law Journal 939-942. 
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prosecution to enable them to carry out their own investigations so as to be able to get 
evidence to rebut a presumption. They opine that the problem was not in the inability 
of innocent accused to sufficiently challenge the existence of the presumed fact but 
that he in practical terms lacks the resources that can unearth evidence favourable to 
himself concerning the basic or presumed facts. They refer to the difficulties in 
criminal procedure. They identify these difficulties as the inadequacy of criminal 
discovery, which prevents the accused from knowing in advance of trial what 
evidence the state will use against him, the absence of funds for investigation or for 
securing expert witnesses so as to pursue independent investigation, and the 
unwillingness which is sometimes encouraged by the prosecution, of witnesses to 
discuss the case with defence counsel before the trial. They identify these as 
handicaps in the criminal justice system which are exacerbated by reverse onus 
clauses.18 They claim that the accused should be able to investigate a case effectively 
without the necessity of relying on the state. They suggest that the state should 
therefore provide subsidised investigative services either by providing a permanent 
staff or through the allocation of funds for investigators and experts to be hired by the 
accused. They suggest that this system, rather than limitations on the use of 
presumptions, will improve the position of the innocent accused.19  
 
Clearly, history has shown that these proposals are not very helpful as modern legal 
systems have not developed on such lines. Whereas disclosure and defence 
investigation assist the defence case, it does not necessarily help in the rebuttal of 
presumptions as several presumptions do not really depend on matters that need to be 
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investigated but rather on normal factual explanations which are nebulous, 
unexplainable and difficult to investigate. Also, their suggestion goes against the 
theory of the presumption of innocence which demands that the onus of proof lies 
with the prosecution. Further, production of evidence and proof are not the same. The 
accused may be able to produce evidence, but may not satisfy the court on a balance 
of probabilities. The evidence produced by the accused can be contested, challenged 
and disputed. So his ability to unearth evidence may not actually overcome the 
theoretical and constitutional implications of reverse onus clauses. The accused 
remains at risk if he fails to satisfy the court that the inference created by the reverse 
onus cannot be drawn. 
 
Further, the procedural structure of criminal proceedings and constitutional theory 
demand that the prosecution produces evidence on every allegation it makes. In 
criminal proceedings, the prosecution has the right to begin. This is logically so 
because it presents its allegations against the accused after which the accused is called 
upon to answer them. It is a skewed application of the rules that the accused has to 
answer to an allegation which the prosecution has not made out. Proof by the 
prosecution by legislative inference is a dangerous misapplication of the process. It is 
an interference by the legislature in the legal process and its effect is to influence the 
determination of the dispute. Constitutionally, on a plea of not guilty, the accused is 
shielded by the presumption of innocence until he is proved guilty beyond reasonable 
doubt. Such standard of proof cannot be attained if the court entertains a reasonable 
doubt from the evidence.20 The placing of the onus of proof on the state, places the 
                                                 
20
 Bridge “Presumptions and Burdens” 1949 Modern Law Review 273 288. 
 270
accused at an advantage, and limits the state’s overriding powers, thereby equalising 
both parties.21 
 
Finally, criminal conviction comes with censure and punishment. Punishment for a 
criminal offence may result in limitations to the basic rights of the individual such as 
deprivation of his right of liberty and disqualification from participation in key 
aspects of social life. It is of great importance, therefore, that innocent persons are not 
convicted. The avoidance of this prospect underlies the demand for a fair trial and 
with it, the presumption of innocence.22 
 
8 4 Institutional governance and the shifting of the burden 
8 4 1 Positivist governance 
Political, legal and constitutional traditions of states have implicated the acceptability 
of shifting of the burden to the accused. Reverse onuses flourish and tend to survive 
constitutional scrutiny in legal systems with a positivist set-up. The positivist 
paradigm derives from the English common law system and is founded on the 
Westminster model of government which operates on the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy. In this regard, the power to legislate is vested with parliament and none, 
the courts included, can question the validity of Acts of parliament.23 The result is that 
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 Ekins “Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law” 2003 Law Quarterly Review 127 135; Cole 2008 
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parliament is at liberty to allocate onuses to the accused. It has the authority to 
determine the elements of offences and to relieve the prosecution of the duty to prove 
any element of an offence.24 Therefore, though the presumption of innocence is firmly 
entrenched in English common law, it can be sidetracked by the legislature as it thinks 
fit.25 Indeed, when Lord Sankey reaffirmed in his famous declaration that the common 
law burden is on the prosecution, he subjected this “common thread” to statutory 
exceptions.26 One wonders whether Lord Sankey’s embracement of statutory 
exceptions was inadvertent, deliberate, or a mere attempt to restate English law. But 
by so doing the golden thread so firmly and eloquently put by him, was wholly 
undermined. According to him, the burden on the prosecution is subject to any 
statutory exception. This open-ended qualification puts the presumption of innocence 
under tremendous legislative pressure. Ashworth states perhaps rightly so: “So the 
legislature might decide, for the most inadequate reason or for no particular reason at 
all, to place a burden of proof on the defendant.”27 He suggests that Lord Sankey 
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should have stated a strong principle of interpreting statutes as not imposing a legal 
burden on the accused, unless where the words to the contrary are clear.28 
 
Some scholars have registered unease and opposition to the positivist tradition. 
Dlamini notes: 
 
“English law recognises the authority of Parliament to impose a persuasive 
burden on the accused. The courts seem to be overzealous in approving and 
applying statutory presumptions of this kind.”29 
 
 Williams registers a diametrical opposition to the positivist paradigm when he states:  
 
“When it is said that a defendant to a criminal charge is presumed innocent, 
what is really meant is that the burden of proving his guilt is upon the 
prosecution…Unhappily, Parliament regards the principle with indifference -
one might almost say with contempt. The Statute Book contains many 
offences in which the burden of proving his innocence is cast on the 
accused…The sad thing is that there has never been any reason of expediency 
                                                 
28
 Ashworth 2006 South African Law Journal 70. The author complains: “The wider problem was that 
Lord Sankey, for all his romantic imagery about webs and golden threads, failed to give an account of 
the reasons why the presumption of innocence was important. And then he gave it all away by stating 
that the presumption was subject ‘to any statutory exception’ – any.” At 70. (Emphasis appears in the 
text). 
29
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for these departures from the cherished principle; it has been done through 
carelessness and lack of subtlety.”30 
 
Ashworth notes: 
 
“For the judges simply to stand by and do nothing was a distinctly 
pusillanimous treatment of a principle that Lord Sankey had described as a 
‘golden thread’”.31 
 
The European Court of Human Rights appears to have followed the positivist 
paradigm. In effect, it tends to be open-ended on the issue and it permits member 
states to place the burden of proof on the accused.32 In Salabiaku v France33 the 
applicant had been convicted of unlawful importation of drugs. In terms of French 
law, once it was proved that the accused was in possession of an article, there was a 
presumption that he was aware of its contents. The European court in confirming the 
validity of offences of strict liability noted: “Contracting states may, under certain 
conditions, penalise a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of whether it 
results from criminal intent or from negligence.”34 The Court, however, emphasised 
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that the criminal law must be kept “within reasonable limits which take into account 
the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence.”35  
 
One can immediately see that the powers of the state are heightened in this setup. The 
legislature steps in to alter the incidence of proof in favour of the state and to the 
detriment of the accused. Legislators decide that the accused should prove vital 
elements of certain offences. The courts in which these offences are prosecuted do not 
readily step in to remedy the imbalance which this situation creates in the system. 
This is because parliament is supreme and its legislations cannot be questioned. 
 
8 4 2 Constitutionalist governance 
In countries where constitutional supremacy is upheld and whose constitutions are 
adorned with bills of rights, it is possible for the courts to question the validity of 
reverse onuses.36 In this regard, a strong framework exists to balance the interests of 
policy makers as against those of the individual. The courts are able to question 
statutory provisions that unfairly disadvantage the accused. The accused is able to rely 
on the constitutionally guaranteed right to presumption of innocence to challenge a 
statutory provision that declares him guilty before trial. The introduction of bills of 
rights in Canada37 and South Africa38 saw an immediate shift from the positivist 
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paradigm to the constitutionalist paradigm.39 It is no coincidence therefore that in 
198640 and 199541 the Supreme Court of Canada and the South African Constitutional 
Court determined the constitutionality of reverse onuses and found that they infringed 
the constitutionally entrenched presumption of innocence. Clearly, constitutionalism 
enhances the normative value of the presumption of innocence.42 
 
The South African Constitution recognises the presumption of innocence.43 The 
courts have been most robust in defending this provision and are well-known for 
striking down reverse onus clauses.44 In holding that reverse onus clauses are 
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence, South African courts have drawn 
inspiration from Canadian jurisprudence.45 South African and Canadian jurisprudence 
recognise that the presumption of innocence is breached where a person can be 
convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Constitutionalist governance 
therefore recognises that any provision which requires the accused to prove an 
element of an offence or lowers the standard placed on the prosecution, will infringe 
the presumption of innocence unless it can be justified in terms of the limitation 
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clause.46 This approach recognises the fact that a provision which places a persuasive 
burden on the accused, violates the presumption of innocence as it permits a 
conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt.47 
 
8 4 3 Institutional governance 
The business of crime control is vested in the state. State institutions are dedicated to 
this role. All offences in Botswana are created by legislation. The legislature creates 
offences, the police investigate crimes and the Director of Public Prosecutions 
prosecutes crimes. Reverse onuses stem from legislative action. The parameters for 
investigating crime and the powers of the police relating to investigation, search and 
seizure, are set by legislation. The fact that the state determines such powers is 
unavoidable. The Hobbesean social contract postulates the ceding of certain rights to 
a central authority in exchange for societal order and individual protection. State 
institutions therefore determine the governance of the criminal justice system. While 
it is accepted that the legislature consists of the elected representatives of the people, 
one may ask what real influence the individual has on the legislative process. The 
relationship between the legislature and the populace can be likened to that between 
directors of a company and its share holders. The legislature is the board of directors 
and the electorate the share holders. The share holders may outnumber the board 
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members and together can overrule or even vote out the directors. But this can hardly 
happen in practice. It is unlikely that share holders can gang up and form a formidable 
voice against the board. They are powerless and do not really influence board 
decisions. Similarly, the electorate does not really get involved or concern themselves 
with legislation and more often than not, unpopular legislation gets passed in the face 
of popular opposition. These are the limits of modern democratic practice. To this 
extent, reverse onuses have become a reality of modern legal practice.  
 
While there are reasoned arguments in favour of reversing the burden, the fact 
remains that it is the product of state institutionalism and political policy which tilt the 
scale in favour of the state, regardless of the individuals who elect them. The 
politicians who make the law hardly face criminal prosecution. When they do, they 
have the resources to brief the best legal brains. Their chances of an acquittal are high. 
To the ordinary accused or share holder, legal representation is a luxury which he 
cannot afford. The chances of an improper conviction are real. These are the realities 
of modern institutional governance and its effect on the criminal justice system. 
 
8 5 Reversing the presumption of innocence 
Legislative reversal of the presumption of innocence takes two forms. First, 
legislation may impose an onus. The second is in the form of evidential burdens. The 
accused is required to point to some facts or issues which may determine his 
innocence. Evidential burdens are not regarded as creating an onus. Whether one is 
dealing with a reverse onus or evidential burden, the fact remains that they both act as 
“stiflers” on the accused’s constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidential 
burdens and reverse onuses are usually justified on practical and public interest 
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considerations. However, requiring the accused to point to or prove his innocence puts 
him in a procedural and constitutional minefield. The rationalisation of placing the 
burden of proof on the prosecution on the basis that this remedies procedural 
imbalances is thus defeated.  
 
8 5 1 Reverse onus clauses 
It is a fundamental principle of the criminal process that the burden is on the 
prosecution to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. This 
principle is articulated by the fundamental trilogy of the criminal justice system of 
Botswana: the Constitution, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act48 and the Penal 
Code49 which are the principal instruments regulating criminal law and procedure. 
The principle that he who avers must prove, forms the basis of all modern legal 
systems and international criminal tribunals, and can be said to have attained the 
status of customary international procedural law.  
 
Recent developments in Botswana and indeed other countries have witnessed a new 
category of statutes that are littered with reverse onus clauses.50 A reverse onus clause 
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is “a burden on the defendant to prove some matter the effect of which is that he is not 
guilty of the offence charged.”51 In this regard the burden of proof is placed on the 
accused and in the result, he has a persuasive burden.52 Parliament creates reverse 
burdens requiring the accused to disprove some elements of an offence. In this regard 
parliament assists the prosecution in proving its case notwithstanding its 
overwhelming resources. Reverse onus clauses are in themselves a breach of the 
equality principle since they unnecessarily tip the scales in favour of the state. The 
placing of the onus on the accused should be the exception and should be justified by 
clear and convincing principles and without weakening or eroding the general rule 
that the burden of proof lies with the state.53  
 
Reverse onus clauses are usually based on presumptive inferences some of which are 
not reasonable in the least. Presumptions usually require that certain facts be taken for 
granted upon proof of evidence whose probative force fails to establish the fact to be 
inferred.54 Some presumptions have no justifiable basis as they require the courts to 
draw a legally important fact from evidence which does not really imply its 
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existence.55 Reverse onuses are based on legislation which instructs the court to take 
for granted the existence of the presumed fact, based on evidence that lacks the 
probative value required to support such a finding.56 The presumption is therefore 
created by institutional governance, which requires additional weight to be given to 
evidence in order to achieve a desired result, irrespective of evidential and judicial 
considerations.57 Because of the difficulties of the prosecution in proving a positive, 
an accused who does not have equality of arms with the prosecution is compelled to 
prove a negative assertion which is even more onerous to accomplish.58 Such 
provisions are clearly inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and are 
therefore unconstitutional.  
 
Further afield from Botswana, reverse onus clauses have received judicial support on 
the basis that they curb crime. It has been held in Ireland that reverse onus clauses are 
necessary to strike a balance between individual freedoms and an ordered society.59 
The European Commission on Human Rights has also upheld a reverse onus clause in 
England which provided that a man who is proved to be living with a prostitute is 
deemed to be knowingly living on the earnings of prostitution unless the contrary is 
proved, holding that the provision was reasonable in the interests of legal order and 
that it will be an impossible task to require the prosecution to obtain direct evidence 
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that the accused was living on immoral earnings.60 The Divisional Court61 in England 
ruled that a mandatory presumption of guilt in respect of an element of an offence 
based upon the proof of another, breached the presumption of innocence.62 However, 
the House of Lords overruled the decision on other grounds, declining to comment on 
the issue of reverse onus.  
 
The argument that reverse onus clauses help to create an ordered society lacks 
theoretical foundation and scientific proof. Reverse onus clauses totally impinge on 
judicial reasoning. An example of this is obvious with reference to rules developed by 
judicial officers relating to the assessment of evidence and the drawing of inferences 
in cases of circumstantial evidence. What most reverse onus clauses do is to remove 
the reasonableness from judicial analysis of circumstantial evidence and, by 
legislative decree, compel a judicial officer to reach to a conclusion devoid of logic 
and common sense. The legislature therefore makes it possible to condemn a person 
on the basis of mere whimsical suspicion, a situation usually justified by increase in 
crime. 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court has struck down reverse onus clauses as being 
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence when they are not rationally 
connected with or proportionate to the law’s objective.63 In England, the Privy 
Council in Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-Kut64 dealt with two 
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offences. The first offence was that of possessing cash reasonably suspected of being 
stolen. The Privy Council held that this offence was inconsistent with the presumption 
of innocence as the prosecution merely had to prove possession of cash which was a 
formal or non-incriminating matter, leaving the accused to disprove his guilt. The 
Privy Council stated that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove all the elements 
of the offence. The second offence required the prosecution to establish that the 
accused was involved in dealing with the proceeds of another’s drugs trafficking, 
while the accused had to prove a number of defences on a balance of probabilities. 
The Privy Council held that this was consistent with the presumption of innocence. 
The distinction between both offences clearly demonstrates the difference between 
what should be reasonably expected of the prosecution. Indeed, the first offence 
required the prosecution to do nothing and created a presumption of guilt based on 
suspicion that is not established. Definitely, the state, with its police services should 
be able to establish more than the mere possession of cash. The prosecution must be 
further burdened to establish circumstances from which a reasonable suspicion of 
theft could be established. Unfortunately, similar statutory provisions exist in 
Botswana.65 The courts in Botswana would do well to borrow from the combined 
approach of Oakes, Laba and Lee Kwong-Kut. The Canadian tests in Oakes and Laba 
clearly recognises the criminal law not as a phenomenon operating in a vacuum but as 
an instrument forming part of the social process in responding to crime. Lee Kwong-
Kut clearly recognises the theoretical importance of the duty of the state in criminal 
proceedings. This is dictated by the common sense demand that he who avers must 
prove. 
 
                                                 
65
 See note 50. 
 283
8 5 2 Permissible inferences 
The placing of evidential burdens on the accused is generally recognised as 
acceptable. Social justification requires that a person accounts for facts that are known 
only to him.66 Rational consideration of comparative convenience dictates that the 
accused is the only person who can explain certain facts.67 In this regard, evidential 
burdens may be compatible with the presumption of innocence.68 Unlike legal 
burdens, they do not carry the risk of non-persuasion.69 Presumptions may be based 
on considerations that are founded on human experience or a need to further a socially 
desirable result or the accomplishment of procedural convenience.  
 
Justification for the placing of evidential burdens on the accused has been made on 
the basis that there are offences that are not truly criminal but rather regulatory. 
Therefore, provisions that require proof of licences to do certain regulated acts are 
usually held to be compatible with the presumption of innocence.70 As has been said 
before, in Botswana, such provisions are solidified by section 272 of the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act which requires that a person charged with acting in 
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contravention of a licensing requirement shall be deemed not to hold such licence 
unless the contrary is proved. This provision relates to situations where permission is 
required to have a licence, permit or authorisation to carry on an act or possess certain 
prohibited items. In terms of this provision, the person is deemed not to be the holder 
of the relevant licence, permit or authorisation. The logic of provisions of these kinds 
is that the accused merely has to produce his certificate or authorisation. On the other 
hand, however, all such licences, exemptions and authorisations are usually in the 
form of written certificates or documents issued by government agencies which 
usually have records of them. The state therefore should have no difficulty accessing 
such information. Therefore, even though these kinds of information are within the 
knowledge of the accused, they are not peculiar to him and the state has unrestricted 
access to them. The inequalities arising from such presumptions lies in the fact that in 
Botswana, most accused are illiterate. They are not familiar with procedural and 
evidential matters. While they may argue in court that they have the relevant licences 
or authorisations, they might not be aware of the prerequisite to produce them. Often, 
the judicial officer will have to intervene and require the accused to produce the 
relevant documentation, thereby triggering an adjournment. 
 
In recognising the distinction between truly criminal and regulatory offences, the 
Court in Sheldrake v DPP71 noted that the lower in the scale the offence is, the easier 
it is to justify an interference with the presumption of innocence. Dennis, however, 
rightly notes the difficulties of using this classification as a basis for justifying reverse 
onuses.72 He points out that a classification based on the moral quality of an act is 
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open to scrutiny as many might consider certain “public welfare” offences such as 
environmental offences or breaches of health and safety legislation as very serious 
and immoral.73 For example, a situation whereby an employee is exposed to health 
risks due to failure by the employer to take certain health precautions and the 
employee dies as a result, gives a very serious tone to an offence that is otherwise 
punishable by a fine under regulatory legislation.74 Also, the fact that a reverse onus 
applies to a regulatory offence does not make it easier to discharge than if it appeared 
in a truly criminal offence.75 There is no relationship between the degree of 
onerousness and the type of offence involved. 
 
8 6 The constitutionality of reverse onus clauses 
In Botswana, the above issue is hardly ever raised as a defence. The constitutionality 
of reverse onuses has been determined in only one reported case in Botswana. The 
matter was determined both in the High Court76 and Court of Appeal77 with slightly 
varied results. The courts relied heavily on the Canadian and South African 
experiences and it is therefore apt to start the discussion by reference to the 
jurisprudence of those two countries.  
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8 6 1 The Canadian experience 
8 6 1 1 The burden of proof 
The common law imposes a burden on the Crown to prove its case against the 
accused beyond reasonable doubt.78 The Woolmington principle which recognises that 
the burden lies with the prosecution finds recognition in Canadian law.79 The liberty 
of the legislature to enact statutory exceptions is also recognised.80 In R v Appleby81 
the Supreme Court held that the words “presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to law” should be taken to envisage a law which recognises statutory 
exceptions reversing the onus of proof with respect to one or more ingredients of an 
offence.82 This view represents the positivist approach and was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in R v Oakes where it was noted that the term “according to law” in 
section 11(d) of the Charter does not embrace statutory exceptions. The Court noted 
that such a provision does not apply to an entrenched Charter which tempered 
parliamentary supremacy.83 The Court emphasised therefore that section 11(d) of the 
Charter requires that an accused is presumed innocent until the state proves his guilt. 
The Court noted that the state bears the burden of proving the guilt of the accused and 
that criminal trials must be conducted in accordance with lawful procedures and 
fairness.84 
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8 6 1 2 Evidential burdens 
In R v Fontaine, Fish J made a classic distinction between an evidential burden and a 
persuasive burden when he wrote on behalf of the Court: 
 
“An ‘evidential burden’ is not a burden of proof. It determines whether an 
issue should be left to the trier of fact, while the ‘persuasive burden’ 
determines how the issue should be decided. These are fundamentally 
different questions. The first is a matter of law; the second, a question of fact. 
Accordingly, on a trial by judge and jury, the judge decides whether the 
evidential burden has been met.”85  
 
In essence, an evidential burden does not require an accused to prove anything. 
Rather, the burden is discharged by pointing to enough evidence to put the matter in 
issue.86 Evidential burdens therefore will not infringe the presumption of innocence in 
section 11(d) since they do not require proof on a balance of probabilities.87 
 
8 6 1 3 Reverse onuses  
In R v Oakes,88 the Supreme Court held that a provision that requires the accused to 
disprove an element of an offence on a balance of probabilities was a breach of the 
presumption of innocence as it permits a conviction of the accused despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt. It accordingly ruled that section 8 of the federal 
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Narcotic Control Act which placed a burden on an accused to prove on a balance of 
probabilities that he or she was not in possession of a narcotic for the purposes of 
trafficking, contravened the presumption of innocence contained in section 11(d) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights. The Court held that the lower standard of proof did 
not make a reverse onus clause constitutional as the accused might be able to raise a 
reasonable doubt but yet still fail to prove his innocence on a balance of probabilities. 
In the dictum of Dickson CJ: 
 
“…[A] provision which requires an accused to disprove on a balance of 
probabilities the existence of a presumed fact, which is an important element 
of the offence in question, violates the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d). If 
an accused bears the burden of disproving on a balance of probabilities an 
essential element of an offence it would be possible for him to be convicted 
despite the existence of a reasonable doubt.”89 
 
The Court noted that the provision’s use of the words “to establish” has the same 
meaning as the words “to prove”, thereby imposing a legal burden on the accused. 
   
For a reverse onus clause to be reasonable and hence constitutional, the facts proved 
must have a rational connection with the facts presumed.90 The rational connection 
test was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Tot v Delia91 where 
Roberts J had this to say: 
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“…[W]e think, that a criminal statutory presumption cannot be sustained if 
there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact 
presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary 
because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.”92 
 
Also in Leary v US93 the Court stated as follows: 
  
“…[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as ‘irrational’ or 
‘arbitrary’, and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with 
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow 
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.”94 
 
In this regard, the facts proved must tend to establish the facts presumed. Dickson CJ 
held in Oakes that the test still allowed a conviction despite the existence of a 
reasonable doubt.  
 
In the case of R v Whyte95 the accused was charged with being in “care and control” 
of a motor vehicle while intoxicated in terms of section 234(1) of the Criminal Code. 
The section provides that everyone who drives a motor vehicle or has in his care and 
control a motor vehicle, whether it is in motion or not, while his ability to drive is 
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impaired by alcohol or drug is guilty of an offence. In terms of section 237(1)(a) of 
the Code, the accused is presumed to be in care and control of the vehicle if he is 
found occupying the driver’s seat unless he could prove on a balance of probabilities 
that he did not enter the vehicle with the intention of setting it in motion. The Court 
noted that any provision which requires an accused to prove anything in order to 
avoid conviction violated his right to the presumption of innocence. The provision 
was, however, saved by section 1 of the Charter on the basis that there was a need to 
clamp down on drunken driving. 
 
In the case of R v Downey96 the Supreme Court had to deal with a statutory 
presumption97 which provided that evidence that a person lives with or is habitually in 
the company of prostitutes is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that he 
lives on the proceeds of prostitution. This presumption was held to infringe the 
presumption of innocence. Again, the Court held it to be justifiable under the 
circumstances. Cory J summarised the position as follows: 
I – The presumption of innocence is infringed whenever the accused is liable 
to be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. 
II – If by the provisions of a statutory presumption, an accused is required to 
establish, that is to say to prove or disprove, on a balance of probabilities 
either an element of an offence or an excuse, then it contravenes s 11(d). Such 
a provision would permit a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt. 
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III – Even if a rational connection exists between the established fact and the 
fact to be presumed, this would be insufficient to make valid a presumption 
requiring the accused to disprove an element of the offence. 
IV – Legislation which substitutes proof of one element for proof of an 
essential element will not infringe the presumption of innocence if, as a result 
of the proof of the substituted element, it would be unreasonable for the trier 
of fact not to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of the 
other element. To put it another way, the statutory presumption will be valid if 
the proof of the substituted facts leads inexorably to the proof of the other. 
However, the statutory presumption will infringe s 11(d) if it requires the trier 
of fact to convict in spite of a reasonable doubt. 
V – A permissive assumption from which a trier of fact may but must not 
draw an inference of guilt will not infringe s 11(d). 
VI – A provision that might have been intended to play a minor role in 
providing relief from conviction will nonetheless contravene the Charter if the 
provision (such as the truth of a statement) must be established by the accused. 
VII – It must of course be remembered that statutory presumptions which 
infringe s 11(d) may still be justified pursuant to s 1 of the Charter.98 
 
8 6 1 4 Justification of reverse onus clauses under section 1 of the Charter 
In determining reverse onus clauses the courts have applied a two-pronged approach. 
The first question for consideration is whether the Charter has been breached. The 
second question is whether such breach is justifiable under the limitation clause.99 The 
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Court in Oakes set out two criteria that would satisfy the limitation of a Charter 
freedom under section 1. Firstly, “the objective which the measures responsible for a 
limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve must be of ‘sufficient 
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom’”.100 
Secondly, the means chosen for the limitation must be demonstrably justified. The 
second criteria involves a proportionality test which has three components. First, the 
measures adopted must be designed to achieve the objective in question. They must 
not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations but must be rationally 
connected with the objective.101 Second, the means must impair as little as possible 
the right in question.102 Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of 
the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom and the 
objective which has been identified as of sufficient importance. Thus the more severe 
the deleterious effects of the measure, the more important the objective must be if the 
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. The Court in Oakes noted that section 8 of the Narcotics Control Act fulfilled 
an important objective for the purposes of section 1 of the Charter, that objective 
being to protect the society from the ills associated with drug trafficking. However, it 
did not survive the rational connection test as possession of small amounts of drugs 
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does not satisfy an inference that the accused was trafficking.103 The Court noted that 
it will be irrational to infer on the basis that an accused had a small quantity of 
narcotics in his possession that he had an intention to traffic.  
 
In Whyte,104 the Court held that though section 237(1)(a) of the Criminal Code 
infringed the presumption of innocence, it constituted a justifiable limitation. 
According to the Court, though the section enabled a conviction in spite of a 
reasonable doubt, its objective was sufficiently important to justify the overriding of a 
constitutionally protected right. The Court further recognised that there was a rational 
connection between the fact presumed and the fact proved. It held that the impairment 
of the presumption of innocence was very limited and that parliament had restrained 
itself while responding to a pressing social problem.  
 
In R v Chaulk105 the Supreme Court held by a majority of five to one that section 
16(4) which creates a presumption of sanity, thereby requiring the accused to prove a 
defence of insanity, violates the presumption of innocence. It concluded that the 
provision constitutes a justifiable limitation. In the Court’s view, the object of section 
16(4) was to avoid the almost impossible task of the Crown disproving insanity. 
Certainly, it would be very difficult for the Crown to prove sanity.106 It was noted that 
while parliament may not have chosen from the least intrusive measure of attaining its 
objective, it had chosen from a range of means that impairs section 11 as little as 
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reasonably possible. Within this range it would be virtually impossible to know, let 
alone be sure, which means violate the Charter the least.107 Dissenting, Wilson J 
opined that though the object of the reverse onus was to keep sane people who had 
committed crimes from pretending to be insane so as to escape criminal liability, the 
Crown had not produced evidence to establish that this was a social problem that 
warranted overriding a fundamental rule of the criminal justice system.108 
 
Also in R v Downey,109 the Supreme Court found on a majority that the violation of 
the presumption of innocence by a mandatory presumption that persons living with 
prostitutes benefitted from their proceeds is a justifiable limit under section 1 as the 
provision was aimed at the cruel and social ills associated with pimping. The Court 
was also satisfied that the presumption satisfied the rational connection and 
proportionality tests as an inference that a person living with prostitutes was living on 
their proceeds was not unreasonable, and that the measure adopted was rationally 
connected to its objective.  
 
In R v Laba110 the Supreme Court held, for the first time since Oakes, that a reverse 
onus clause could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter. In that case, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of section 394(1)(b) of the Criminal Code which 
provides that anyone who sells or purchases certain precious minerals is guilty of an 
offence “…unless he establishes that he is the owner or agent of the owner or is acting 
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under lawful authority…” The Court found that this section was not justifiable under 
section 1 of the Charter unless the words “unless he establishes that” could be 
replaced by the words “in the absence of evidence which raises a reasonable 
doubt.”111 Sopinka J considered evidence that theft of precious minerals was a serious 
problem and that it was usually difficult to prove such theft. He concluded therefore 
that the provision served a sufficiently pressing and substantial purpose. Referring to 
the Oakes test, he stated that the test should be re-stated as follows: 
 
“(1) In order to be sufficiently important to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right or freedom the impugned provision must relate 
to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic 
society; 
(2) The means chosen to achieve the legislative objective must pass a three-
part proportionality test which requires that they (a) be rationally connected to 
the objective, (b) impair the right or freedom in question as little as possible 
and (c) have deleterious effects which are proportional to both their salubrious 
effects and the importance of the objective which has been identified as being 
of ‘sufficient importance’.”112 
 
Sopinka J held that the provision satisfied the rational connection test. He rejected the 
view that it was imperative that a provision be internally rational to overcome the 
hurdle of the rational connection test, though this would be a relevant factor in 
determining proportionality. He held that for the purpose of the rational connection 
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test, the only relevant matter for determination was whether the presumption is a 
logical method of meeting the objective of the legislature. The Court noted however 
that the provision did not meet the minimal impairment test as the legislative 
objective could have been satisfied by imposing an evidential burden. While 
parliament should be accorded some leeway, this was a case where the government 
could “be characterised as the singular antagonist of an individual attempting to assert 
a legal right which is fundamental to our criminal justice system.”113 The Crown had 
not demonstrated that an evidential burden would be insufficient and the provision 
was read down as an evidential burden. 
 
Canadian cases have moved away from the traditional English common law tolerance 
of onuses that require accused persons to establish certain facts on a balance of 
probabilities. Though it must be noted that the Canadian courts will in theory not 
allow a conviction where a reasonable doubt exists, the courts have often found 
justification of such clauses under its limitation clause. 
 
8 6 2 The South African approach 
Canadian law on reverse onus has greatly influenced South African law.114 A reverse 
onus clause was first considered by the South African Constitutional Court in the case 
of S v Zuma.115 In that case, the Court considered the constitutionality of section 
217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act which placed an onus on an accused to 
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establish on a balance of probabilities that a confession was involuntarily made.  
Kentridge AJ, delivering the unanimous decision of the Court, held that the 
presumption of innocence will be infringed whenever the possibility of a conviction 
existed notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable doubt. Among the foreign cases 
referred to in the judgment, the Court found Canadian cases116 particularly helpful 
because of their “persuasive reasoning”117 and because the Canadian limitation clause 
is very similar to the South African one. Since South African and Canadian legal 
principles on the presumption of innocence originate from English principles which 
were re-stated in Woolmington,118 the Court found it easy to adopt Canadian law.119 
Three principles set out by the Canadian cases were noted. First, the presumption of 
innocence is infringed if the accused may be convicted despite the existence of a 
reasonable doubt. Second, if an accused is required by a statutory provision to 
establish, either by proving or disproving, on a balance of probabilities either an 
element of an offence or an excuse, the presumption of innocence is infringed as this 
permits a conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Third, even if a 
rational connection exists between the fact proved and the facts presumed, this could 
be insufficient to make a valid presumption requiring the accused to disprove an 
element of the offence.120 The argument by the state that the presumption did not 
relate to any element of the offence was rejected. The Court held that the fact that a 
conviction could follow from the admission of a confession notwithstanding the 
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existence of a reasonable doubt as to whether it was freely and voluntarily obtained, 
was decisive. The onus of the state to prove the voluntariness of a confession was an 
integral and essential part of the accused’s right to remain silent, the right not to be 
compelled to make a confession and the right not to incriminate oneself.121 A reversal 
of the onus would therefore compromise these rights.122 Kentridge AJ further 
considered the question whether the provision could be saved by the limitation clause. 
He came to the conclusion that it could not. In so holding, he noted that the infringed 
rights were fundamental to the concept of justice and forensic fairness. The state had 
not shown that it was in practice unduly burdensome or impossible for it to discharge 
its burden. The rationale of the provision, to prevent unduly long voir dires and the 
prevention of some dishonest accused persons retracting their confessions, were in the 
Court’s opinion rather doubtful and did not justify overriding the important rights 
mentioned above.123 
 
In S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso124 the Constitutional Court held that the presumption 
contained in section 21(1)(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act which 
provided that any person found in possession of dagga exceeding 115 grams is 
presumed to be dealing in such substance unless the contrary was proved, was 
unconstitutional. O’Regan J noted that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental 
principle of South African law. Therefore, the imposition of a legal burden on the 
accused violated the Constitution. 
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In S v Coetzee and Others125 the Constitutional Court dealt with the effect of a 
statutory provision which requires the accused to prove an exemption, exception or 
defence. In that case, the Court considered section 332(5) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act which provides: 
 
“When an offence has been committed, whether by the performance of any act 
or by the failure to perform any act, for which any corporate body is or was 
liable to prosecution, any person who was, at the time of the commission of 
the offence, a director or servant of the corporate body shall be deemed to be 
guilty of the offence, unless it is proved that he did not take part in the 
commission of the offence and that he could have prevented it, and shall be 
liable to prosecution therefore, either jointly with the corporate body or apart 
therefrom, and shall on conviction be personally liable to punishment 
therefor.” 
 
Langa J held that the provision required the accused to prove an element relevant to 
the verdict and that it was irrelevant whether the section related to an element of the 
offence or an exemption. The majority rejected Kentridge AJ’s dissenting view that 
the section did not infringe the right to be presumed innocent because the legislature 
by creating a special defence in respect of which the accused bears the burden, 
mitigated the hardship the accused would have suffered had it chosen to create an 
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offence of absolute liability. Consequently, a reverse onus cannot be saved by the 
“greater includes the lesser test.”126 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its determination at the 
limitation stage. It has also been inconsistent in its determination of whether a less 
intrusive measure could have met the objectives of the legislation. It has similarly 
varied in respect of the degree of rationality required between the reverse onus clause 
and its objective.127 Whereas Canadian case law has maintained a strict theoretical 
stance against reverse onuses, in actual fact, several such provisions are saved under 
the limitation clause. The South African Constitutional Court on the other hand has 
maintained a robust approach against such clauses, often declining to find any 
justification for their existence. While the Canadian Supreme Court tends to justify 
reverse onus clauses because of pressing social demands, the South African 
Constitutional Court tends to give more credence to individual rights by insisting on 
evidence in support of their justification.128  
 
8 6 3 The Botswana approach 
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In the case of Otlhomile v The State129 the matter went on appeal from the 
magistrate’s court to the High Court. The accused had been convicted of stock theft 
under the Stock Theft Act in the magistrate’s court.130 Section 4 of the Act provides: 
 
“In any proceedings, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a 
person was found in possession of any stock or produce reasonably suspected 
of being stolen it shall be presumed that such person is guilty of an offence 
under section 3 in relation to the stock or produce concerned, and shall suffer 
the penalties provided thereunder, unless the contrary is proved.” 
 
Marumo J rejected the state’s argument that once it was established that the accused 
was in possession of the cattle, section 4 kicked in and the accused was liable for 
conviction unless he proved his innocence to the court. The judge relied on Canadian 
cases, drawing inspiration from Downey and Oakes.131 The Court emphasised that the 
presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt are 
embedded in section 10(2)(a) of the Constitution of Botswana.132 The Court set out 
the test in Downey in exact terms as was done in Zuma. The Court noted that section 
10(12)(a) of the Constitution of Botswana limits the presumption of innocence as 
guaranteed by section 10(2)(a), by permitting the legislature to enact legislation which 
imposes a burden on an accused to prove specific facts. He noted however that this 
section merely permits an evidential burden on the accused to prove certain facts and 
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does not shift the legal burden to him to prove his own innocence.133 According to the 
Court, section 4 of the Stock Theft Act clearly imposes a legal burden on the accused 
to establish his innocence upon proof of possession of stock reasonably suspected to 
be stolen. In effect, rather than being required to prove the offence to the requisite 
legal standard, the state is excused from doing so. In the Court’s view, therefore, 
section 4 “cannot fit itself into the scheme created by the plain and simple wording of 
the constitutional provision in question.”134 The Court noted that contrary to the 
fundamental principle that the state proves every element of an offence beyond 
reasonable doubt, section 4 of the Stock Theft Act permits a situation whereby upon 
proof of possession and a suspicion, the state is relieved of proving any other element 
of the offence. Instead, a legal presumption is created, placing a burden of proof on 
the accused. The Court continued: “Once the fact of possession is established, sitting 
back and awaiting proof of the other elements on the part of the accused is to almost 
certainly invite a conviction and a minimum imprisonment term of five years.”135 The 
Court recognised and adopted the dictum in Oakes that if an accused bears a burden 
of disproving an element of an offence on a balance of probabilities it would be 
possible to convict despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. For even where the 
accused raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, it “would be a doubt of little or no 
consequence, for the converse of guilt, ie innocence will not have been 
established.”136 The Court therefore concluded that the provision was unacceptable in 
light of the Constitution and consequently struck it down. 
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The judgment of Marumo J did not mark the end of the matter. The state appealed to 
the Court of Appeal where Marumo J’s decision was overturned by a unanimous 
decision of five judges.137 The Court found that there was a rational connection 
between the facts to be proved and the facts presumed. Tebbutt JP noted:  
 
“There is, I would agree, a rational connection between the facts to be proved 
and the facts presumed. There is, I find, a connection between the two in 
common experience. It would not be irrational to presume that if a person is 
found in possession of stock eg cattle or sheep of which he is not the owner 
and of which there is a reasonable suspicion that such cattle or sheep have 
been stolen, that the person in possession of it has stolen it. That would accord 
with the circumstances of life as we know them.”138  
 
The Court noted that what the prosecution should prove is that the suspicion is a 
reasonable one on the basis of an objective test. The suspicion must be founded on 
reasonable grounds objectively viewed. 
 
While agreeing that the provision imposed a legal burden on the accused, the Court 
recognised three circumstances wherein reverse onus clauses may be justified. First, a 
reverse onus may be justifiable and rational when it requires the accused to prove 
facts to which he has easy access and it would be unreasonable to require the 
prosecution to disprove. Second, where they are necessary for the prosecution of 
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certain types of offences, and third, where in terms of section 3 of the Constitution the 
presumptions are reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.139 
 
The Court proceeded to find for a justification of the provision on the basis of public 
interests. In so doing, the Court stated that cattle is “a golden thread in the economic 
fabric of Botswana…”140 It noted that in many parts of the country, particularly in 
rural areas, cattle are a person’s most valuable asset, ranking in importance with his 
dwelling and if he has one, his motor vehicle. In a country like Botswana where much 
of the economy rests on cattle and other stock, the public interest requires that the 
rights of the owners be adequately protected from those who would deprive them of 
ownership. It noted that cattle is capable of being easily stolen. It also noted the high 
incidence of stock theft in the country. Proving the offence of stock theft is difficult 
and “those guilty of such theft often in the past escaped conviction because of the 
state’s inability to prove that they did not come by suspected stolen cattle 
innocently.”141 According to the Court, the person in whose possession cattle is found 
can in fact provide facts showing that he came into possession of them innocently. It 
should ordinarily not be difficult for him to do so as such facts lie within his peculiar 
knowledge.   
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The decision of the Court marks a backward step in maintaining equality. The Court 
did not consider whether a reverse onus clause is the only and most practical step 
available to the state in combating stock theft. Surely, there are scientific methods 
available in Botswana for identifying the origins of cattle. The Court made a finding 
on the prevalence of stock theft without any statistics or other scientific evidence. The 
assertion that stock theft is at such proportions that it is a threat to the economy was 
neither demonstrated nor justified. The Court made a skewed juxtaposition of 
individual rights and the rights of cattle owners when it stated thus: 
 
“In the setting of Botswana society it is my view that in balancing the interests 
of the rights of its citizens to the protection of their ownership of cattle and 
other stock and the interests of those thought to infringe those rights to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty, the rights of the former must 
prevail.”142 
 
Such statement is surprising, coming from a judiciary that has earned the reputation of 
protecting fundamental human rights. What is unique about Botswana that justifies 
the above approach, one may ask. While cattle is a source of individual wealth and 
pride in Botswana, that does not justify a limitation of such a crucial right as the 
presumption of innocence, especially in respect of an offence that carries a statutory 
minimum five year prison sentence. The legislation is certainly harsh and has no place 
in a democratic dispensation. The Court leaves the law uncertain in respect of the 
rationalisation of reverse onuses. Though the decision of Marumo J was overturned, 
the Court merely did so by relying on public interest considerations. The Court 
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proceeded to make reference to Canadian and South African cases, but did not state 
whether it relied on the principles enunciated by the former and followed by the latter. 
Though the Court held that there was a rational connection between the proved fact 
and presumed fact, it did not make any doctrinal analysis or clear principles for the 
purposes of the law of Botswana.143 This results in uncertainty and leaves little 
guidance for future determination of reverse onus clauses. The Court’s justification of 
the clause results in a violation of a fundamental right which is important in 
maintaining the balance of equality between the prosecution and the accused. The 
rationale of placing the burden of proof on the prosecution is based on the fact that the 
state is an all powerful entity with massive and unrivalled resources to investigate 
crime and prosecute cases. The resources of the state range from manpower, 
administrative, legal, legislative and financial resources. Armed with all these 
resources, the state has access to information and is generally able to prosecute crime 
effectively. The shifting of an onus to an accused therefore further weakens his 
position in the contest. It is important therefore that the reversal of burdens should be 
discouraged in a system that upholds the values of a fair trial. 
  
8 7 Conclusion 
The Court of Appeal’s saving of the reverse onus in Othlomile, loses sight of the 
principle of equality of arms which is a fundamental feature of the adversarial system. 
The decision unhinges a central procedural feature, proof by the prosecution. The 
state is relieved of the duty to prove. A vital accused-based right and the matrix of 
modern procedural constitutionalism are washed away. The Court showed a total lack 
of faith in the modern adversarial tradition and the basic underlying value which is the 
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presumption of innocence. It instead put the interest of curbing stock theft ahead of 
the presumption of innocence, a basic and fundamental procedural right without 
which the criminal process becomes irrelevant. Clearly, there is an urgent need for 
the courts to read in the principle of equality of arms into the constitutionally 
protected presumption of innocence. Whereas the courts of Canada, South Africa and 
Botswana have failed to recognise any nexus between the presumption of innocence 
and the principle, the statement of Anderson J in the New Zealand Supreme Court144 
is significant and should form the basis of the determination of the constitutionality of 
reverse onus clauses. In his words: 
 
“Because of prosecutorial difficulty in proving a positive, an accused who 
does not have equality of arms in terms of resources, and may lack 
articulateness, is forced to carry the even heavier burden of proving a 
negative. That such negative is subjective and intangible only exacerbates the 
difficulty for an accused.”145 
 
The presumption of innocence, which places the burden of proving every elemental 
aspect of an offence on the prosecution, is a fundamental principle of modern 
constitutional and procedural theory. Any unjustified reversal of the presumption 
undermines the application of the principle of equality of arms and the right to a fair 
trial. Such reversal weakens the protection which the presumption affords to the 
accused. Up until the Otlhomile case, the courts in Botswana have followed the 
positivist approach. This is as a result of the influence of the English common law. 
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Whereas the introduction of bills of rights in Canada and South Africa had an 
immediate impact which resulted in a shift to the constitutionalist approach, Botswana 
maintained the positivist approach even though it has had a Bill of Rights since 1966. 
Perhaps this is due to the fact that the constitutionality of reverse onuses had never 
been questioned in the courts. In Otlhomile, it is interesting to note that the issue was 
raised by the judge mero motu. The results of the Otlhomile case are encouraging in 
that the recognition that a reverse onus infringes on the presumption of innocence has 
the effect of curing the great disadvantage that reverse onuses causes to the accused. 
What is disheartening however is that the Court of Appeal decided to justify the 
offending provision. Even the Court’s analysis and finding that the clause was 
unconstitutional was begrudging and cursory while most of the judgment was 
dedicated to its justification. This creates a nagging feeling that the present Court of 
Appeal will if faced with the question of constitutionality in the future will follow the 
Canadian approach of finding for invalidity but justifying the offending provision. 
There are several reverse onus clauses in the statute books of Botswana. Generally, 
such clauses are usually determined on a case by case basis. Therefore, even where 
there are successes in relation to their being struck down, many accused persons will 
still be faced with situations where they carry the risk of non-persuasion as it will take 
a lot of challenge and litigation before such provisions are determined. This does not 
augur well in maintaining the balance between the prosecution and accused, a cardinal 
demand of modern criminal jurisprudence. The presence of reverse onus clauses in 
the statute books makes everyone presumptive criminals. For example, if cattle stray 
into someone’s land, the law declares him a thief. He faces the difficulty of explaining 
that he was indifferent to the presence of the cattle, or was making a search to find the 
owner, or that he just arrived from work and found them there. Several times, the 
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explanation of the innocent is ridiculous, unbelievable, and cannot be corroborated. 
Therefore, reverse onuses, puts the entire populace in danger of being accused of an 
offence and being convicted.  
 
It must be noted that it is the accused who needs the presumption of innocence. By the 
time a case is taken to court, the stacks are against him. The prosecution has 
completed its investigation. They believe that they have reasonable prospects of 
success. The accused needs the presumption of innocence to level the playing field. 
But unfortunately, the legislature further assists the prosecution by asking the accused 
to prove something. It is the prosecution who comes with allegations and must be 
called upon to prove them. “The presumption of innocence, which is in reality not a 
presumption…is merely a statement of the prosecutions’ burden of proof.”146 The 
presumption of innocence represents the allocation of the burden of proof. The 
prosecution alleges that the accused is guilty. By taking a case to court they believe 
that they have reasonable prospects of success. This implies that they have evidence 
to substantiate their claim. Unfortunately, parliament says that the accused is 
considered guilty and must prove the contrary. If the prosecution is favoured by a 
statutory provision which reverses the burden of proof, it is inevitable that there will 
be convictions despite a reasonable doubt. Clearly, the reversal of proof is the greatest 
impediment to equality of arms. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE RIGHT TO INFORMED AND EQUAL PARTICIPATION BY THE 
ACCUSED 
9 1 Introduction 
The essential notion of a fair trial is that the parties must have an equal opportunity to 
present their cases and, in particular, that an accused should be present to take part in his 
trial and be able to comment on the evidence of the prosecution.1 The ability of the 
accused to present his case in his defence is a fundamental pillar of the principle of 
equality of arms. The cardinal rule of natural justice is audi alteram partem – let the other 
side be heard – and the extent to which the accused is procedurally able to present his 
defence, is essential to the notion of a fair trial. Conceptually, the right to adversarial 
proceedings arises from the right to be heard. The right to participate and be heard 
demands that the person against whom a decision is to be taken must be heard and must 
be given an opportunity to defend himself.2 This requires that he be given an opportunity 
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to present his evidence and arguments.3 The right to be heard assists the court in arriving 
at a value judgment.4 The accused’s case is heard and he is given an opportunity to 
influence the decision of the court.5 He may be of assistance to the court as he may have 
information which is unknown to the court.6 The right underlies the proposition that the 
accused is a subject and not an object of the proceedings.7 It plays a major factor in the 
accused’s acceptance of judgment and sentence of the court.8 
   
The accused’s right to participate in his trial consists of a number of component or cluster 
rights that are crucial to the realisation of this over-arching right. These cluster rights are 
of immediate relevance to the presentation of the accused’s case. They are all inter-
related and overlapping and tend to strengthen the accused as a courtroom adversary. 
Characteristically, they take the form of two overlapping divisions. The first is the right 
to challenge. The accused has a right to challenge the evidence of the prosecution. 
Examples of these rights are the overarching right to confrontation, the right to be present 
at the proceedings, the right to understand the proceedings and the right to cross-examine 
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prosecution witnesses. The second is the right to produce. The accused has a right to 
produce evidence in his defence. In this regard the accused has a right to testify, the right 
to call witnesses and the negative right to elect to remain silent. It must be noted however 
that these rights overlap and easily fit into both categories. The right to be tried in the 
language he understands overlaps both into the spheres of the right to confront and the 
right to produce, for the accused cannot do either if he does not understand the 
proceedings or if he cannot communicate with the court. The right to cross-examination 
also falls under the overlapping regime, since the purpose of cross-examination is to 
challenge the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and to put the version of the accused 
before the court at the earliest opportunity. 
 
Before discussing  the component rights, it must be noted that their realisation are 
dependent on a collateral and primary enabling duty which demands that the accused be 
assisted in the exercise of his procedural rights. The right is fundamental to the accused’s 
participation in the proceedings. A discussion of the enabling process is apt at this stage. 
 
9 2 The primary enabling duty and the holding-hand process 
Unless the accused is able to appreciate the procedure and legal steps involved in the 
proceedings, he cannot effectively defend himself or exercise the rights available to him. 
An accused has a right to understand criminal proceedings and basic legal steps, 
otherwise, there can be no equality between the parties and the proceedings become a 
mere formal procedure, with the accused being unable to access justice. In a situation 
where the accused is unrepresented, the duty of enabling the accused lies with the judicial 
 313
officer. Due to economic inequalities between the state and the unrepresented accused or 
even where he is represented, the courts should take a stand in lessening the inequalities 
in the court room.9 The principle of equality of arms demands that the prosecution and 
accused are procedurally equal before the court. Therefore, the court has a duty to assist 
the accused. Failure of the court to assist an unrepresented accused may render the trial 
unfair especially if the accused suffers prejudice. To this extent, it might be said that the 
unrepresented accused has a right to be assisted by the courts. 
 
9 2 1 Evidential and instrumental procedural obstacles 
Impediments to access to justice are normally discussed around issues of lack of funds to 
hire a lawyer or lack of court structures and staff, especially in rural areas. But when 
faced with the practicalities of third world countries where basic services are a luxury, the 
ability of the state to provide services like legal aid is mostly far-fetched. In such states, 
one is therefore faced with a scenario where thousands of accused persons go through the 
criminal justice system without the assistance of a lawyer. Usually, the state is legally 
bound to provide lawyers only in cases involving the capital punishment. This situation is 
compelled by the lack of resources. Even if the resources were available, the manpower 
and political will may be lacking. A situation wherein an accused is compelled to conduct 
his own defence can be compared with a situation where sick persons are required to 
diagnose their own diseases and administer self-medication. 
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A criminal trial consists of evidential and instrumental procedural processes. These 
processes may be unintelligible to the unrepresented accused. In this regard, they become 
obstacles. Evidential procedural processes directly relate to the rules governing 
presentation of evidential material in court. From the perspective of the accused, such 
processes include his ability to present his evidence fully, to present his defence fully and 
to be afforded the facilities to do so.10 Instrumental procedural processes enable the 
accused to access the courts through rules of procedure. Without knowledge of the law 
regulating the procedure, the litigant is lost and this places him at a great disadvantage 
vis-a-vis the prosecution. To bring any semblance of equality to the system, the courts are 
left with no alternative but to alert the unrepresented accused to the basic and 
fundamental rules of procedure. The unrepresented accused is in a difficult position 
basically because of his lack of knowledge of court procedure. In this regard, the courts 
have a positive duty in granting such accused persons procedural access to the courts. 
This includes explaining the procedures, and carrying the accused through them while 
also condoning their irregularities to some extent. The courts are under a duty to engage 
in a process of continuous information in relation to the accused.  
 
The accused is denied full access to the court’s system if he is unaware of and unable to 
use the basic court mechanisms. They are unintelligible to the accused. This kind of 
access is inanimate or intangible. He is not even aware of there existence and even when 
brought to his attention, he may not even know how they assist his case. Though these 
instruments are obstacles in a latent sense, they may result in a positive breach of the 
                                                 
10
 Motshwane and Others v The State [2002] 2 B.L.R. 368. 
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accused’s rights if his failure to use them results in prejudice. It can be said therefore that 
they manifest themselves in the form of rights. The court process consists of mechanisms 
that enable the litigant to access the court and follow the procedures. Initially, a litigant 
may have to file certain documents to ignite legal proceedings. Once this is done, the 
filing of a number of documents will follow. In a criminal trial, while it may not be 
necessary for the accused to file any document for simple straightforward trials, he may 
still be at a loss as to the procedural steps involved. The judicial officer therefore has a 
duty to ensure that the accused does not suffer inequality due to his lack of knowledge of 
the formal process.  
  
9 2 2 Special judicial enabling duty 
There is an emergent legal culture imposing a special duty on the court to assist the 
accused. The courts have a duty to ensure that an accused, especially when he is 
unrepresented, gets a fair trial.11 Without descending into the arena, a trend has arisen 
whereby the court assists an unrepresented accused. This is crucial in ensuring that the 
accused gets access to the court as well as promoting the principle of equality before the 
law. Access to the court involves enabling the accused to use the rules of procedure 
efficiently, failing which he might suffer unfair advantage. This requires that the accused 
be fully informed of legal rules. In South Africa, judicial assistance and the duty of the 
courts to inform accused persons of various rights appear to have constitutional 
                                                 
11
 Lesetedi and Another v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 393; Gare v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 143 (CA); 
Morobatseng and Others v The State [2003] 1 B.L.R. 466; Chanda v The State [2007] 1 B.L.R. 400 (CA); 
see also the Australian cases of  Ragg v Magistrates’ Court of  Victoria & Corcoris [2008] VSC 1; 
Tomasevic v Travagnili [2007] VSC 337. 
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backing.12 There is also a general rule of law requiring the courts to assist the 
unrepresented accused in conducting his case.13 The duty to inform the accused of his 
right to legal representation and legal aid are also constitutionalised.14 The South African 
Criminal Procedure Act15 also empowers the court to question witnesses or to subpoena 
witnesses other than those called by the parties as well as to recall witnesses. The court is 
obliged to exercise these powers if it is essential to the justice of the case and a failure to 
do so will amount to an irregularity.16 Botswana and South African case law also requires 
courts to explain to undefended accused persons certain statutory provisions,17 as well as 
unfavourable presumptions so as to enable them to give evidence to rebut such 
presumptions if they so desire.18 
                                                 
12
 S 35(3)(f) & (g) of the South African Constitution. 
13
 Steytler notes: “The court is obliged to inform the accused of some of his procedural rights and duties 
and to assist him in exercising some of those where he clearly experiences difficulty in doing so.” Steytler 
The Undefended Accused on Trial (1988) 222; Bekker “The Right to Legal Representation, Including 
Effective Assistance, for an Accused in the Criminal Justice System of South Africa” 2004 Comparative 
and International Law of Southern Africa 173 181; Meernik 2003 Judicature 315; see the Botswana cases 
of Obonetse Ngakaemang v Regina [1964-1967] B.L.R. 131; Walter Madisa v Regina [1964-1967] 
B.L.R.157; Mmopi and Another v The State [1986] B.L.R. 8; Moima v The State [1982] 1 B.L.R.112; 
Mhaladi v The State [1990] B.L.R. 168; Tsie v The State [1999] 2 B.L.R. 305; Kelebile v The State [1983] 
B.L.R. 92; see also the South African case of S v May 2005 (2) SACR 331 (SCA). 
14
 S 35 (3)(g) of the South African Constitution. 
15
 S 167 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
16
 S v Mayiya 1997 (3) BCLR 386 (C).  
17
 Gaosenkwe v The State [2001] 1 B.L.R. 324; S v Ngwani 1990 (1) SACR 449 (N). 
18
 Gare v The State supra note 11; Gaosenkwe v The State supra note 17; S v Lango 1962 (1) SA 107 (N); 
see also the Namibian case of S v Kau and Others [1993] NASC 2; 1995 NR 1. 
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The courts in Botswana have moved towards the enabling or hand-holding process. 
While there is an underlying principle of court assistance in respect of unrepresented 
accused persons,19 such assistance continues to develop piecemeal and on a case by case 
basis rather than by any positive or general rule of law. Thus, the court has a duty at the 
close of the prosecution’s case to explain the accused’s rights and options in full.20 An 
accused should be informed of his right to cross-examine, to object to the tendering of 
evidence, and of the risk of his being convicted of a lesser offence even if acquitted of the 
                                                 
19
 “When a person is on trial for a serious offence and does not have the advantage of legal representation I 
consider that it is essential that the magistrate should offer advice by way of explaining court procedure to 
such a person. An unrepresented accused is under a severe disadvantage. If he is given no assistance on 
matters of procedure that one would not necessarily expect to be known to an unrepresented accused person 
injustice could easily result.”: per Murray J in Mmopi and Another v The State supra note 13 10F-H; State v 
Ncube [2008] 1 B.L.R. 64; the court has a duty to warn an unrepresented accused of the consequences of 
asking incriminating questions in cross-examination: State v Khumo Khumo and Tumelo Gaoage CRHFT-
000019-07 (unreported). 
20
 See Obonetse Ngakaemang v Regina supra note 13; State v Rantabana and Another [1981] B.L.R. 255; 
State v Molatlhegi [1997] B.L.R. 911; Mhaladi v The State supra note 13 on failure of the court to ask the 
accused whether he intends to adduce evidence in his defence; Tshukudu v The State [2000] 1 B.L.R. 400. 
At 402G-H Dibotelo J had this to say: “In my view it is often not enough for a trial court, especially where 
an accused is not represented by counsel, merely to record that it had fully explained to the accused his 
rights without briefly recording on the record what those rights were and any such omission may be fatal to 
a conviction.”; Boniface v The State [2002] 1 B.L.R. 183; Morobatseng and Others v The State supra note 
11; where the accused is represented his attorney may perform this duty: Tsae v The State [2003] 2 B.L.R. 
55 (CA). 
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offence with which he is charged.21 Also, a court may not convict an accused on the basis 
of a guilty plea. Where an accused pleads guilty to a charge, the facts of the case must be 
presented to the accused and he must be asked whether he admits to all the elements of 
the offence.22 For instance, in a case of rape the accused should be asked if he admits to 
(a) unlawfully having had sexual intercourse with the complainant and (b) that it was 
without her consent.23 Particular care should be taken where there is a statutory defence 
to the offence. Thus, in a case of defilement the accused should not only be asked if he 
had sexual intercourse with the victim and if she was below the age of sixteen. He should 
also be asked if he admits that (a) he knew that the girl was below the age of sixteen or 
(b) that he had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was below sixteen.24 A court 
should only enter a plea of guilty when the accused admits to all the essential elements of 
the offence. If the accused disagrees with an essential element the court cannot conclude 
that his plea was unequivocal.25 Instead, a plea of not guilty should be entered and the 
matter should proceed to trial. The courts have warned that a formalistic approach should 
                                                 
21
 Ntwayame v The State [2008] 1 B.L.R. 167 (CA); State v Ncube supra note 19; Chalaome v The State 
[1986] B.L.R. 261 (CA); State v Sethunya [1986] B.L.R. 483; State v Mponda [1986] B.L.R. 286. 
22
 See Practice Direction Judicial Circular No 1 of 1975 (Conviction on an Unequivocal Plea of Guilty) 
[1984] B.L.R. 256; State v Monthopitsa [1981] B.L.R. 207; Tachipulu v The State [1987] B.L.R. 188; 
Makuni v The State [1984] B.L.R. 257; State v Maphorisa [1988] B.L.R. 65; Kolagano v The State [1992] 
B.L.R. 49; Nchindo v The State [1996] B.L.R. 927; Mmolotsi v The State [2001] 2 B.L.R. 621; Kebiditswe v 
The State [2004] 1 B.L.R. 386. 
23
 Practice Direction supra note 22. 
24
 257. 
25
 Kolagano v The State supra note 22; Ledimo v The State [1986] B.L.R. 78; Moipei v The State [1986] 
B.L.R. 14. 
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be avoided and the Practice Direction26 on recording a guilty plea need not be followed 
with exactitude.27 This procedure clearly enables the accused to understand the legal 
position28 and to participate in the proceedings as well as balancing the level of equality 
in the plea process. 
 
Also, during the course of the trial, if it appears to the court that the accused may be 
convicted of a lesser offence, he should be so informed and should be given an 
opportunity to defend himself in respect of that offence when he prepares his defence.29 
Thus in the case of State v Bareki30 it was held that on a charge of rape, where the 
complainant is alleged to have been under the age of sixteen years, if the accused is 
undefended he must be alerted that a conviction of defilement is a competent verdict and 
must be afforded the opportunity of meeting additional issues such as the age of the 
complainant if it appears that he is in danger of a conviction for defilement. It has been 
held that the accused is entitled to an acquittal if he was not advised of the special 
defence set out in section 147(5) of the Penal Code.31 
                                                 
26
 Supra note 22. 
27
 Lucas Mapiwa v The State Miscellaneous Criminal Appeal No F132 of 2001 (unreported); State v Kabelo 
[1979-1980] B.L.R. 241 242; Macheme Ncube v The State (CA) Criminal Appeal No 36 of 1998 
(unreported); see also Van Niekerk and Another v The State [1968-1970] B.L.R. 60 (CA) where an earlier, 
but similar Practice Direction was considered. 
28
 Galebonwe v The State [2002] 1 B.L.R. 46 (CA); Moshokoa v The State [1999] 1 B.L.R. 172. 
29
 Chalaome v The State supra note 21; State v Sethunya supra note 21. 
30
 [1979-1980] B.L.R. 35. 
31
 Gare v The State supra note 11; Ramabe v The State [2002] 1 B.L.R. 523; Galebonwe v The State supra 
note 28; Matlakadibe v The State [2004] 1 B.L.R. 44 (CA); Tsunke v The State [2004] 2 B.L.R. 155; 
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In the case of Rabonko v The State32 the Court was alive to the disadvantages and 
inequalities an unrepresented accused suffers in presenting his case and the attendant duty 
of the court to bridge the gap. In that case the appellant had been charged with and 
convicted of attempted rape. In fact, the evidence of the complainant was to the effect 
that he had raped her. In cross-examination his only question to her was “Did I rape 
you?”, to which she answered in the affirmative. Also to the mother of the complainant 
who testified that the complainant reported the rape to her, the appellant’s only question 
was, “Did your daughter say I raped her?” At the close of the state’s case after his rights 
had been explained to him, he stated: “[M]y defence is the medical results from the 
doctor nothing else to say.” The doctor’s opinion was that there was no evidence of 
penetration. Clearly, the accused thought that he was charged with rape. The Court noted 
that notwithstanding the clear misunderstanding on the part of the accused that he was 
charged with rape, the magistrate did not explain the real charge to the accused nor was 
the object and purpose of cross-examination explained to him. The Court proceeded to set 
out the duty of the presiding officer in relation to an unrepresented accused as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mfwazala v The State [2007] 3 B.L.R. 476; Gaosenkwe v The State supra note 17. Section 147(5) provides: 
“It shall be a sufficient defence to any charge under this section if it appears to the court before whom the 
charge is brought that the person so charged had reasonable cause to believe and did in fact believe that the 
person was of or above the age of 16 years or was such charged person’s spouse.”; In Kgopiso v The State 
[1986] B.L.R. 446, it was held that a trial court has a duty to alert an accused of self-defence on a charge of 
grievous harm. 
32
 [2006] 2 B.L.R. 166. 
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“An accused person has in terms of s 10(1) of the Constitution an entitlement to a 
fair trial. In my view, a fair trial cannot be reali[s]ed where an accused person 
does not understand the import of the criminal proceedings which he is facing nor 
have a rudimentary idea as to how not only to present his case but to conduct his 
defence by way of putting the essential elements of his defence to the prosecution 
witnesses. That there is a duty upon a presiding officer to assist an accused person 
who is unrepresented and seems not to understand the court procedures, in the 
conduct of his defence has been expressed in a number of cases…[W]here a 
magistrate fails to render advice by way of explaining court procedure to an 
unrepresented accused person who is under a severe disadvantage of failing to 
appreciate the procedure, such a failure may result in an injustice being 
occasioned.”33 
 
This case presents a classic example of the effects of inequality and the injustice caused 
as a result. But more significantly, it recognises the inequality and disadvantage suffered 
by the unrepresented accused. Indeed it is a statement of the principle of equality of arms. 
It also brings to the fore the solemnity of the duty of judicial officers as enforcers of 
equality and balance. The appellant in this case, believing that he was charged with rape, 
clearly based his defence on the fact that there was no evidence of penetration from the 
medical evidence. The Court noted that instrumental procedural processes are clearly 
                                                 
33
 168D-F; “…[I]n a contest where the undefended accused is patently unequal to the prosecution in ability 
and resources, a judicial officer, by remaining passive and allowing the prosecutor to take unfair advantage 
of the accused’s inability, sides most decidedly with the prosecution.”: Steytler  The Undefended Accused 
230. 
 322
inaccessible to accused persons. It enjoins judicial officers to assist unrepresented 
accused persons. The implications of this case and indeed the hand-holding process are 
three-fold.  
 
First, it represents a paradigm shift in the prevailing criminal procedure model. No longer 
is a strict adversarial model permissible. Certainly, not when the accused is 
unrepresented. The Court is duty bound to ensure that the accused gets a fair trial. In so 
doing, the court should ensure that he understands the proceedings by engaging him in 
the evidential and procedural processes. This duty is meant to obviate the disadvantages 
and equalities suffered by the unrepresented accused. 
 
Second, new normative values are introduced into the system. The hand-holding process 
certainly creates a new set of norms centred around the duty and role of the judicial 
officer. He becomes more engaged and drawn into the system. He is compelled to explain 
the rights of the accused at various stages in the proceedings and perhaps to continuously 
guide the accused when it appears that he is handicapped and awed by the legal process. 
In this regard, the system has embraced a new procedural order. This order is the result of 
an acknowledgement that due to his inability to appreciate complex legal procedures, the 
accused suffers a disadvantage in the criminal justice system. Effectively, a procedural 
right to informed participation in the criminal process is confirmed. 
 
Third, there is implicit countenance of the principle of equality of arms. The disadvantage 
and prejudice suffered by the unrepresented accused are recognised. This situation results 
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in unfairness. Hand-holding represents the judicial officer’s attempt to maintain the 
balance of the trial. 
 
9 3 Incidences of the right to challenge and the correlative right to produce 
9 3 1 The right to be present at his trial 
9 3 1 1 The right to confrontation 
The right to confrontation can be traced back to Roman law which required that an 
accused be given an opportunity to defend himself face to face with his accusers.34 The 
practice of bringing accusing witnesses before the accused has been practised by the 
English for centuries in a system called “altercation”.35 The right to confrontation is 
regarded as closely related to the right of the accused to be present at his trial, the right to 
present his case,36 and the right to cross-examination. As Cassim notes: “Cross-
examination is regarded as an example of confronting one’s adversary. Thus, the right to 
challenge evidence may well include the right to confrontation.”37 Confrontation gives 
the accused and the court an opportunity to observe the demeanour of witnesses as they 
                                                 
34
 Cassim “The Rights of Child Witnesses Versus the Accused’s Right to Confrontation: A Comparative 
Perspective” 2003 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 65; Cassim Meaningful 
and Informed Participation 273; see also State v Segana Ntibi supra note 2. 
35
 Cassim 2003 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 65-66; Langbein The 
Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (2005) 13-16; Cassim Meaningful and Informed Participation 274. 
36
 Cassim 2003 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 66. 
37
 Cassim 2003 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 66. 
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give evidence and to determine their credibility.38 This was echoed by Colman J in the 
South African case of S v Motlatla39 when he noted: 
 
“…[E]xcept in special circumstances which were not relevant here, every 
criminal trial shall take place, and the witnesses shall give their evidence, viva 
voce, in open court in the presence of the accused. That is a very important 
provision in our criminal law and it means more than that an accused person must 
know what the State witnesses are saying or have said about him. It means even 
more than that he shall be able to hear them saying it. There must be a 
confrontation; he must see them as they depose against him so that he can observe 
their demeanour. And they for their part must give their evidence in the face of a 
present accused.”40   
 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that the right of an accused to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses of his own is a well-recognised essential to 
due process.41 
                                                 
38
 Indeed, the accused has a right to be present and hear all the evidence led against him; Lee v Illinois 476 
U.S. 530 (1986); see Muller “The Effect of the Accusatorial System on the Child Witness” 2000 Child 
Abuse Research in South Africa 2000 13 14; O’Neil “Davis & Hammon: Redefining the Constitutional 
Right to Confrontation” 2007 Connecticut Law Review 511 513; Bekker, Geldenhuys, Joubert, Swanepoel, 
Terblanche & Van der Merwe Criminal Procedure Handbook 8 ed (2007) 82. 
39
 1975 (1) SA 814 (T); Cassim Meaningful and Informed Participation 275. 
40
 815D-F. 
41
 Chambers v Mississippi 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
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9 3 1 2 Procedural considerations 
The presence of the accused during his trial is important even where he is represented by 
an attorney. Section 178(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, provides that 
evidence shall be given in the presence of the accused, unless he conducts himself in a 
manner that makes his presence impracticable. Since the presence of the accused at his 
trial is so vital, he should be put on notice in the event that his conduct warrants his 
expulsion from court. Therefore, before an accused is ordered out of court it is desirable 
to warn him of the consequences of his conduct, namely, that if he persists in disrupting 
the proceedings he will be removed from the court and that the trial will be continued in 
his absence.42 
 
The importance of the accused being able to present his defence by giving evidence was 
highlighted in the English case of R v Cunningham.43 In that case the appellant, a male, 
was charged with inter alia defrauding the Department of Health and Social Sciences in 
that he had claimed supplementary benefit by claiming that he was a married woman with 
three children. His defence was that there had been no dishonesty as the representations 
were true. Accordingly, an application was made that he attends court dressed as a 
woman. The judge stated that he would not allow him to appear in court dressed “in a 
                                                 
42
 Mafunye v The State [1990] B.L.R. 474 476; Lekgotla v The State [1990] B.L.R. 445; Tshupo and Others 
v The State [1991] B.L.R. 230; R v Pauline 1928 TPD 643; S v Maoka 1985 (1) SA 350 (O); Cassim 2005 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 295. 
43
 1988 Criminal Law Review 543. 
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frock.”44 The appellant was not arraigned and the court entered pleas of “not guilty.” His 
counsel, assuming that the judge’s ruling meant that the appellant would not be allowed 
in court and thus would not be allowed to give evidence, cross-examined a prosecution 
witness on matters of credibility, putting previous convictions of dishonesty to him. This 
situation opened the appellant to grave embarrassment in the event that he gave evidence. 
At the close of the prosecution’s case, counsel stated that he could not call the appellant 
to give evidence because of the judge’s ruling. The judge stated that he was willing to 
reconsider his earlier ruling if the appellant wished to give evidence. He stated that he did 
not intend to shut him out from giving evidence and that he had anticipated that counsel 
would ask at the end of the prosecution case whether the ruling extended to the appellant 
giving evidence. Counsel however stated that he had conducted the defence on the basis 
that the appellant would not give evidence and that he would have conducted the matter 
differently had he anticipated that the appellant would be permitted to give evidence in a 
dress. 
 
The conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal as the trial judge did not make 
himself explicit at the start of the case when he said that he would not allow the appellant 
in the courtroom dressed in a frock. Had he considered the consequences of such a 
sweeping statement, he would have added a rider that the appellant would be permitted in 
                                                 
44
 Suggesting that the appellant wears “neutral garb”, the judge stated: “Your client can appear in this court 
appropriately dressed as a man otherwise he or she can stay in the cells. If he wants to give evidence he can 
come appropriately dressed. I am not having this court turned into a rarity show for an exhibitionist 
transvestite unless you can point to some authority from a higher court.”: R v Cunningham supra note 43 
543.  
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court to give evidence, no matter how he was dressed. The misunderstanding which arose 
had the effect of depriving the accused of his right to give evidence. The Court held that, 
so fundamental was that right that the deprivation amounted to a material irregularity.45 
 
In another English case,46 the judge imposed restrictions on the accused’s right to call 
witnesses and to address the jury due to his intolerable behaviour.  The accused defended 
himself. In the exceptional circumstances of the case, this was held justified as the 
accused’s rights had to be read in context with the judge’s obligation in ensuring a proper 
conduct of the trial as a whole. The Court noted that the right does not give the accused 
licence to behave as he likes and say what he wishes, irrespective of the impact of his 
behaviour on the proper conduct of the proceedings. The accused’s rights were not to be 
used to frustrate the course of justice. 
 
Interestingly, the European Convention does not specifically demand the presence of the 
accused at his trial.47 Article 6(3)(c) provides that the accused may defend himself in 
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing. This led to a tendency to apply 
the provision restrictively. The Commission gave a restrictive interpretation to this 
provision, stating that while it guarantees that the trial does not take place without 
adequate presentation of the case for the accused, it does not give the accused the right to 
                                                 
45
 544. 
46
 R v Morley [1988] 2 All E.R. 396. 
47
 Stavros The Guarantees for Accused Persons Under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: An Analysis of the Application of the Convention and A Comparison with other Instruments (1993) 
194. 
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determine for himself in what manner his defence will be secured. The decision as to 
which of the two alternatives should apply (that is whether the accused should defend 
himself or be represented by attorney of his choice on the one hand, or whether a lawyer 
would be appointed by the court on the other) depends on the relevant officials 
concerned.48 However, there is more progressive European jurisprudence on this issue, 
and the European Court has recognised the right of an accused to be present and take part 
at an oral adversarial trial.49 The Court has held that a trial in the absence of the accused 
will only be acceptable if the state has made diligent but unsuccessful efforts to trace 
him50 or if he has unequivocally waived such right.51 The European Court has also 
extended the accused’s right of presence to appellate proceedings. In Belziuk v Poland52 
the government argued that the public prosecutor was present at an appellate hearing not 
in his capacity as prosecutor but as “guardian of the public interest.” The Court however 
noted that the prosecutor’s submissions were directed towards having the accused’s 
appeal dismissed and his conviction upheld. It noted therefore that respect of the principle 
of equality of arms and the right to adversarial proceedings required that the appellant be 
present to contest the submissions of the prosecutor. 
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 Stavros The Guarantees 194. 
49
 Colozza v Italy (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 516; Monnell and Morris v United Kingdom (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 579; 
Zana v Turkey (1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 667; Brandstetter v Austria (1993) 15 E.H.R.R. 378. 
50
 Colozza v Italy supra note 49. 
51
 Colozza v Italy supra note 49; Albert and Le Compte v Belgium (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 533; Poitrimol v 
France (1993) 18 E.H.R.R. 130. 
52
 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 614. 
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9 3 2 The right to testify and the right to remain silent  
9 3 2 1 The right to testify 
The requirement that a person against whom an allegation is made shall be given an 
opportunity to say something in his defence, is universally engraved in every civilised 
legal system. The European Court has developed the right to be heard not just in relation 
to the principle of equality of arms, but also as a principle that the accused must be 
present and all evidence must be produced in his presence within the adversarial 
context.53 Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of Botswana provides 
that every person charged with an offence is entitled to make a defence. The court has a 
duty to explain his rights in full at the close of the prosecution’s case. The effect and 
consequences of giving evidence on oath, making an unsworn statement or remaining 
silent should be explained so that the accused makes an informed decision.54  
 
9 3 2 2 The right not to testify 
If the accused has a right to testify, then he should also be able to exercise a concomitant 
right not to testify55 without any adverse consequences. The question here is whether the 
exercise of a right to silence can be used as substantive evidence of guilt. United States 
jurisdictions are split on this issue. The United States Supreme Court in the case of 
                                                 
53
 Jackson 2005 Modern Law Review 752; Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v Spain (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 
360.  
54
 S v Makhubo 1990 (2) SACR 320 (O); “Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own 
defence, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit 
perjury.”: Harris v New York 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 
55
 Laws “Beyond Rights” 2003 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 265 274. 
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Griffin v California56 held that a prosecutor may not comment on an accused’s choice not 
to testify at his trial. It forbids an imposition of a penalty – the “penalty doctrine” – on the 
accused for relying on a constitutional privilege57 or his constitutional passive defence as 
it has been more recently described.58 Griffin has been stretched out with time. In an 
extension of this approach, judges may if defence counsel so requests, instruct juries not 
to draw an adverse inference from the accused’s failure to testify.59 Though dealing with 
the failure of the accused to testify at his trial, it has been extended to pre-trial silence.60 
The Court61 has also used a combination of the Miranda62 warnings and the penalty 
doctrine in support of its conclusion that any adverse use, whether substantive or for 
impeachment purposes, of pre-trial silence, amounts to a violation of the accused’s due 
process rights.63  
 
In the Canadian case of R v Noble64 the Supreme Court held that the failure of an accused 
to testify could not be used as evidence of guilt. The Court reasoned that if silence is 
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 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
57
 614. 
58
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treated as evidence, the accused has no alternative but to furnish evidence whether he 
desires to testify or not. It went on to state that the use of silence to establish a prima 
facie case infringes on the presumption of innocence because it actually relieves the 
prosecution of the duty to  establish a prima facie case without the assistance of the 
accused.65 The state, it is argued, should establish a prima facie case from sources other 
than the accused.66 One should note that flowing from this reasoning, the drawing of an 
inference of guilt from failure to testify will infringe on the principle of equality of arms. 
Not only does it relieve the prosecution of proof, it demands proof from the accused. The 
right of the accused not to offer any evidence and to demand proof from the prosecution 
is his greatest protection against the might of the state. Its rationality is obvious in view 
of the fact that the accused has a minimum of evidence. Without the ability to gather 
evidence, the defence of the accused is mostly a mere denial of the state’s case or the 
setting up of a defence in law. The success of the accused’s case is largely dependent on 
its success in discrediting the evidence of state witnesses rather than on his denial. The 
accused’s denial usually gains strength when the state’s case is discredited or fails to 
meet the relevant standard of proof. 
 
On the other side of the argument, the rule against self-incrimination has been criticised 
on the grounds that its historical basis is no longer relevant in present day society, that it 
is a bane in truth seeking and a shield for criminals and that its reasoning is flawed. A 
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brief excursion into the historical reason for the rule against self-incrimination begs the 
question as to its relevance in current modern society.67 It arose in response to a need to 
protect the accused from the ills of medieval inquisition in continental Europe.68 In the 
ius commune (common law) which is a combination of Roman and medieval canon laws, 
a product of twelfth century jurisprudence, the rule was developed to guard against over 
zealous officials and not as a substantive right that could be invoked by anyone facing 
prosecution or the prospects of being prosecuted.69 It was a tool to protect the private 
lives of people from officials and was not recognised as a subjective right.70 The rule 
developed against the background of extreme cruelty such as occurred in the Star 
Chamber in England which used torture to extract confessions from accused persons71 
who were, in any event, considered or presumed guilty. Ecclesiastical Courts forced the 
accused to go through the “cruel trilemma” whereby he was forced to answer questions 
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on oath and face the possibility of incriminating himself,72 committing perjury while at 
the same time condemning his soul to hell for lying under oath,73 or being held in 
contempt for failure to answer questions.74 Accused persons usually went through trial by 
ordeal in order to establish their innocence. This included trial by fire, water or poison.75 
By the time the Star Chamber and the king’s Prerogative Courts were abolished in 1641, 
their practices had become intolerable.76 This is the historical background that demanded 
the privilege against self-incrimination. Theophilopoulos77 draws a distinct evolutionary 
path between the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence. According 
to him, the origin of the privilege against self-incrimination is found in seventeenth 
century political and religious struggle against the inquisitorial use of the ex officio oath. 
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It later developed into a shield against religious and political oppression in the 
Prerogative Courts.78 The accused’s right to silence arose from the genesis of the lawyer-
centered adversarial system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.79 
 
The illogicality of the privilege is made out by the fact that it is a normal fact of life that a 
person who is accused of wrongdoing, if innocent would normally proffer a denial or an 
explanation of his innocence. It is contended that no man will make a declaration against 
himself except if it is the truth.80 In any situation, the best person in a position to know 
whether someone has committed an offence is the offender himself. The best factual 
evidence therefore emanates from the accused and its relevance cannot be downplayed in 
the process of fact finding.81 The ultimate effect of the privilege therefore is the exclusion 
of the most reliable evidence of truth which would logically emanate from the offender.82  
As Van Dijkhorst states:  
 
“It is normal for a child who has stolen a cookie to be questioned by his parent on 
its disappearance. It would be absurd if the child’s defence is that he may not be 
questioned and in any event cannot be expected to reply as this might incriminate 
him. Yet when he has stolen a bicycle this is the accepted situation vis-à-vis 
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police and court, entrenched in our Constitution. He does not even have to raise 
this defence, as the Constitution does it for him. And we do not find it absurd!”83 
 
This attitude is reflective of the Anglo-American system that is combative in nature with 
opposing sides pitched against each other in a contest and unwilling to give ground to the 
other. Therein lays the right not to cooperate with police during investigations and not to 
testify at one’s trial within the adversarial context.84 Inquisitorial systems on the other 
hand embrace the view that an accused should be liable to give evidence of his innocence 
and to cooperate with the police in clarifying issues so long as they are not forced to 
incriminate themselves.  
 
Without the court’s or counsel’s comment, the normal course of human thinking dictates 
that a juror will draw inferences from an accused’s failure to testify where the state has 
established a prima facie case. The fact remains that no constitution can change the 
human mind.85 The question that arises therefore is whether adverse comment can be 
prejudicial where a judge sits without jurors. Does the failure of the accused to testify 
really have a negative effect on the mind of a legally trained judicial officer? The rule in 
Griffin should not be read to prohibit a court sitting without a jury86 from drawing 
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inferences from the silence of the accused. In the case of Attorney-General v Moagi87 the 
Court of Appeal of Botswana reasoned that while Griffin prohibits comment on silence, it 
does not rule that silence is not evidential material against the accused.88 If it were so, the 
Court stated, the Court in Griffin would have specifically instructed the jury that they 
cannot draw any unfavourable inference from the accused’s silence. The Court was of the 
view that the rule in Griffin is inapplicable where a court sits without jurors. The Court 
further went on to state that while failure of the accused to testify should not be used to 
bolster the prosecution’s case, it cannot be treated as a non-event. In the words of Aguda 
JA: 
 
“If there is a preponderance of direct evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused 
and which calls for an answer from him, the Court must be free to draw an 
inference that he has no exculpating answer to offer. By this the accused is not 
being compelled to prove anything, the Judge is only being permitted to draw or 
not to draw any inference as a matter of human experience from the failure of the 
accused to say something in the face of a preponderance of incriminating 
evidence. Whatever might have impelled the accused to refuse to give an answer 
to such damaging evidence becomes immaterial. He must be presumed to have 
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weighed the consequences of his offering an explanation on the one hand with his 
keeping quiet knowing full well that an inference may be drawn adverse to him on 
the other, in the face of such evidence, and he must be presumed that after such 
weighing he had decided that it would be to his best interest either on advice or 
otherwise to keep quiet.”89 
 
In the same case Maisels JP rationalises the issue by distinguishing the existence of a 
right and the exercise of it as follows: 
 
“When the prosecution has not established a case calling for an answer from him 
the accused properly exercises his right not to testify. Where, however, the 
prosecution has produced evidence calling for an answer the position is different. 
Unless the accused’s silence is reasonably explicable on other grounds, it may 
point to his guilt. There is an evident distinction between the possession of a right 
(or power) albeit unquestionable, and its exercise, which may, in appropriate 
circumstances, be highly questionable, and indeed warrant the drawing of 
inferences adverse to the possessor…I do not think that, if an adverse inference is 
drawn from the failure of an accused to testify when the prosecution has adduced 
evidence which calls for an answer, that should be considered to violate the object 
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which the right not to testify is intended to achieve – that is, to protect accused 
persons from being improperly coerced to answer questions…”90 
 
A well-balanced articulation of the operation and effect of the self-incrimination rule is 
provided by the European Court in Murray v U.K.91 The Court had to determine whether 
adverse inferences drawn from the applicant’s failure to give an explanation of his 
presence at the scene and to testify at his trial rendered his trial unfair. In holding that this 
did not render the trial unfair as a whole, the Court noted three fundamental points. First, 
the trial was conducted by a professional judge sitting alone who gave an explanation for 
his decision. A different approach might be taken in a jury trial where the reasoning 
processes are unknown. Second, it would be contrary to articles 6(1) and 6(2) of the 
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European Convention to base a conviction solely on an accused’s silence or failure to 
give an explanation or testify at his trial. However, in the present case, there was other 
evidence that justified a conviction. Third, an adverse inference may be drawn in 
situations that clearly call for an explanation from him. Those inferences may be taken 
into account in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence adduced for the prosecution. 
 
In my view, the conclusion in Moagi represents the rational approach and is not 
inconsistent with the principle of equality of arms. This position does not affect the 
burden of proof nor lower the standard of proof. The burden still remains on the 
prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The trained judge is guided by the 
law and the law does not operate on presumptive and subjective suspicions or unfounded 
conclusions that would lead one to believe that the accused did not testify merely because 
he had something to hide or did not have a reasonable explanation. A judge’s duty where 
the accused exercises his constitutional right to remain silent and not to offer any 
evidence will be to assess the prima facie evidence of the prosecution and determine 
whether the state’s case matures to the required standard from which the guilt of the 
accused can be declared, in the absence of any evidence to disturb it.  
 
The fact that the state has produced sufficient evidence which calls upon the accused to 
answer the state’s case is a natural and expected consequence of a trial. The accused is 
not compelled to testify but rather is required by evidential necessity, to rebut the state’s 
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evidence. It must be noted, however, that failure of the accused to testify should only 
have evidential consequences and cannot qualify as substantive evidence of guilt.92  
 
9 3 3 The right to call and cross-examine witnesses  
9 3 3 1 The right to call witnesses 
Section 10(2)(e) of the Constitution of Botswana which is similar to article 6(3)(d) of the 
European Convention, expresses the principle of equality of arms with regard to the right 
to call witnesses as regards the prosecution and the accused.93 An accused should be 
given adequate opportunity and if need be, assistance, to call his witnesses. The 
realisation of the right to call witnesses becomes crucial when the accused is 
unrepresented, incarcerated and without resources. The accused in such a situation does 
not have sufficient resources like the state to call and bring witnesses to court. As part of 
its special duty to the unrepresented accused, the court should advise him of his right to 
call witnesses and to assist him to do so if he lacks the resources.94 In Botswana, the 
procedural provisions relating to the facilitation of the attendance of witnesses are 
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unequal in terms of financial provision. While witnesses for the state are entitled to 
payment of witness fees as a matter of course,95 witnesses of the accused are not 
necessarily entitled to payment of fees unless at the discretion of the presiding officer.96 
This results in a disparity of treatment and certainly flouts the principle of equality of 
arms as expressed in section 10(2)(e) of the Constitution.  
 
Botswana is a vast country with several scattered settlements where people live below the 
poverty line. People usually rely on public transport to travel hundreds of miles to give 
evidence. Therefore, non-payment of defence witnesses disadvantages the accused, as it 
makes it difficult for him to secure their attendance. Though section 10(2)(e) of the 
Constitution provides that an accused should be afforded facilities to obtain the 
attendance of his witnesses on the same conditions as those applying to the state, section 
10(12)(c) of the Constitution validates any law that “imposes reasonable conditions that 
must be satisfied if witnesses called to testify on behalf of an accused person are to be 
paid their expenses out of public funds.” Therefore, the inequality which the proviso to 
section 209(1), and section 209(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act creates by 
giving the judicial officer a discretion to direct the non-payment of a defence witness or 
payment of a lesser amount than the prescribed amount, can potentially survive any 
constitutional challenge. This state of affairs significantly disadvantages the accused in 
his defence. 
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European jurisprudence appears to impose a sterner duty on courts to assist an accused in 
securing witnesses. Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention guarantees the accused’s 
right to call witnesses and examine witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him. A court must take all steps within its control to ensure that a 
witness called by the accused appears in court.97 The European Court of Human Rights 
held in Bricmont v Belgium98 that a court must give reasons for not summoning a witness 
requested by the accused. This case marks the importance of the duty of courts to give 
assistance to the accused in securing his witnesses. The European Court also held that the 
principle of equality of arms was violated when a Belgian court failed to explain why it 
had rejected the accused’s request to call four witnesses.99  
 
9 3 3 2 The right to cross-examination 
The accused’s right to be given an opportunity to challenge the evidence of the 
prosecution by cross-examination, is equally important. The right to cross-examination is 
an essential element of confrontation in the adversarial system and is well grounded in 
the Botswana legal system.100 The United States Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
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gives the accused a right to confront adverse witnesses.101 The Confrontation Clause 
guarantees the presence of the accused at all stages of the trial so as to ensure effective 
cross-examination.102 This gives the accused an opportunity to test the veracity and 
credibility of witnesses while at the same time presenting his case by putting his side of 
the story to them. Presiding officers have a duty to explain the concept and purpose of 
cross-examination to unrepresented accused persons in full.103  
 
The accused should be given adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness either at 
the time he makes the allegation against him or at his trial. The European Court has found 
a breach of the Convention where the prosecution produced statements without producing 
the makers to give evidence and be cross-examined, especially where conviction was 
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based solely on the statements.104  For example in Luca v Italy105 where the accused was 
convicted of drug trafficking, the evidence was mainly based on statements made to the 
police and public prosecutor by a co-accused who refused to testify when he appeared in 
court. The Court found that the trial violated article 6 of the Convention. The Court 
observed, inter alia, that had the accused been given an opportunity to challenge the 
witness’s depositions when made or at a latter stage, article 6 would not have been 
contravened. However, if a conviction is substantially based on the deposition of a person 
whom the accused had no opportunity to examine either during the investigations or at 
trial, this will amount to a violation of article 6.106 
 
9 3 3 3 Cross-examination and hearsay evidence 
The admissibility of hearsay evidence has received judicial attention in the United States. 
The United States Supreme Court held in the case of Ohio v Roberts107 that the 
Confrontation Clause did not necessarily prohibit the use of hearsay evidence by the 
prosecution. It stated that hearsay could be admitted if it met two requirements, namely, 
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unavailability and reliability. The requirement of unavailability would be met if the 
maker was unavailable to testify at the trial. The requirement of reliability was met under 
two circumstances. First, if the statement fell within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, 
the requirement would be met without more. Second, if it did not fall within a firmly 
rooted exception, it would be admitted if it contained “particulari[s]ed guarantees of 
trustworthiness” such that cross-examination would do little to test its reliability.108  
Roberts attracted severe criticism.109 The second part of the second test was attacked as 
been uncertain and open to manipulation. It was contended that courts will simply hold 
that hearsay which they wished to admit was reliable, and that which they wished to 
exclude was unreliable.110 It was also contended that it was unsafe to assume that all 
hearsay that falls under the firmly rooted exception is reliable, thereby making the need 
of further enquiry unnecessary. The Supreme Court rejected Roberts in the case of 
Crawford v Washington,111 formulating a new test based on whether the evidence was 
“testimonial.” The Court made a distinction between “testimonial” and “non-testimonial” 
statements.112 The Court held that the admission of testimonial hearsay violates the Sixth 
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Amendment unless the maker is unavailable and the accused had had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine him, regardless of whether the evidence is considered reliable by the 
court. The Court held that the admission of hearsay evidence violates the Sixth 
Amendment because the accused would not have an opportunity to confront the out of 
court statement of the maker. Scalia J, in criticising the Roberts approach, stated that 
admitting statements deemed reliable is at odds with the right to confrontation.113  He 
traced the right of confrontation back to Roman times and noted that the Confrontation 
Clause was principally designed to guard against the civil law mode of criminal 
procedure and its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. He noted 
that the Confrontation Clause creates a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee and 
that it demands not that evidence be reliable but that reliability is tested on the crucible of 
cross-examination.114 In other words, the only means of testing reliability is that provided 
by the Constitution, being confrontation. However, non-testimonial hearsay statements 
may be admitted pursuant to the jurisdiction’s hearsay rules without violating the Sixth 
Amendment as long as the exception is considered “firmly rooted.”115 Firmly rooted 
exceptions include excited utterances, dying declarations, public records, agency 
admissions and co-conspirator statements.116 A non-testimonial statement that does not 
fall within a firmly rooted exception may still be admissible if it has “particulari[s]ed 
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guarantees of trustworthiness.”117 The trustworthiness of hearsay evidence must be 
evaluated in light of the rest of the evidence including the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the statement which makes the maker “particularly worthy of belief.”118 
 
Crawford is consistent with the majority of decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ interpretation of section 6(3)(d) of the European Convention which guarantees 
the accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses.119   
 
9 3 3 4 Cross-examination and anonymous witnesses 
The right to cross-examination can come into direct conflict with state interests in 
keeping its witnesses anonymous, as can been seen in European jurisprudence. This point 
is exemplified by two cases arising from a Dutch law that provides for the prosecution to 
keep its witnesses anonymous.120 In Doorson v Netherlands121 the Court held that the trial 
was fair even though the witness remained anonymous as he was questioned by the judge 
in the presence of counsel though not in the presence of the accused. In Van Mechelen v 
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Netherlands122 the Court held the trial unfair where the witnesses who were police 
officers remained anonymous and were questioned by the judge while defence counsel 
was in another room with only a sound link to the judge’s chambers. These cases allow 
for anonymity of witnesses in certain cases but stress the need for defence counsel to be 
present and to be able to observe the demeanour of the witnesses.123 At the same time the 
rights of the accused were curtailed in the interest of the witnesses as it was feared that 
revealing their identity would lead to reprisals against them and their families.124 The 
decision in Doorson is significant as the European Convention does not recognise rights 
of witnesses. The Court, however, took into consideration public order interests. The 
Court noted that even though the Convention does not recognise the rights of witnesses 
and victims in general, it emphasised that their life, liberty and security were at stake. The 
Court stated that contracting states should organise their criminal proceedings in such a 
way that these interests are not imperiled. The Court recognised that in appropriate 
circumstances, the principles of a fair trial require that the interests of the defence are 
balanced against those of the witnesses or victims called to testify.125 While conceding 
that the anonymity of the witnesses posed a problem for the defence, it held that the 
defence was able to ensure that all necessary questions were put to the witnesses and to 
observe their demeanour by the presence of counsel. In Van Mechelen on the other hand, 
the Court observed that the witnesses were police officers and it was part of their normal 
duties to give evidence. Further, counsel was excluded and had no opportunity to observe 
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the demeanour of the witnesses. On these grounds, it was held that the accused and 
counsel were improperly excluded from observing the demeanour of the witnesses during 
questioning. The Court also emphasised that any measure restricting the rights of the 
accused must be strictly necessary and that if a less restrictive measure can be applied, it 
should be adopted.126 
 
9 3 4 The right to make submissions 
Procureurs-General were once considered as neutral and impartial and, therefore, failure 
to give the accused an opportunity to respond to his representations to the court would 
not impugn the principle of equality of arms.127 However, the Court has noted that where 
a legal officer recommends that an application be recommended, he ceases to be neutral 
and the accused should be given an opportunity to respond to his comments.128 In 
Borgers v Belgium,129 the Court noted that the concept of a fair trial had undergone 
considerable evolution. It noted that no matter the unquestionable objectivity of the 
Avocat-General, he could not be regarded as neutral from the point of view of the parties 
in the Court of Cassation. By making submissions which were unfavourable to the 
accused, he became the accused’s opponent. There was no justification in preventing the 
accused from replying to the unfavourable submissions of the Avocat-General. The Court 
noted that the inequality was promoted by the fact that the Avocat-General participated in 
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the deliberations of the Court prior to its decision. The Court therefore held that the rights 
of the accused and equality of arms had been violated. 
 
In Bulut v Austria130 the Attorney-General had passed on undisclosed observations to the 
Supreme Court that determined the applicant’s appeal. These observations were not 
brought to the attention of the applicant. The Court noted that the Attorney-General’s 
office was the institution charged with prosecuting the applicant and that the submission 
of observations allowed the Attorney-General to take up a position which was not 
communicated and to which the applicant could not reply. The Court noted the 
importance that is attached to appearances and the increased sensitivity to the fair 
administration of justice. The Court noted that equality of arms does not depend on 
quantifiable unfairness emanating from a procedural inequality. It is for the defence to 
decide whether a submission requires a response. It is therefore unfair and a 
contravention of equality of arms for the prosecution to make a submission to the court of 
which the defence is not aware. 
 
In Botswana, section 181 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act provides that the 
prosecution and accused are entitled to address the court after all the evidence has been 
adduced. Though the courts have not articulated the right in light of the principle of 
equality of arms, it has been rigorously protected. In Walter Madisa v Regina131 the 
accused was charged with the offence of assault of a woman with whom he was 
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cohabiting and had three children. The Court concluded the evidence shortly before 
lunch. The magistrate then adjourned the matter intimating that he will give judgment 
after lunch. When the matter resumed, the magistrate proceeded to deliver the judgment 
and sentence, and informed the accused of his right to appeal. It was after this that 
defence counsel who was present right through, informed the Court that he had not been 
given an opportunity to address the Court before judgment. On appeal, the Court 
accepted defence counsel’s explanation that he misunderstood the magistrate when he 
said that he will give judgment after lunch. The Court was also of the view that counsel 
had not deliberately refrained from exercising his right only to take advantage of this 
later. The Court held that argument was desirable in this case. The Court noted that the 
magistrate relied solely on the evidence of the complainant, having discounted the 
evidence of the other witness. The Court noted that counsel in his submission could have 
commented on the credibility of the complainant. This is so as the complainant stated that 
she only realised that she was six months pregnant when she received medical 
examination after the assault, whereas she already had three children. The Court’s 
rationale clearly is based on the circumstances of the case and the fact that the accused 
might have been prejudiced.132 No recognition was made of equality or the constitutional 
right to make submissions.  
 
In Chiwaura v The State133  the Court again took the prejudice route, clearly stating that 
failure to allow the defence to address the court does not by itself vitiate the proceedings. 
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The Court however recognised that such failure is a breach of the accused’s right to fully 
present his defence. 
 
Though, the right to make submissions is recognised, an omission by the court to afford 
the accused such right will only vitiate the proceedings where the accused is 
prejudiced.134 On the other hand, should the court deliberately refuse the accused the 
opportunity even when he makes a request to submit, the trial will be rendered unfair.135 
This approach negates the right to submit as a constitutional right. Indeed, there is no 
express constitutional provision in relation to final submissions and the cases did not give 
constitutional alignment to their interpretation of section 181 of the Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence Act. In all these cases, both the prosecution and accused did not make 
submissions. It is therefore difficult to contemplate whether the courts would have 
assessed these situations on the basis of prejudice had the prosecution made submissions. 
However, failure to rationalise the right to make submissions as a constitutional right still 
gives room for the courts to assess the effect of such irregularity on the basis of prejudice. 
This approach runs contrary to the principle of equality of arms and is a result of its non-
recognition. Section 10(2)(d) of the Constitution requires that the accused be permitted to 
defend himself either in person or by a legal representative. Clearly, a recognition of 
equality of arms would permit the right to make submissions as a fundamental 
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constitutional right in line with section 10(2)(d). However, in Goletilweng v The State,136 
the Court of Appeal reversed its earlier position. The Court declared that the right of an 
accused to address a court which holds his fate in the balance is a fundamental one. In the 
Court’s view, any speculation as to what the results might have been had the accused 
addressed the court, is impermissible. An accused is entitled to a fair trial which includes 
the right to address the court. The exercise of that right is in no way dependent on the 
strength or weaknesses of the defence raised by him. The Court concluded that the fact 
that the accused was denied a right to address the court represents a fatal irregularity. 
This case ensures that in the event that the prosecution makes submissions and the 
accused as a result of some inadvertence does not, the courts will not overlook this 
transgression on the grounds that no prejudice resulted. The result of this case is that 
procedural equality between the prosecution and the accused will be effectively 
maintained. However, this position was soon to change. 
 
In Makwapeng v The State,137 the appellenat appealed to the Court of Appeal on the 
grounds that he was not called upon to make final submissions. In its head of arguments, 
the appellant relied on Goletiweng v The State. On realising that the state was capitulating 
on the basis of Goletiweng, the three judges who had been assigned to hear the appeal, 
referred the matter to the president of the Court who then empanelled a full bench of five 
judges including himself. The state also filed subsequent heads of argument, now relying 
on Moletsane. The stage for the reversal of Goletiweng was set. 
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The Court in Makwapeng, stated that the effect of Goletiweng is that, convicted persons 
who have no grounds upon which to seek their freedom on the evidence, could easily 
pounce on non-compliance of section 181 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
In the view of the Court, this served as a platform for convicted persons whose appeals 
are devoid of merit, to escape on a technicality. The Court opined: 
 
“It seems to me, at least in this country, that an ordinary member of the public 
who sat throughout a trial in a magistrate’s court and heard overwhelming 
evidence given against an accused person who refused to give any evidence or to 
make any statement whatsoever, or whose defence is obviously a lie without any 
redeeming feature, will feel disenchanted with our system of justice if he 
subsequently hears that the accused person who is convicted in his very presence 
is subsequently acquitted and discharged only because the trial magistrate forgot 
to ask him to make a speech after the conclusion of the trial when it is clear to that 
ordinary on-looker that there was nothing useful that the accused could have 
added to what was already on record. Such an ordinary citizen may well call in 
question the sense of justice of the judiciary.”138 
 
The Court noted that while the accused’s right to a fair trial was important, the interests 
of the victim and society at large should be considered. The Court held that a failure to 
comply with section 181 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act amounted to an 
irregularity. The Court held that in deciding whether to set aside the judgment following 
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such irregularity, the totality of the evidence should be considered. If the evidence 
established the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and there was nothing that he 
could have told the court that would affect the verdict, then the court should dismiss the 
appeal. In this way, Moletsane was reinstated. 
 
It must be noted that in these cases, both the state and accused did not make submissions. 
Therefore, the question as to the legal effect of one of the parties not making submissions 
has not been addressed. It appears that a genuine omission on the part of a judicial officer 
to call both parties to make submissions is of no legal consequence if the accused is not 
prejudiced. The courts have determined the issue of prejudice on the question of whether 
the submission would have affected its decision at all. It appears that this approach takes 
consideration of evidential matters only. It is submitted that if an accused raises issues 
that go to fundamental legal issues which should demand an acquittal, he may well be 
prejudiced if he is deprived of his right to make submissions. It cannot be assumed that 
the issue would subsequently be cured on appeal as not all matters go on appeal, and 
there is no automatic review of cases in Botswana. 
 
9 4 Conclusion 
While the Constitution, statutory provisions and case law do not expressly recognise the 
principle of equality of arms, the principle is incorporated in the trial process by certain 
guarantees that are available to the accused. These are expressed in the form of accused-
based rights which enable the accused to defend himself. They include the right to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses, the right to testify and the right to call witnesses. But it is 
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the express and positive application of the principle of equality of arms by the courts, that 
that will ensure the full and fair realisation of these rights. The reality of the Botswana 
criminal process is that most accused are unrepresented and uninformed. The right of the 
accused to be heard is central to the determination of equality and fairness within the 
context of the adversarial process. This essentially involves the ability and right to 
challenge the evidence of the prosecution and produce evidence in his favour on terms 
equal to those of the prosecution. The concept of a fair trial includes the right to informed 
participation by the accused. However, the unrepresented accused is procedurally 
disadvantaged. This clearly results in unfairness. Traditionally, the adversarial process is 
underlined by a passive judge who does not take control of the proceedings or solicit 
evidence. Though there are constitutional and procedural rules that guarantee that the 
accused is able to present his case, they only reflect a theoretical and conceptual promise, 
constituting a mere framework for the enjoyment and application of the principle of 
equality. The rules do not really bring the unrepresented accused in line with the 
prosecution. It is now accepted that the practical realisation of equality and the use of 
instrumental rights are impossible without the assistance of the judicial officer. 
Adversarialism involves persuasion, and instrumental procedural processes erect a barrier 
in the path of the unrepresented accused. In this regard the hand-holding process imposes 
on the judicial officer a crucial duty in assisting the accused in the context of Botswana 
where the majority of accused persons are unrepresented. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
10 1 Introduction 
This thesis has discussed the application of equality of arms in Botswana’s criminal 
process. In doing so, it has been necessary to limit the discussion to those procedural 
rights that interrelate with the principle of equality of arms. Therefore, no attempt was 
made to discuss all procedural rights in Botswana. Indeed, to argue for equality of 
arms in respect of each and every procedural right is not possible. It is clear that the 
accused is disadvantaged in the system and that the present application of section 10 
of the Constitution is insufficient to put the accused in relative equality with the state 
in order to ensure true fairness. The thesis has highlighted certain accused-based 
rights which, if applied in stricter terms, can lead to greater equality. These rights 
relate to disclosure, legal representation, confrontation, cross-examination and calling 
of witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of 
innocence.  
 
Fairness can only be attained by maintaining a balance between the prosecution and 
the accused. The prosecution has certain advantages that the accused does not. These 
include powers of investigation, a permanent team of prosecutors, access to forensic 
evidence and budgetary allocation. The state must possess these powers and resources 
if it is to maintain social order. The accused-based rights referred to earlier, 
specifically cater for some balance in the system. These rights are not meant to 
undermine the powers of the state. They are meant to provide equality, fairness and 
the protection of the accused. Unfortunately, these rights remain in a state of basic 
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application. To some extent, they remain dormant and are not effectively enforced to 
the benefit of the accused. 
 
10 2 Fair trial rights and the application of the principle of equality of arms 
While the specific rights referred to above are central to equality, they have been 
applied rather superficially. It is submitted that only a reconceptualisation and 
revitalisation of the right to a fair trial can see a meaningful enjoyment of these rights 
by accused persons in Botswana.  
 
The pre-trial stage marks the first contact between the state and a suspect. The suspect 
is, therefore, at his most vulnerable. The police possess powers of investigation. These 
powers are necessary for the detection and prevention of crime. However, if the rights 
of the individual are not protected at this stage, manifest unfairness and arbitrary use 
of powers are inevitable and can ultimately have a grave impact on trial fairness. In 
this regard, modern societies and legal systems have developed protective barriers for 
the individual. These barriers exist at the affective and effective stage of the criminal 
process.1 At the affective stage, are procedural formalities that the state has to follow 
as a condition for limiting the liberty and privacy of the suspect. In this regard, the 
police are generally required to obtain warrants which empower them to arrest and 
search.2  Time limits for detention have developed.3 The need to inform suspects of 
their rights including the right to silence is required at the time of arrest.4 These 
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procedural requirements serve to remedy the imbalances between the state and the 
suspect during the investigations. Exclusionary rules have also developed.5 The courts 
may exclude forced confessions.6  The courts may also exclude illegally obtained 
evidence if their prejudicial effect outweighs their probative value.  
 
However, these pre-trial protective measures are clearly inadequate. In Botswana, the 
accused does not have a mandatory pre-trial right to legal representation.7 This is a 
single most important requirement for securing any meaningful balance between the 
state and the suspect at the pre-trial stage. While confessions made to the police 
should be confirmed by a judicial officer, this is not really a foolproof system. The 
requirement for confirmation is meant to ensure that the confession is voluntary and 
obtained without coercion. It must be noted that it is the police who take the suspect 
to the judicial officer for confessions and this very suspect is handed back to the 
police after confession. Therefore, there is no guarantee that any threat operating in 
the mind of the suspect (including threats to make a false confession in the presence 
of a judicial officer) does not operate in his mind at the time of “confessing” to the 
judicial officer. 
 
The investigation of crime is a sole-enterprised process that is monopolised by the 
state.8 The adversarial system is interest-based.9 Investigations are conducted by the 
police with almost no judicial involvement. When the police investigate crime, their 
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intention is to build up a case that will result in a conviction. This is especially so 
when it is clear that an offence has been committed and, perhaps, a suspect identified. 
The intention is to get sufficient information to convict the suspect and not necessarily 
to find the truth.  As a result, miscarriages of justice and wrongful convictions are 
bound to occur. The suspect does not take part in the investigations.10 The state may 
seize documents, interview witnesses and obtain incriminating evidence in the 
absence of and without the participation of the suspect. The suspect has little 
knowledge of the information collected during the investigation. 11  However, the 
police may interrogate him and he is generally expected to answer questions put to 
him.  
 
The present investigative system in Botswana is police-dominated and limits the 
possibility of early judicial and prosecutorial control of the pre-trial process. However, 
as has been said, the might and coercive powers of the state during the investigation 
period is particularly recognised and countered by instruments of limitation such as 
warrants and time limits in relation to detention and exclusionary rules. In this way 
the ubiquitous and coercive nature of the state are put in check. While exclusionary 
rules serve to exclude evidence obtained by unfair means, the general rule in 
Botswana is that all relevant evidence, except confessions, is admissible no matter 
how it was obtained. It is vitally important that the accused be incorporated into the 
investigation process. Active participation of the suspect during investigations is 
required. Searches and seizures should be made in his presence when possible, and 
not only when the police require him to point out incriminating evidence. 
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There needs to be more active judicial intervention during the pre-trial process. 
Suspects should be able to approach the courts when unfair processes are resorted to 
during investigation. The courts should extend the right to legal representation to the 
pre-trial stage.  
 
Disclosure forms part of the system. The state is bound to disclose all evidence in its 
possession. In Botswana, the power to investigate crime lies with the state. Suspects 
usually do not have the resources or the power to investigate crime. Attempts by the 
accused to interview possible witnesses or obtain relevant document or other evidence 
might well be interpreted as interference with the investigation process.12 That the 
state shares its information with the suspect is a significant measure in ensuring 
equality. The fact remains that disclosure is made after the state has collected all its 
evidence and have proferred charges. Therefore, the accused is deprived of accessing 
the information at the earliest opportunity. The legislature and courts should now take 
the matter one step further by determining that suspects are able to access information, 
so far as possible, as and when obtained so that they are able to prepare for their case 
as the prosecution prepares for theirs. Whereas it might be argued that this will only 
allow the suspect to tailor and fabricate his evidence, this argument cannot really hold. 
It must be noted that disclosure is presently made after arraignment and the accused 
will still require time to prepare his case. Therefore, in the present situation, an 
accused who intends to fabricate evidence will still have the opportunity to do so. 
Fabrication can still be done even in the absence of disclosure. It must be noted also 
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that fabrication will not necessarily hold in the face of tangible evidence and the 
process of cross-examination. 
 
At the trial stage, there are rights which enable the accused to defend himself. Two of 
these rights stand out significantly. These are the right to legal representation and the 
right to be presumed innocent. Unfortunately, it is these two rights that are stifled the 
most in Botswana. While they are recognised by the Constitution and case law, their 
application is severely constrained. The right to legal representation is constrained by 
the Constitution, and by the absence of resources to support its realisation. The right 
to be presumed innocent is constrained by the fact that it is quite often taken away by 
legislation creating reverse onuses, a situation that is tolerated by a lack of judicial 
intervention.  
 
The right to legal representation at trial is guaranteed by the Constitution of Botswana. 
But like all other rights, it is an empty declaration. Not only does the constitutional 
right to legal representation fail to ensure equality of arms, it actually undermines the 
principle of equality of arms. The Constitution provides that the accused may secure 
legal representation at his own expense. It entitles the accused to legal representation 
but does not ensure that the accused gets one.13 The provision is an empty declaration 
which is unsupported by mechanisms to ensure its realisation.  
 
The state has a directorate of public prosecutions which employs full-time lawyers. 
However, several accused persons cannot afford legal representation, and are also not 
represented by legal aid lawyers. This represents grave inequalities in the system. The 
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absence of a legal aid system is of grave concern. Any legal system that fails to 
provide legal aid for accused persons, deprives them of equality before the law.14 The 
unrepresented accused is effectively denied access to the legal process and procedures. 
Forcing an unrepresented accused to face a trained prosecutor is a great injustice and 
is inconsistent with modern democratic values. The Constitution itself runs counter to 
the principle of equality of arms by expressly excluding any duty on the state to 
provide the accused with legal assistance. While the state provides legal assistance in 
respect of capital offences, this is not enough. A comprehensive legal aid system is 
desirable. It is of importance to note that the state itself derives at least two benefits 
from legal aid. First, criminal cases (and especially the complex ones) are processed 
through the courts with greater efficiency. Second, legal aid assists the state in 
legitimising the operation of the criminal justice system. The ideal system would be 
the setting up of a public defender system, which allows for the allocation of lawyers 
to assist suspects from the pre-trial investigations. It is conceded that the resources of 
Botswana are scarce and as a developing country, there are other pressing social 
demands. However, legal aid can be instituted incrementally, extending legal aid to all 
offences that attract minimum sentences.15  Indeed, there are several such offences in 
the country’s statute books. 
 
The presumption of innocence has constitutional endorsement in Botswana. The 
presumption of innocence should ensure that the burden lies with the prosecution to 
prove every element of an offence. The state has all the resources to prove offences. It 
also has sufficient time and forensic experts to analyse the evidence. The decision to 
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take a matter to court is taken by the state after it has sufficiently analysed the 
evidence. It must be assumed therefore that when charges are instituted, the state is 
satisfied that it has sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is unfortunate, 
therefore, that the courts have acquiesced to the legislation of reverse onus clauses 
which declare the accused guilty, calling upon him to prove to the contrary.16 The 
words of Anderson J in Paul Rodney Hansen v The Queen 17  cannot be 
overemphasised:  
 
“Because of prosecutorial difficulty in proving a positive, an accused who 
does not have equality of arms in terms of resources, and may lack 
articulateness, is forced to carry the even heavier burden of proving a negative. 
That such negative is subjective and intangible only exacerbates the difficulty 
for an accused.”18 
 
The legislature should refrain from casting the burden of proof on the accused. 
Otherwise, the accused is significantly disadvantaged in the articulation and 
realisation of his right to be presumed innocent, a right which is the foil of the state’s 
powers and resources to investigate crime, which the accused does not have. 
 
There are other trial rights which relate to the guarantee of equal participation by the 
accused at trial. These rights enable the accused to challenge the evidence of the state 
and to present his evidence. These rights include the right of the accused to be tried in 
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his presence, the right to testify or to remain silent, the right to call witnesses and to 
cross-examine witnesses and the right to make submissions. Because of the non-
application of the principle of equality of arms, these rights do not receive immediate 
application. They rather receive contingent application. Therefore, failure to apply 
them does not attract immediate sanction. In Botswana, sanction will depend on 
whether the accused was prejudiced as a result of their non-application. What is 
unfortunate about this approach is that the courts will not necessarily be in a position 
to know what prejudice the violation of these rights would have caused the accused. 
For example, one can only speculate what difference a cross-examination or argument 
(which did not take place) would have had on the proceedings. In determining that the 
accused was not prejudiced, the courts have mainly relied on the existence of 
overwhelming evidence against the accused. But the fact remains that the accused 
would have been deprived of exercising a constitutional right which is meant to bring 
him at par with the state. The courts have similarly held that failure to advise an 
accused of his right to legal representation will only amount to an irregularity if the 
accused was prejudiced. Again, even where the evidence is overwhelming, it is true 
that an attorney could have succeeded in tearing such evidence into shreds, which the 
accused could not do. It is well-known that in cases where lawyers have later entered 
the fray and succeeded in recalling witnesses for cross-examination, their presence 
and participation demonstrably lead to acquittals where convictions seemed probable 
or certain, had a lawyer not appeared. Therefore had the accused been informed of 
such right, he would have decided to secure the services of counsel and the results of 
the trial would have been different. It is clear, therefore, that effective application of 
the principle of equality of arms would avoid situations where the application of 
constitutional rights is contingent and not immediate. The fact that the evidence is 
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overwhelming might be because the accused is not allowed to counter it due to the 
violation of a constitutional right. It can be said, therefore, that the non-application of 
equality of arms results in an inefficient system.  
 
10 3 The inefficiencies of implicit countenance and the demand for express 
recognition 
10 3 1 Implicit countenance 
It can be seen that the concept of equality has been accepted by the courts of 
Botswana, albeit in a passive sense.19 The recognition of the might of the state and the 
fact that the accused must have a fair chance in defending himself, has been stated in 
a number of cases. These cases represent a natural response to the need for equality 
and balance in the criminal process. While there is no express recognition of the 
principle of equality of arms by the courts, there are instances of its countenance 
which naturally come into the system. In the court’s bid to ensure fair trials, 
procedural equality has naturally received recognition. It must be noted that the 
recognition of procedural equality in Botswana is mainly ensconced by a common law 
notion of fairness rather than by constitutional theoretical foundation. 20  The 
underlying tone of the courts relates more to an underlying common law of procedural 
equality based on the notion that no party should suffer procedural prejudice and that 
trials should be procedurally fair. Though there is no express constitutional 
articulation of the principle of equality of arms, section 10 has generally been 
interpreted so as to ensure that the accused is able to compete in the face of the 
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enormous resources of the state.21 The courts have given recognition to the fact that 
equality applies in relation to section 10. 22  However, this does not amount to a 
constitutional recognition of the principle.  
 
Section 10 of the Constitution creates accused-based and participation rights which 
should effectively create balance and equality. 23  The need to prevent severe 
disadvantage has been recognised by the courts, particularly in the case of the 
unrepresented accused. This duty translates to a general right of the accused to be 
assisted by the courts. This right flows from the right to confront and equal 
participation by the accused at his trial. This has resulted in the development of an 
enabling duty on the part of the judicial officer in relation to the unrepresented 
accused. In this regard, the judicial officer has a duty to explain the rights and 
procedural steps to the unrepresented accused.24 These include informing him of his 
right to call witnesses, his right to cross-examination, his right to make submissions 
and his right to legal representation. The accused should also be made aware of 
specific defences, and presumptions that are unfavourable to him.  
 
10 3 2 Express recognition 
The principle of equality of arms permits the application of section 10 as a minimum 
non-exhaustive right. In this regard, the courts may venture beyond specific rights and, 
like the European Court, develop a broader concept of fairness. Like article 6 of the 
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European Convention and article 14 of the ICCPR, section 10 of the Constitution of 
Botswana which provides for the right to a fair trial does not specifically map out the 
principle of equality of arms, except in respect of securing witnesses. However, 
European and international case law recognises this principle as part of the 
overarching notion of a fair trial. The principle is of general and not specific 
normative application. Since section 10 of the Constitution is not very dissimilar from 
article 6 of the European Convention, borrowing from European jurisprudence, the 
principle should find easy and acceptable application in the Botswana constitutional 
and legal order. Its application in the absence of any specific provision should not be 
problematic, since with consistent application in international and domestic systems, 
it can be said that the principle has gained the status of a general principle of law and 
a general principle of international procedural law. The courts in Botswana though not 
expressly recognising the principle, conduct procedural fairness in light of the 
principle.25 Its application in international jurisprudence beyond the strict provisions 
of statutory or regulatory provisions is a path for the courts of Botswana to follow. 
The application of the principle in Botswana is relevant to the accused’s right to a fair 
trial, having regard to the adversarial procedure of the system.26 In consequence, its 
application as a fundamental constitutional right rather than a guiding principle will 
strengthen the right to a fair trial in the adversarial context. It will enhance a number 
of separate rights which lie at the heart of the adversarial trial. These include the right 
to legal representation, the right to defend and participate in the proceedings and to 
call and cross-examine witnesses, the right to be presumed innocent and the right to 
be protected against self-incrimination.  
                                                 
25
 Para 4 4. 
26
 Para 3 6. 
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The principle, if expressly recognised, essentially removes the articulation and 
application of these and other rights from a state of rhetoric and theoretical analyses, 
to the practical realisation of the rights of the accused. In so doing, the principle 
translates the natural law principle expressed as audi alteram partem into reality by 
allowing its permeation into several component fair trial rights.27 Compliance with the 
principle therefore should be the minimum threshold for a trial to be considered fair 
and consistent with human rights standards.28 The words of Silver cannot be more 
appropriate: “Thus, the more direct route to ensuring balance is to accord formal 
recognition to the principle of equality of arms, a principle essential to fairness and 
effectiveness in our adversarial search for the truth.” 29  The author continues: 
“Ultimately, the Court’s lack of faith in the adversarial process undermines the 
fairness and effectiveness of the process, underscoring, in turn, the need to recognise 
an implied constitutional right to the equality of arms.”30 
 
The development and growth of human rights are not yet closed. This becomes 
evident when one considers the ever growing categories of human rights over the past 
decades. So central is equality of arms to the fairness of trial that it can no longer be 
relegated to some obscure principle. The principle represents the center-piece of 
                                                 
27
 Para 2 1; 9 1. 
28
 Negri “The Principle of ‘Equality of Arms’ and the Evolving Law of International Criminal 
Procedure” 2005 International Criminal Law Review 513 514.  
29
 Silver “Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional Right” 1990 Wisconsin 
Law Review 1007 1032. 
30
 Silver 1990 Wisconsin Law Review 1041.  
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fairness but has not been recognised as a positive procedural right.31  Though the 
principle has been recognised over and over as central to the notion of fairness, its 
non-recognition as a fundamental constitutional and procedural right is a grave 
omission.32 The principle therefore remains in a shadowy state of basic application in 
the absence of express recognition and application. In Botswana, a firm and robust 
application of the principle will certainly result in a fuller and better articulation of 
these rights. The moment equality of arms is identified as a procedural right, the 
impermissible breach thereof should have measurable consequences, like the setting 
aside of a conviction. 
 
10 4 Conclusion – Towards a more efficient system 
10 4 1 Institutional development  
The attainment of fairness is incomplete without some measure of equality. Whereas 
basic protective structures exist, there is a clear and pressing need to reconsider the 
practical difficulties faced by the accused in Botswana. Special consideration should 
be given to the fact that the majority of accused persons are indigent and 
unrepresented. Some changes to the criminal justice system are, therefore, of 
paramount importance. 
 
The demand for fairness and equality at the pre-trial stage requires that the suspect be 
integrated and incorporated into the investigation process. The fact that the state 
collects and prepares evidence well in advance of the accused gives the former an 
unfair advantage over the latter. The state’s information should be shared with the 
accused, as and when obtained. Forensic and scientific reports should be supplied to 
                                                 
31
 Para 4 6. 
32
 Para 4 6. 
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the accused as and when obtained, and not only once he is formally charged. The fact 
that information, especially scientific information is provided late in the day, limits 
the accused’s opportunity for challenge. The accused should also be able to witness 
searches and seizures, where possible. An opportunity should be created for a suspect 
to approach a court to intervene, in the event of unreasonable pre-trial and 
investigation procedures. A right to legal representation at the pre-trial stage, should 
be embraced by the courts and the Constitution.           
 
The allocation of resources is central to the attainment of equality. It is laudable that 
the state allocates significant funding for the investigation and prosecution of crime. It 
is well-known that the state allocates significant funding to the police and the Director 
of Public Prosecutions. The offices of these institutions continue to spread all over the 
country. They are provided with training, increasing manpower and modern 
equipment. That these measures have paid off in containing crime in the country, 
cannot be disputed. However, the protection of societies does not lie with the police 
alone. The police in their bid to protect the society come into contact with individuals 
in the natural course of their duties. The state is a powerful institution and the 
individual should be protected against its might and excesses. The allocation of 
funding to set up a public defender and legal aid system will serve to remedy the 
imbalances between the state and the accused. 
  
10 4 2 Legislative intervention 
While the Constitution recognises various procedural rights, their realisation remain 
in a state of flux. An unfortunate state of flux and contentment has developed. Section 
10 rights are in their basic state. Their application and normative value are stifled. 
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Without the means to enforce them, they are empty promises and meaningless 
declarations. We glorify the system and have become satisfied that the Constitution 
provides for various procedural rights and that these rights are upheld by the courts. 
However, one should not turn a blind eye to the clear inefficiencies in the system. 
These inefficiencies are clear when the state enacts reverse onus clauses, or forces the 
unrepresented accused to contend with a trained prosecutor by declining to provide 
legal aid, or accepts that legal sanction for breach of a constitutional right should 
depend on prejudice to the accused. What is clear, therefore, is that these rights 
remain muted in the absence of a recognised constitutional right to equality of arms. 
A constitutional amendment to this effect is highly desirable and should be strongly 
considered. 
 
10 4 3 Judicial intervention  
While a constitutional amendment to constitutionalise the right to equality of arms is 
desirable, it is not a precondition for its recognition by the courts. The courts should 
be bold and elevate the principle to the status of a right (as indeed, they did with 
disclosure). This will ensure that the system is responsive to the actualisation of 
constitutional procedural rights. The courts of Botswana have been alive to 
democratic traditions. They have demonstrated their ability to uphold the rights of the 
individual. However, they need to be more activist. They have failed to tackle the 
ever-increasing problem of reverse onuses. While these clauses clearly present 
dangers in that they erode the presumption of innocence, thereby weakening the 
position of the accused, they ultimately preempt unjust and unsafe convictions. The 
courts should also be bold to recognise the principle of equality of arms and 
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incorporate it in the application of procedural rights. Again, the position of Silver can 
only be reiterated here: 
 
“To ensure that the adversarial process achieves its end, the optimisation of 
the search for truth, the Supreme Court must formally recognise a new right 
designed to restore and protect the delicate balance of power between the 
prosecution and defence. As described above, the adversarial process 
functions effectively only when opposing counsel can fashion and present 
their strongest case from positions of relative equality. This equality, as 
significant as the other protections underlying the adversarial process in 
ascribing meaning to the nebulous guarantee of due process, must be extended 
formal protection.”33 
  
                                                 
33
 Silver 1990 Wisconsin Law Review 1007 1037. 
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